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ABSTRACT 
Although there is a plethora of literature on social movements in the fields of sociology 
and political science, fewer studies exist on the subject in the field of media studies, especially in 
Africa. While scholarship on the role of social media is emerging in recent years, the literature 
on the news media coverage of social movements vis-à-vis international human rights 
organizations that also have a role in shaping the discourse is absent. The aim of this project was, 
therefore, to understand the framing dynamics in the discourse around social movements by the 
international news media, local activists, international human rights organizations, and 
  
government officials. It analyzed the 2015-2016 Oromo protest movement against injustices by 
the Ethiopian government to examine: (1) the major themes highlighted by these actors, and 2) 
the framing dynamics between the actors’ frames. Qualitative framing analysis was used to 
examine texts of international news media outlets, Facebook messages of prominent Oromo 
activists, reports and statements of Human Right Watch and Amnesty International, and the 
Ethiopian government officials’ response to the protests. The findings reveal that three major 
themes—cause of the protest, government response to the protest, and call for action—
dominated the texts of the news media, activists, and human rights groups. These themes were 
framed as various political and economic grievances, violence, and third-party intervention for 
justice, respectively. The themes and frames of the news media and human rights organizations 
largely supported the themes and frames highlighted by protest activists. Similar themes were 
highlighted in the texts of the government officials but were used to counter-frame the frames of 
other actors (ex: portraying the protesters as violent). The findings have significant implications. 
They may guide democratic social movement activists in the social media age who want to 
design similar protests against authoritarian governments in an international arena. The findings 
bolster existing studies on the use of collective action framing and the relationship between news 
media and activists. Additionally, the results suggest that international human rights organization 
are also “signifying agents” engaged in creating meanings and shaping discourse about social 
movements.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
“Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa gets a silver for running – and a gold for bravery” was the title 
of a news article by the Daily Maverick published on 22 August 2016. The news story was about 
an Oromo athlete who crossed his arms above his head as he finished the marathon race at the 
2016 Rio Olympics to show solidarity with Oromo people who were protesting against the 
Ethiopian government since 12 November 2015. Allison (2016), the writer of the news article, 
described the significance of Lilesa’s action by comparing it with similar actions of only a few 
athletes in history who used sports events as a venue to bring injustices in their countries to 
global attention. He wrote: 
Whatever happens next, Lilesa himself has joined that small pantheon of athletes who 
realize that sport is about more than running and jumping and kicking a ball. It is an elite 
group that includes the likes of Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who raised their fists in 
that iconic black power salute in 1968; the Zimbabwean cricketers Andy Flower and 
Henry Olonga who wore black armbands in a match against Namibia in 2003, to 
symbolize the death of democracy in Zimbabwe; boxer Muhammad Ali, whose 
outspoken opposition to the Vietnam War cost him his titles and his fighting license. 
(para. 12).  
Ethiopia experienced a history of several consequential protests and uprisings. For 
example, the 1960 student movement played a crucial role in ending the regime of Haile Selassie 
in 1974. The civil war in northern Ethiopia that lasted decades led to the overthrow of the 
Communist regime of Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991 and cessation of Eritrea in 1993. The 
Oromo protests that started in November 2015 forced Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to 
resign on February 15, 2018. It is this latter protest in Oromia that I am studying here. 
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The recent Oromo protest is different from the previous two uprisings in Ethiopia for 
various reasons. First, unlike the first two uprisings which were bloody, Oromo protests were 
mainly peaceful. Second, the first two uprisings ended in regime change, but Oromo protests led 
to what many political commentators refer to a “soft coup d’état”—a change of leadership, not 
regime. Third, social media, which did not exist during the first two uprisings, were widely used 
by Oromo activists. Fourth, although the main protests took place in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian 
diaspora community in North America, Europe, Australia, and South Africa played a vital role in 
bringing the issue to the attention of the international community. Fifth, it got sympathy of 
international news media and human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International. These differences led me to want to investigate the communicative role 
that the international media and human rights organizations played in the dynamic between the 
protesters and the government that may help explain the outcome. 
The Oromo protests succeeded in many ways. The new government led by Prime Minster 
Abiy Ahmed introduced many political reforms. It released all political prisoners including 
politicians and journalists. It lifted a state of emergency which was in place during the protests.  
It changed the anti-terrorism law. It lifted a ban on media. For the first time in Ethiopian history, 
there is no single journalist in jail. 
This introductory chapter aims at introducing the whole project. First, it gives an overview 
of the Oromo protest movement by highlighting how it started and summarizing the main 
demands and strategies of the protesters. Then, by describing the purpose of the study, the 
chapter also states the main research questions. The chapter also explains the significance and 
scope of the study, as well as how it is organized. 
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1.1 The Oromo Protest Movement 
Since November 2015, Ethiopia experienced public uproar to the magnitude it had never 
seen before (Allo, 2016). Local activists protested across many areas of the Oromia region, the 
most populous federal state in Ethiopia. Protests started on November 12, 2015 against the 
government plan, known as the Addis Ababa Master Plan – a plan that would have expanded the 
territory of Addis Ababa, the capital city, into surrounding areas of the region (Amnesty 
International, 2015). Oromo activists, who led the protests, viewed the Master Plan as a scheme 
by government officials to displace farmers from their lands (Allo, 2016). 
Due to its magnitude and violent response from government security forces, the protests 
received significant international media attention. For example, on January 8, 2016; August 19, 
2016; and October 11, 2016, The Washington Post published editorials with titles: "Ethiopia 
silences its critics with a deadly crackdown on dissent;" "Ethiopia's regime has killed hundreds. 
Why is the West still giving it aid?" and "Ethiopia meets protests with bullets," respectively. On 
August 26, 2016, Thomson Reuters Foundation published an 11-minute documentary that 
narrates factors that triggered the protests. On August 12, 2016, Jeffrey Gettleman of the New 
York Times published a story titled: "'A Generation is Protesting’ in Ethiopia, a Long U.S. Ally." 
The protests received wide coverage on social media as well. 
The Oromo protest movement also captured the attention of different human rights 
organizations. For example, Amnesty International put out a statement that said, “prolonged 
protests over political, economic, social and cultural grievances were met with excessive force 
and lethal force by police” (Amnesty International, n.d, para. 1). It portrayed the government’s 
action as “crackdown on defenders of human rights, independent media, journalists, bloggers, 
peaceful protesters, as well as members and leaders of the political opposition” (para, 9). 
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Likewise, Human Rights Watch published several reports on how the government handled the 
protesters of the Oromo protest movement. On January 21, 2016, the United Nations human 
rights experts called on Ethiopia to stop its violent measures against protesters. The European 
Parliament condemned the disproportionate use of force against protesters by Ethiopian security 
forces. On March 9, 2017, the U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on human rights 
violations in Ethiopia (Tadias, 2017). Furthermore, many U.S. lawmakers including Al Franken, 
Amy Klobuchar, Keith Ellison, Betty McCollum, Tom Emmer, and Mike Goffman wrote letters 
to the State Department urging it to pay attention to how the government of Ethiopia was 
handling Oromo protests.  
1.2 Demands of the Protesters 
 The Oromo protest movement activists voiced a broad range of political and economic 
demands. As the trigger of the protest movement was the plan to expand the jurisdiction of Addis 
Ababa city into the territory of the Oromia region, the activists’ demand was a halt to the plan. 
They used different slogans such as “No to the Master Plan,” “The master plan is a master 
killer,” No to landgrab,” “Lafti teenya lafee keenya” [“Our land is our bone”], “Oromiyaan kan 
keenya” [“Oromia is ours”], “Didne” [“We say, no”].  Although the Ethiopian government 
claimed the plan was to provide better services and create economic opportunities, for the 
Oromos it amounted to a landgrab that could displace them from their lands (Allo, 2016; Gaffey, 
2016) 
There were also other demands including the demand for the release of opposition 
political party leaders such as Merera Gudina, Bekele Gerba, and Olbana Lellissa. As the 
government security forces also killed some protesters during the protests, they also demanded a 
halt to the killing of “innocent people”. The protesters also demanded the implementation of a 
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Constitutional provision which recognizes the “special interest” (the legal rights) of the State of 
Oromia on Addis Ababa City. Article 49/5 of the Ethiopian Constitution says:  
The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of 
social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as 
joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of 
Oromia shall be respected. Particulars shall be determined by law. (pp: 104-105). 
The protesters used slogans such as “Finfinneen handhurra keenya” [“Addis Ababa is our 
navel”], “Finfinneen kan keenya} [“Addis Ababa is ours”]. However, when the death of many 
protesters was reported, protesters changed their demand to the end to the regime. They used 
slogans such as “down down woyanne.” Woyaane refers to Tigray People’s Liberation Force 
(TPLF), a member party of the four-party coalition that rules the country. The protests mainly 
aimed against TPLF as they believe it dominates all other parties in the ruling coalition. 
1.3 Protesters’ Strategies   
Oromo activists expressed their demands in different ways. Some took to social media, 
especially Facebook to post news, views, and analysis on the protests. Others gave interviews to 
international news media outlets such as Aljazeera, BBC, the Voice of America (VOA), Deutsch 
Welle (DW), PBS, NPR, and diaspora-based Ethiopian media such as Oromia Media Network 
(OMN) and the Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT).   
Activists both at home and in the Diaspora also engaged in different forms of activism. 
Singers released new songs; poets composed poems; artists drew pictures; religious leaders 
condemned the government and prayed for the souls of those who died; and women challenged 
men for not doing enough to fight the government. Oromo activists also organized rallies and 
demonstrations in different places. Those in Ethiopia used streets, schools, religious gathering 
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places, and funerals to protest against the government. Those in the diaspora protested in front of 
the State Department and White House in the U.S. while those in the United Kingdom and 
Australia protested in front of the office of the prime minister and parliament respectively. To get 
media attention, they also demonstrated in front of CNN’s head office in Atlanta and the BBC 
office in London.   
August 21, 2016 marked a turning point in the history of Oromo protests when Feyissa 
Lilesa, an athlete, crossed his arms above his head—a symbol of resistance—at the 2016 Rio 
Olympics as he finished second in a marathon race. Many international media, curious about the 
meaning of his symbol, went even further to cover about Ethiopia in general, and Oromo protests 
in particular. Lilessa told BBC on August 21, 2016 that he used the international stage to tell the 
international community that, "‘The Ethiopian government is killing my people, so I stand with 
all protests anywhere as Oromo is my tribe . . . I raised my hands to support with the Oromo 
protest.'" (para. 5).  
As the intensity of the protests increased and received the attention of the international 
media and international human rights organizations, the government heeded some of the 
demands. For example, on January 13, 2016, it announced the cancellation of the Addis Ababa 
Master Plan, which had triggered the initial protests on November 12, 2015 (BBC Africa, 2016). 
In his speech to the parliament on October 10, 2016, Mulatu Teshome, the president of Ethiopia, 
told lawmakers of his government’s plan to solve the issue of the State of Oromia’s special 
interest in Addis Ababa city, another key demand of the protesters. The government also put out 
official statements promising a broad range of both political and economic reforms to answer the 
grievances of the protesters. However, the protesters did not trust the government’s promises, so 
they called for regime change.    
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1.4 Purpose of the Study 
The story of Oromo protest movement summarized in the preceding paragraphs may raise 
many fundamental questions that go beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, given the 
intensity of the protest and the attention it received from the international community—both the 
international news media and international activist organizations—two questions warrant close 
attention. First, how did the news media and other actors (human rights groups and government 
officials) frame the Oromo protest movement, in response to the package of grievances outlined 
by Oromo activists that were designed to motivate collective action? Furthermore, what were the 
framing dynamics among these actors in terms of posing similar and competing themes 
regarding the protest? 
The goal of this project was to discover the frames highlighted by the news media and 
non-media actors (Oromo protesters, international human rights organizations, and Ethiopian 
government officials). To this end, it sought to answer the following research questions about the 
Oromo protest: 
RQ1. What were the major themes of the international news media on the Oromo protest 
movement? How did they frame those themes? 
RQ2.  What were the major themes of the messages of the key Oromo activists? How did 
they frame those themes? 
RQ3. What were the major themes highlighted by international human rights 
organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International)? How did they 
frame those themes? 
RQ4. What were the major themes of the Ethiopian government officials’ response to the 
protest? How did they frame those themes? 
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RQ5. How did the international news media frames compare with the frames of other 
actors (activists, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian government officials), 
especially in terms of reflecting the Oromo activists’ frames on the protests?  
1.5 Justification and Significance of the Study 
Scholars have studied the link between the news media and social movements. One of the 
areas that attracted the attention of scholars has been the role of the news media on social 
movements. The news media has the power to shape social events including social movements 
(Tim, 1996). They cover the existence of social movements; create the conditions for collective 
action; and provide definitions and interpretations on issues (Klandermans, 2014). They frame 
issues to promote some aspects of the reality (Entman, 1993).  
Another area that attracted attention is the interdependency between the news media and 
social movements. For example, Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) have long argued that social 
movements and the news media depend on each other, although they also stressed that the former 
depends on the latter more so than the reverse. Social movement activists need the media to pass 
their message across to their constituent members (mobilization), to create the impression that 
the world is watching them (validation) and enlarge to the size of their protests (scope 
enlargement) (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). According to Gamson and Wolfsfeld, the media-
social movement relationship is also characterized by a “struggle over framing” (p. 18).  
This project is significant for different reasons. First, it focuses on the protests in Ethiopia 
which makes it unique in many ways. Although there were many movements in Ethiopia such as 
the student movements of the 1960s and the peasant uprisings of the 1950s, no study has yet 
looked at the international news media coverage of social movements in Ethiopia. The 
movements in Ethiopia and most African countries are different from the movements in most 
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western countries in that they take place under authoritarian regimes where violent response to 
suppress the protests has been the norm. Even from African countries, Ethiopia’s case is different 
in that most social movements in Africa focused on the anti-colonization movement (Larmer, 
2010), which Ethiopia did not experience, as it is the only African country that did not fall under 
colonization. According to Larmer (2010), even those social movements studied in Africa used 
the political science approach to understand the change in politics, rather than the discourse 
surrounding them.  
Second, unlike many studies that looked into one or two actors (for example, the news 
media or protests), this project analyzes the frames of more actors (the news media, the anti-
government movement itself, government officials, and human rights organizations) to further 
our understanding of social movements in general and the Oromo protest movement in 
particular. It helps us to understand the dynamics of the frames of these actors all discussing and 
constructing meanings on the same topic from different perspectives. Including the frames of 
international human rights organizations—the actors involved in the discourse of the movement 
but who do not receive enough scholarly attention—make this project more comprehensive and 
unique from other studies.  
The findings of this project can make several contributions. By explaining how 
movements change their grievances into collective action through the framing process, it will 
further our understanding of social movements in general and the Oromo protest movement in 
particular. By comparing frames of more actors, some of which did not tend to receive scholars’ 
attention (e.g., frames of human rights organizations), the findings may also shed light on the 
dynamics among the frames of different actors related to a democratization protest. The findings 
might also serve as a stepping stone, or become an additional resource, for scholars who want to 
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conduct further studies on the framing of social protest movements from a variety of primary 
actors/stakeholders’ standpoints. Practically, the findings may help government officials and 
social entrepreneurs to have a better understanding of how activists use media to air their 
grievances, especially in the context of anti-government protests in authoritarian regimes. 
1.6 The Scope of the Study 
Different aspects of social movements and media could be studied, but the focus of this 
project was on the framing of the major themes only. It did not focus, for example, on the type of 
media the protesters used, how they used them, and why, or their motivations for selecting 
different media. It instead focused on messages and how those messages were framed. Also, as 
this project aims mainly at understanding collective action frames and frames of different actors, 
not their impact, it did not do audience analysis, nor did it fully assess achievement of goals by 
movement actors.  
Although the protests in Ethiopia were not limited to only the Oromia region—it also 
covered the Amhara region—the focus of this project was on the protests in Oromia only. The 
protests in these states have different causes and questions. While the immediate cause of the 
protests in Oromia was the expansion of a capital city into the lands owned by Oromos, those in 
the Amhara region were caused by the detention of the Wolkayit Committee. Because of 
cultural, linguistic, and historical differences between people in these regions, their questions 
were also different. Also, due to its long duration and intensity of the protests, the Oromo 
protests received more media attention than those in the Amhara region.  
This project analyzed documents/texts only. It analyzed texts of Facebook posts of the 
key Oromo activists, news media, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian government officials.  
The detailed description of the data and selection process are in chapter three.  
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As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Oromo protest movement has achieved 
its major goals such as cancellation of the Masterplan, change of the government (leadership, not 
regime), the release of the political prisoners, lifting of the ban on the media, cancellation of the 
Anti-Terrorism Law, etc. The goals they achieved include the change of government, the 
cancellation of the master plan that triggered the protests, release of political prisoners, and 
promise on political reforms. So, this project analyzed materials produced around big events 
such as the August 6, 2016 "Grand Oromia Rally," and the Irreecha event of October 2016, and 
August 21-Rio Olympics, where athlete Feyisa Lilesa raised his hands above his head to protest. 
So, the result of this project may not explain the frames developed throughout the entire protest 
movement and their evolution over the years, but it captures the most significant and 
newsworthy events of the protest movement.   
Lastly, the project used a qualitative approach aimed at understanding a particular issue, 
how the Oromo protest movement was framed.  So, the result cannot be generalized to all 
movements in the world, different movements in Ethiopia, or even to Oromo protests that 
happened many years back.  
1.7 Author’s Perspective 
My interest in conducting this project comes in part out of my familiarity with the politics 
of Ethiopia in general and of the Oromo people in particular. I am a member of the Oromo 
society who was born and grew up in Oromia, Ethiopia. Hence, I not only know the Oromo 
language and culture, I also closely follow issues related to Oromo politics. I am also a long-time 
friend of some of the activists who were the leaders of the Oromo protest movement. I take my 
familiarity with the Oromo people—language, culture, and politics—as an asset to successfully 
carry out this project. My knowledge of the language and culture helps me to understand the 
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nuances of the Oromo protest movement’s demands, frames, and discourse. However, even 
though I am supportive of the protesters’ struggles for democracy and human rights in this 
authoritarian regime, I had no agenda for this project other than to gain a better understanding of 
the protest framing dynamics to contribute to media studies and social movement studies. As 
such, I strived to accurately and fairly describe all players involved.  
1.8 Organization of the Dissertation  
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters including the introductory and conclusion 
chapters. Chapters two through eight are organized as follows:  
Chapter two provides a discussion of the relevant literature. It starts by giving a historical 
context to the Oromo protest movement, especially the political dynamics in Ethiopia that might 
also have a bearing on the current Oromo protest movement. Then it presents the summary of the 
literature on social movements and scholarly perspectives on how to study them, especially on 
theories of collective behaviors, resource mobilization, political processes, and framing.  It then 
discusses available literature on the link between media (both traditional and social media) and 
social movements. The chapter presents scholarly perspectives on issue framing dynamics 
between social movements and government officials.  
Chapter three discusses the methods. It has two main sections: the data and procedures. 
The first section describes all the data used for this project. It explains justifications of why they 
are essential to carry out this project. The second section discusses the procedures—description 
of the steps used to collect and analyze the data.  
Chapters four through seven constitute the vital part of the dissertation: analysis of the 
data. Chapter four analyzes the data from the news media. It discusses all the major themes, and 
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the frames that emerged from the data. Chapters five, six, and seven present the results of data 
analysis from Oromo activists, human rights groups, and government officials respectively.   
The last chapter (chapter 8) is the conclusion of the study which provides the summary 
and interpretation of the findings. This chapter also discusses the results and their implication by 
connecting findings to existing literature. After explaining the limitations of the study, the 
chapter concludes by suggesting future areas of research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews literature that focuses on areas relevant to this project. The chapter 
has five major sections. The first part gives background information and historical context that 
gave rise to the Oromo people’s protest. The second section deals with the literature on social 
movements and framing. It reviews the literature on the link between social movements and the 
media. The third section of this chapter gives a summary of scholarly work on foreign media and 
democratization. Mainly, it pays attention to the role of international media within the 
democratization in undemocratic countries. The fourth section looks at the major theories of 
international relations and the role of media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like 
human rights groups.  After discussing the literature on framing and counter-framing by 
government officials in the fifth section, the chapter previews the research questions and gives a 
summary to segue to the methods section.  
2.2 Overview of Ethiopia and the Oromo People  
Ethiopia is a multi-cultural country in East Africa. It has more than 80 different ethnic 
and linguistic groups. Out of this, the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigray constitute 34.4%, 
27%, 6.2%, and 6.1% of the population respectively (The World Factbook, 2018). The major 
languages are Afaan Oromo, Amharic, Somali, and Tigrigna spoken by 33.8%, 29.3%, 6.2%, and 
5.9% of the population respectively (The World Factbook, 5 September 2018).   
Although a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-linguistic country, Ethiopia was 
created as an “empire state” (Keller, 1995, p. 622). The creation of the modern Ethiopian state 
began in the second half of the nineteenth century by emperors Tewodros (1855-1868) and 
Yohannes (1872-89) and consolidated by Menelik (1889-1913). These emperors tried to 
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construct a nation-state with a single Ethiopian national identity dominated by the Amharic 
language and the Amhara culture. The Communist military government of Mengistu 
Hailemariam which ruled from 1974-1991 also attempted to keep the Ethiopian nationalism 
intact (Keller, 1995).  
However, after the end of the long imperial rule of Emperor Haile Selassie from 1930-
1974, a question for self-determination by different ethnic groups emerged and led to the rise of 
ethnic nationalism (Keller, 1995). The question of nations and nationalities is associated with 
“controversies regarding the legitimacy of those in power and their policies” (Joireman, 1997, p. 
388). According to Joireman (1997), Ethiopian regimes before 1991 tried to downplay the issue 
of ethnicity” in order to “foster pan-Ethiopianist feeling and breakdown the opposition posed by 
organized ethnic groups” (p. 388).  
However, the attempt to create a single national identity was unsuccessful as the question 
of self-determination was also highlighted during the Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s. 
Two of the major issues raised by the Ethiopian student movement were, among other things, the 
self-determination of nations and nationalities and land rights with a slogan, “land to the tiller” 
(Joireman, 1997, p. 389). While the question of the right to self-determination of nations and 
nationalities was addressed in the current Constitution of the country, i.e., Article 39, the demand 
for land rights was also tackled by the Communist regime of Mengistu Hailemariam that came to 
power in 1974.  
The Oromo people are known for their traditional institution called the Gadaa system. 
According to Legesse (2000), Gadaa is a “system of generation [sic] classes that succeed each 
other every eight years in assuming political, military, judicial, legislative and ritual 
responsibilities” (p. 104). The Oromos consider the Gadaa system as “a classic example of a 
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traditional African form of democracy” (Keller, 1995, p. 624). Like the modern democracy, it 
has the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government (Keller, 1995). However, 
the Oromo Gadaa system declined especially after the mid-nineteenth century due to the 
expansion of religion (Islam and Christianity) and a ban on it by the Amhara dominated Ethiopia 
(Keller, 1995). 
The Oromo people consider the imperial rule between 1855-1974 as a colonial rule 
(Keller, 1995).  This conception is due to “its coincidence with the European scramble for Africa 
and the creation of nation-states based on external models” (Keller, 1995, p. 625). During this 
time, they experienced different forms of political and economic suppression: they were forced 
to share their produce with the ruling class, mainly the Amharas; and were forced to change their 
traditional religions to Christianity (Keller, 1995). They also faced economic subjugations under 
imperial Ethiopia. As Keller wrote:  
In the distribution of scarce resources, their needs were considered secondary to those of 
the dominant Amhara groups as a matter of course, despite their great contribution as 
regards Ethiopia’s chief export crops: coffee, oil seeds, hides, and skins. All Oromo areas 
had become crown lands as a result of conquest and were used by the Emperor to reward 
or remunerate those in his service in the periphery. Moreover, peasants and pastoralists 
alike were saddled with a heavy cash tax burden in an economy that had yet become 
market-oriented. After 1855, they found themselves subjects of Amhara overlordship in a 
world that was now organizing itself along the lines of nation-states with permanent and 
inviolable geographic boundaries. (p. 626).  
The subjugation of the Oromo people under the Amhara elites led to the development of 
sense of the Oromo ethnic identity (Keller, 1995), which also led to the rise of Oromo social 
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movements (Jalata, 1995). According to Jalata, the growing sense of Oromo nationalism is 
linked to the realization of the political, economic, and cultural exploitation by the Ethiopian 
ruling class. Jalata (1995) described this exploitation as: 
The Ethiopian colonial state created a leadership vacuum in Oromo society by destroying 
a cultural and political leadership during its colonial expansion. It also delayed the 
development of an Oromo national leadership by denying the Oromo opportunities 
essential for developing an educated and Organized leadership. The division of power 
have been ethnized and almost all Oromos and other colonized peoples were limited to 
agricultural activities. Educational opportunities have been mainly provided for children 
of the Ethiopian rulers in order to perpetuate Amhara-Tigrayan dominance. (p. 169).  
The perception of political, economic, and cultural marginalization prompted educated 
Oromos to create an organized movement in the 1960s such as the Mecha-Tulema self-help 
organization in 1965. The Mecha-Tulema organization was founded by Oromos who demanded 
fair share for their nation (Keller, 1995). Keller also noted that “by the mid-1960s, Oromo 
intellectuals were demanding first-class citizenship” (p. 627).  
The establishment of the Mecha-Tulema was regarded as significant. According to Keller 
(1995), it sent three major signals to the Ethiopian government: 1) assimilation of the Oromo was 
not successful; 2) Oromo elites preferred self-determination to multi-ethnic Ethiopian nation-
state, and 3) it was impossible to suppress the sentiments of the Oromo nation by banning 
political parties. On the other hand, it strengthened the sense of Oromo nationalism. As Keller 
(1995) pointed out, “the movement sensitized the Oromo to the importance of their own national 
culture as well as to the contradictions in the emerging politico-economic system” (p. 628).  
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The Oromo people’s political movement is also shaped by their narrations of experience 
(Levine, 2007). Levine classified the Oromo people’s narratives of their experience into three 
types: The Traditionalist, The Colonialist, and The Ethiopianist narratives. The Traditionalist 
narrative, according to Levine, is rooted in Oromo people’s key institutions, the Gadaa system. 
Levine summarized the core of this narrative by saying: 
It identifies Oromo culture-bearers as carrying a distinctive legacy of important sacred 
values. It enjoins a course of action directed at sustaining and strengthening whatever can 
be preserved of the traditional institutions of the Oromo Gadaa system. Toward that end 
they should maintain a certain distance from the political center of the Ethiopian nation.  
They should do whatever can be done to resist the alienation of their land, and to promote 
the survival and rebirth of the herds so important to their traditional lifestyle. (p. 59).  
The Colonialist narrative highlights the subdual of the Oromo people’s glorious 
experience and the people who promote it. It “identifies the Oromo experience as essentially one 
of victims of a century-and-a-half of unrelieved subjugation” (Levine, 2007, p. 59). It challenges 
the “Ethiopian national center” and encourages “a struggle to ensure adequate representation in 
the Ethiopian Parliament and in the federal bureaucracy, and to maximize full and genuine 
autonomy for the Oromia region (p. 59). 
The Ethiopianist Narrative, however, “identifies the Oromo as participants in a five-
century [since 15th C] process in which diverse[sic] interacted to form a multiethnic national 
society” (Levine, 2007, p. 60). It sees the Oromo expansions during the 16th century as 
promoting “the process of building a modern multiethnic national state” (p. 55). According to 
Levine, Oromo values such as “adoption, assimilation, and intermarriage” helped in the process 
where “Oromo settlers blended readily with the peoples living in the areas that they penetrated” 
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(p. 55). This emphasizes that Oromos participated in the nation building after the late 6th century 
(Levine, 2007).   
As discussed in this section, the Oromo people have struggled for their political, 
economic, and cultural rights for decades. The previous regime of Mengistu Hailemariam 
addressed their question for land rights. The current government has answered their question of 
culture such as language use. But still, the Oromo people’s struggle against the Ethiopian 
government has not stopped. However, the latest protest that started in 2015 has attracted global 
media attention, as outlined in the introduction chapter. The next section provides a review of 
literature on social movements and the link between social movements and media.   
2.3 Overview of Social Movement Literature 
According to Grossley (2002), several definitions of the term social movements have 
been offered, however, "all of them are problematic" (p. 2). Grossley stated that one problem 
relates to either defining it too broadly "such that they include phenomena which we would not 
wish to call social movements" or defining it too narrowly (p. 2).  Another problem, according to 
Grossley, has to do with the ambiguity of words used to describe social movements which need 
definition themselves.  
According to Eyerman (2005), social movements refer to a "form of acting in public" and 
politically motivated performances (p. 43). Eyerman also pointed out that emotions play a vital 
role in communicating movement messages. Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004), on the other hand, 
provided the following broad definition: 
Social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of 
organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the 
purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or 
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culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they 
are a part. (p. 11).  
Common to these definitions is collectivity and goal-orientedness (to support or to oppose a 
change) and action. So, my definition of Oromo protest movement refers to the actions taken, 
and campaigns held by Oromo activists both online and offline to oppose the Ethiopian 
government policies.   
The literature on social movements provides different explanations on why social 
movements occur. For example, theories of collective behavior link social movements with 
"significant social and cultural breakdowns" (Morris, 2000, p. 445). Morris said that social 
movements, according to this view, are phenomena characterized by spontaneity, lack of 
organization and structure, and lack of any connection with institutions and organization. Social 
movements historically were characterized by "emotions and irrational ideologies" which play a 
key role as movements "occurred in highly charged contexts characterized by mass enthusiasm, 
collective excitement, rumor, social contagion, and mass hysteria" (p.445). However, this 
approach was criticized for focusing on individual psychology rather than political and 
organizational factors (Oliver & Johnson, 2005). It was also criticized for ignoring agency and 
agency-producing mechanisms such as "social organizations, strategizing, reasoning, analysis, 
and rationality" (Morris, 2000, p.445). 
Another approach to the study of social movement is the resource mobilization approach. 
Contrary to theories of collective behavior, the resource mobilization approach regarded social 
movements as "normal, rational, political challenges by aggrieved groups" (Buechler, 2011, p. 
111). Resource mobilization theory links origins of social movements to resources (Sen & Avci, 
2016). According to McCarthy and Zald (2001), four core assumptions characterize this theory: 
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its emphasis on resources; its view of social movements as normal behavior; its assumption 
about sources of resources; and its emphasis on the role of media. Resources include money, 
energy, and time (McCarthy & Zald, 2001). This theory also views social movements as "normal 
behavior emerging out of biographical circumstances, social supports, and immediate life 
situations" (p. 535). Proponents of resource mobilization theory also argue that the sources of 
resources are larger society, governmental and non-governmental institutions, and groups" (p. 
535). For proponents of this theory, media play a major role in "mediating between the 
movement and bystander publics" (p.535). In other words, resource mobilization theory argues 
that individuals mobilize resources to alleviate their grievances (Sen & Avci, 2016).  However, 
this theory was challenged for too much focus on resources as a key factor, as social movements 
may occur even in the absence of enough resources, especially money (Sen & Avci, 2016). It 
was also challenged by social psychologists for ignoring the issue of social construction of 
reality (Oliver & Johnson, 2005). 
Another theory of social movements is political process theory. This theory emphasizes 
the interaction between activists and mainstream institutional politics (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; 
Sen & Avci, 2016). Its core assumption is that a social movement is determined by “exogenous 
factors” which “enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particulars sorts of claims to be 
advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for 
movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, pp: 
1457- 1458). It also views a social movement "as a type of political movement" the origins of 
which is based on "the availability of political opportunities" (Sen & Avci, 2016, p.127).  In 
other words, "the relationship between challengers and political systems is placed at the center of 
analysis because the political system determines whether movements are able to develop in the 
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first place" (Morris, 2000, p. 446). As opposed to the resource mobilization approach which pays 
attention to the "formal organization, elite sponsorship, external resources, rational actors, 
interest group constituencies, and manufactured grievances," the political process approach 
emphasizes "diverse organizational forms, informal mobilizing structures, solidarity and group 
consciousness within the mass base, indigenous resources …" (Buechler, 2011, p. 140).  The 
political process model faced criticism due to its view that "external political opportunities must 
become available before challenging groups can generate collective action" (Morris, 2000, p. 
447). Morris argued about the existence of a “reciprocal relationship” between social 
movements’ ability to mobilize and political opportunities saying, “thus, in some instances, 
collective action can generate political opportunities where none existed previously and in other 
instances, political opportunities can clear the way for collective action” (p. 447). 
Framing is also another major approach to the study of social movements, and one most 
relevant to this dissertation project. Dove (2010) indicated that the framing perspective became 
one of the major developments in the study of social movements in the 1980s. It "provided a way 
to link ideas and social construction of ideas with organizational and political process factors" 
(Olvier & Johnson, 2005, p. 185). Based on the concept of a frame by Goffman (1974), the 
framing perspective "focuses on the various collective action frames that are used by social 
movements to increase and maintain support for their goals and activities" (Dove, 2010, p.203). 
Collective action refers to “the processes of consensus mobilization needed for people to decide 
to participate in collective action” (Klandermans, 2014, p.41). 
The framing perspective differs from other approaches such as resource mobilization and 
political process theory in the way its proponents viewed social movements. Snow and Benford 
(1988) argued that social movements should not be conceived as just "carriers or transmitters of 
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programs for actions that arise from new structural dislocations" or as merely "resource 
acquisition and deployment activities of movement organization" (p.198). Snow and Benford 
(1992) further argued that there were two problems with the literature on social movements 
before the mid-1980s: treating meanings and ideas as a given and ignoring "the extent to which 
movements are engaged in ‘meaning work’—that is, in the struggle between the production of 
ideas of meanings" (p. 136). Snow and Benford (1988) argued that social movements are 
"engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers" as well (p. 
198). Social movements are conceptualized as "signifying agents" (p. 198). To elaborate on this, 
they borrowed the verb ‘framing' from Gamson et al. 1982; Snow et al., 1986) which indicates 
"an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). They explained this saying: 
It is active in a sense that something is being done, processual in the sense of a dynamic 
evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social 
movement organization or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it 
involves the generation of interpretative frames that not only differ from existing ones but 
that may also challenge them. The resultant product of this framing activity is referred to 
as collective action frames. (p. 614).   
 Snow and Benford (1988) contended that social movements assign meanings to events 
and interpret them in such a way that they can mobilize their followers, get the support of 
bystanders, and demonize their antagonists. Movements construct collective action frames as 
they negotiate a common understanding of a problem that needs change, making attributions on 
what or who to blame, “articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in 
concert to affect change" (Benford & Benford, 2000, p. 615). That is, constructing collective 
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action frames requires casting existing circumstances as shared grievances which also need to be 
“transformed into demands” (p.52).  
Snow and Benford (1988) explained that movements are engaged in three types of 
collective action framing tasks: diagnosis, prognosis, and mobilizing participation. Accordingly, 
while diagnosis refers to framing an event or some aspect of social life as a problem that needs to 
change, the prognosis task of framing aims at proposing a solution to the problem. The third 
task—the framing task of mobilization—is aimed at calling for "arms or rationale for engaging 
in ameliorative or coercive action" (p. 199). Klandermans (2014) pointed out that the role of 
collective action frames in mobilizing adherents depends on how well they attend these three 
framing tasks. Snow and Benford (1988) also maintained that the success of framing is affected 
by four factors: (1) the robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort, (2) 
"internal structure of the larger belief system with which the movement seeks to affect some kind 
of cognitive/ ideational alignment," (3) "relevance of the frame to the life world of the 
participants or phenomenological relevance, and (4) cycles of protest (p.198).  
Another important task of social movements identified in the literature is frame alignment 
(Buecheler, 2011; Johnston, 2002; Klandermans, 2014; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 
1986).  Snow, Worden, Rochford, and Benford (1986) referred to as the “linkage of individual 
and SMO [social movement organizations] interpretative orientations, such that some set of 
individual interests, values, beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and 
complementary” (p. 464). They pointed out that frame alignment is a crucial requirement for 
movement participation.  
According to Snow et al. (1986), there are four types of frame alignment processes: frame 
bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformations. Frame bridging refers 
25 
to “the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames 
regarding a particular issue or problem” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). For example, in her 
study of the “Million Hoodies Movement,” Hon (2016) found that the movement used frame 
bridging to portray the case of Trayvon Martin as part of race issue experienced by not just an 
individual (Trayvon Martin), but also by African-Americans. As Buechler (2011) put it: “frame 
bridging essentially says ‘we are already on the same page; why not join us?’” (p.146). It 
“activates unmobilized [sic] sentiment pools or public opinion clusters; it recruits people by 
demonstrating that there already is a movement representing their views” (Buechler, 2011, 
p.146). 
 Frame amplification, according to Benford and Snow (2000) involves “idealization, 
embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (p. 624).  “the 
clarification and invigoration of an interpretative frame that bears on a particular, issue, problem, 
or sets of events (p. 469). In “Million Hoodies” movement study, Hon (2016) indicated how the 
movement used frame amplification by continuously updating members with encouraging 
clarification by saying “‘Zimmerman is getting charged (April 11, 2012)’ and ‘Motion for 
acquittal denied. Zimmerman will face the jury.’ July 5, 2013)’” (p. 16). Frame amplification is 
of two types: value amplification and belief amplification (Snow et al. p. 469).  
Frame extension involves portraying a movement's “interests and frame(s) as extending 
beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance 
to potential adherents” (Benford & Snow, 2000 p.625).  For example, Hon (2016) indicated how 
“Million Hoodies” movement used frame extension by announcing, “‘National Hoodie Day and 
International Day of Internet Action for Justice! Spread the Word! (April 9, 2012)’” (p. 16). The 
fourth type of frame alignment process is frame transformation, which involves “changing old 
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understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625). 
According to Snow et al. (1986), frame transformation occurs when the frames promoted by 
social movements do not resonate with the frames of their recruits.  
2.3.1 Media and social movements  
“The power of the media to shape social events is a fact beyond dispute” claimed Tim 
Baylor in his article on “Media framing of movement protest” published in 1996. Klandermans 
(2014) argued that the media cover the existence of movements; set the stage for collective 
action; provide definitions and interpretations of the situations; and take part in the creation of a 
common understanding of the situations. As Fahlenbrach, Sivertsen, and Werenskjold (2014) 
argued, “although both sides [media and social movements] might follow up different or even 
divergent motives and frames, there is structural bind between them that is first of all based on 
the common need for public attention” (p. 2).   
Both media and activists need each other. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) pointed out that 
social movements need media for three main purposes: "mobilization, validation, and scope 
enlargement" (p.116). According to these authors, in addition to wanting the media to convey 
messages to their constituents (mobilization), they also need it to create the impression that ‘the 
whole world is watching us’ (validation). Movements view media as a key to broadening the 
scope of the conflict as well.  Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012) also echoed similar idea saying, 
"it is difficult to imagine that social movements could exist without the mass media" (p. 395). 
According to Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993), making a conflict more public offers the movement 
an opportunity to "improve its relative power, compared to that of its antagonist, and mass media 
coverage is a vehicle for this" (p. 115). However, this is not always the case as the media 
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sometimes do not pay attention to what movements would prefer. I will discuss this in detail in 
the following section.  
The media-social movement interaction is not limited to the covering of issues only; it 
involves how those issues are covered as well. The interaction between media and social 
movements is characterized by negotiation over meaning or what Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) 
referred to as a "struggle over framing" (p. 18). Getting “preferably favorable media coverage is 
one of the critical preconditions for collective action” (Boykoff, 2006, p. 193) because it affects a 
movements' ability to mobilize their constituents (Cooper, 2002; Barker, 2008). Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld (1993) also argued that people who are engaged in "symbolic contests read their 
success or failure by how well their preferred meanings and interpretations are doing in various 
media arenas" (p. 119).  
Research evidence suggested that media framing has an impact on social movements’ 
mobilization. For instance, Cooper (2002) observed the existence of a direct relationship between 
media and social movement framing congruence and movement mobilization. Thus, high 
congruence between media framing and social movement framing correlates with high level of 
mobilization while low level of congruence correlates with low level of mobilization.  Likewise, 
in their study on “Mobilizing the White March,” Walgrave and Manssens (2005) found that the 
Belgian press did not only define the theme of the movement, it also facilitated people’s 
participation. Accordingly, the press “not only engaged in diagnostic or prognostic framing—
more ‘normal’ functions of the media—but unmistakably undertook—large scale and 
unconcealed motivational framing efforts” (p.132). The authors described the support of the 
Belgian press saying, they “presented themselves as actors and players in White March events 
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with as it seems, their own agenda and objectives. Indeed, turning the White March into a 
success seemed to be an implicit goal of several newspapers” (p.132). 
Media framing and a social movement’s framing of an issue do not always match, 
however. According to Ryan (2001), factors such as resources, journalists' beliefs, and media-
related conventions are important factors that facilitate or hinder a movement's access to the 
media. Furthermore, the match between movements’ frames and the cultural frame is also an 
important factor. For instance, Baylor (1996) in his study on the television framing of American 
Indian protests concluded that “even to stage confrontational events to get media attention to 
promote a frame that does not already conform to some widespread and beneficial cultural 
frame” may not succeed (para. 45). For example, the study revealed that while the Indian 
protesters used the Civil Rights and the Treaty rights frames to focus on social and economic 
issues, the media mainly used the “militant,” “stereotype,” and “factionalism” to negatively 
portray the protests. Undrakhbuyan’s (2001) findings on the media coverage of World Trade 
Organization and protests in Seattle in 1999 also indicated how media frames and protesters’ 
frames of an issue do not always much. In his content analysis of whose interests the media 
advanced in their coverage of the World Trade Organization and protests, he found that 
developed countries and corporations received more favorable media coverage than developing 
countries and protesters. In fact, most of the newspapers (39.0%) portrayed the protesters as 
violent compared to (7.8%) which supported their agenda. This corroborated Ryan’s (2001) 
findings that resources play a major role in facilitating or hindering movements’ frame resonance 
with media. Furthermore, the study suggested that ideology played a role in influencing how 
media covered the WTO and protests in Seattle saying, “the agenda of major metropolitan 
newspapers tend to reflect the agenda of a strong ideological force” (p. 21).  
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Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) also identified three components of movement-related 
factors that affect media attention: standing (the level of attention given to the movement by the 
media); preferred framing (the salience of movement's frame in the media discourse); and 
sympathy (the extent to which the content covered by the media receives sympathy from 
concerned people). Gamson and Wolfsfeld added that movement standing by itself depends on 
resources, organization, professionalism, coordination, and strategic planning of the movement, 
which also influences the degree to which the preferred frame is salient in media discourse.  
2.3.2 Social media and social movements  
The literature on social movement-media interaction I reviewed in the preceding section 
focused on traditional media. In recent years, however, the link between social media and social 
movements also received significant attention, especially since the 2008 financial crises, Arab 
Spring, popular movements in Britain and Spain, and Occupy movement, etc. (Allsop, 2016). 
One major question surrounding this relationship relates to whether social media has an impact 
on social movements (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016). 
 Scholars' views on the impact of social media on social movements are divided into three 
main categories: those who have optimism about the impact of social media, those who are the 
pessimist about it, and those who are ambivalent (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016). For optimists, social 
media has a "revolutionary power" (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016, p.785). These group of scholars 
view the role of social media as a "paradigm shift" as "empowering individuals and communities 
challenging existing power structures in new ways" (Allsop, 2016, p.35). They present different 
reasons for their claim. For example, Gangopadhyay (2015) listed advantage of social media 
such as the speed at which participants of social movements can organize themselves, 
availability of chat rooms to discuss and share information, and easy and quick ways of signing 
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online petitions. Maghrabi and Salam (2011) also pointed out that internet-based 
communications not only help movements to organize themselves, but they also enable them to 
make a real impact on politics. These authors emphasized the vital role social media play in both 
"fostering the development of social movements and promoting the growth in a new political 
form" (p. 9). Pointing to recent years' politics in North African and Middle East countries, Balci 
and Golcu (2013) argued about the role social media plays in overthrowing authoritarian 
regimes.  However, they also emphasized that social media cannot cause social movements by 
themselves, but when used effectively can help movements to achieve their political goals. 
Pessimists view social media not only as incapable of having an impact on social 
movements but also as a hindrance to a positive contribution towards a social change (Kidd & 
McIntosh, 2016). These group of scholars sees social media activists, also known as 
"slacktivists," as "encouraging relatively ineffectual actions, rather than supplement more 
traditional forms of activism" (Allstop, 2016, p.35). Louw (2013) pointed out a problem with 
manipulation in social media use, "as with all media platforms, interactive digital media forms 
are also susceptible to being used as weapons by large political actors who mobilize surrogate 
warfare as tools of their foreign policy" (para. 3). Louw used the examples of how states and 
non-state actors use social media to insert their agenda into social movements' discourse.  
The third group of scholars, ambivalent, view social media-led revolution as difficult, but 
also possible in some cases (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016). According to Kidd and McIntosh (2016), 
social media is not a platform used by social movements only, they are also communication 
channels effectively used by governments to disrupt them. Likewise, Tufekci (2014) contended 
that movements might use social media to get public’s attention quickly, find a way around 
censorship, and easily coordinate, but this may not translate into their success, as success 
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depends on other factors such as the structure and organization of the movement as well.  
Tufekci also explained that governments have tried to disrupt protests using legal means and 
other strategies such as negatively portraying social media, restricting content, and inundating 
the cyberspace with supporters and paid people.  
Scholars also identified other factors that moderate the impact of social media on social 
movements. For instance, Olorunnisola and Martin (2012) pointed out that social media can 
empower movements, but their impacts are tempered by factors related to contexts such as 
digital divide. Similarly, Garcia-Murillo, Wohlers, and Zaber (2017) argued that information 
communication technologies provide movements with valuable benefits such as the decreased 
cost of information, but the impacts are constrained by factors such education, income level, 
legal matters.  
2.3.3 Social media and collective action frames 
 Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017) argued that social media serve as an important 
framing tool. Ince, Rojas, and Davis (2017) contended that social media are platforms not only 
where movement activists “promote their messages, articulate their core beliefs,” they are also a 
place where they frame issues (p.1818). Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec (2017) argued that "when 
traditional sources of issues framing such as elites and media lose their credibility, social media 
can provide a powerful platform for framing events and issues" (p. 775). Moscato (2015) also 
pointed out that social media frames of an issue also serve the purpose of traditional media which 
include reporting, mediating, debating, entertaining, and taking positions on political and 
economic issues. Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017) even went further claiming that 
internet-based social media have “unmatched capabilities” as sources of news and framing tool 
(p. 775).  
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Social media enable people to construct their frames on contentious issues (Goh & Pang, 
2016, p. 531). They allow citizens to “alter and manipulate the movement’s construction of 
meaning” (Ince, Rojas, & Davis, 2017, p. 1827).  They enable users to create a “distributed 
framing” which is using hashtags to develop an “understanding of problems and solutions that do 
not exclusively rely on leaders within the movement or other highly visible individuals” (p. 
1818). In their study on how Twitter users interacted with “Black Lives Matter” movement using 
hashtag, Ince, Rojas, and Davis found that users 1) added more framings to the original frames of 
the movements, and 2) made moves to transition from “a movement that is small and focused on 
a specific grievance to a mass movement that has more developed tactics” (p. 1825).  
Studies have also indicated that social media frame issues using collective action framing 
strategies. For example, in her study that looked at how the “Million Hoodies Movement for 
Justice” framed issues on social media, Hon (2016) found all framing tasks of collective action 
frames identified by Snow and Benford (1988): diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, 
motivation framing, frame bridging, and frame alignment. Accordingly, the movement used two 
diagnostic frames: the injustice frame to oppose George Zimmerman’s release from jail, and the 
racism frame to explain his motivation behind the shooting of Trayvon Martin. The finding also 
indicated that the movement used solidarity and gun control frame as prognostic frames, while it 
used participation frames such as holding rallies, marches, and vigil as motivational frames. 
Moreover, the result of the study revealed that the movement used different types of frame 
alignment processes.  For example, they used the case of Trayvon Martin as part of a racism 
issue faced by African-Americans (frame bridging). They continuously updated members with 
clarification of the next move (frame-amplification). They reached out to more supporters 
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(frame-extension) and went beyond Trayvon Martin’s case to include other social issues facing 
African Americans (frame-transformations).  
 Likewise, Goh and Pang (2016), who studied the protests in 2013 and 2014 in Singapore 
against the government’s immigration policy, also found that protesters used the three collective 
action framing strategies: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing strategies.  Their 
study indicated that the protesters used the injustice frame to raise awareness about the cause of 
the problem, the victim of the problem, and the injustice. They also used two prognostic 
frames—a call for government change and call on the government to listen to their concerns. 
They also used three types of motivation framing: collective agency (to unite to assert their 
identity), individual agency (get your voice heard), and the reason for participation (legitimate 
cause, likely success). However, the same study indicated the existence of difference on the level 
of emphasis on different framing strategies—motivational framing most frequently used, 
followed by diagnostic, prognostic frame respectively. Furthermore, it revealed a difference 
between organizers and individual protesters on the level of emphasis on sub-frames under each 
frame; for example, while the protest organizers emphasized government for as a causal agent, 
the individual protesters emphasized foreigners. 
Scholars have also looked at the impact of social media frames of movements on 
traditional media frames of the same. In the study that analyzed the frames of Canada’s 
“Idlenomore Movement,” Moscato (2015) found evidence that frames of hashtag activism were 
not only embraced by traditional media, they also helped audiences of the mainstream media to 
identify grievances, challenges, and opportunities of the movement.   
However, there is not always a congruence between social media framing of a movement 
and the traditional media framing of the same. For instance, in their study on how social media 
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and traditional media, especially the foreign media, framed the Ukraine's Euromaidan 
Movement, Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017) found disparities between the frames of the 
mainstream media and social media. That is, while traditional media framed the movement as a 
“geopolitical struggle,” social media portrayed it as an “anti-regime revolution” (p. 758). 
Likewise, a study on framing of the 2011 Egyptian uprising by Hamdy and Goma (2016) showed 
discrepancies between the frames of social media and the mainstream media. Accordingly, while 
government-affiliated newspapers framed the movement as a conspiracy against the state of 
Egypt, social media portrayed it as “‘a revolution for freedom and social justice’” (p. 195). The 
same study also revealed that independent media adopted the combinations of both frames. 
As discussed in this section, there are different perspectives on the study of social 
movements such as theories of collective behavior, resource mobilization approach, the political 
process theory, and the framing. This section also discussed the link between social movements 
and the media (both traditional and social media). The next part looks at the role of foreign 
media in the democratization process by paying attention to the Western media coverage of 
Africa.  
2.4 Foreign Media and Democratization 
The role of foreign media on democratization has been the subject of scholarly 
discussions for decades. Studies revealed that international media play a significant role both in 
the process and the outcome of the democratization effort such as encouraging and promoting 
protests and weakening authoritarian governments through propaganda. This section provides a 
summary of the literature on the role of foreign media in the process of democratization and 
some overview of Western media coverage of Africa. 
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Foreign media played a significant role in conflicts in other states. For example, the 
Western media played a vital role in weakening the Communist regimes. They provided 
audiences in those regimes with alternative information that was not available on domestic media 
(Kern & Hainmuller, 2009). By so doing, they allowed the audiences “to compare communist 
propaganda with credible information from abroad” (Kern & Hainmuller, 2009, p. 379).  
According to Kern and Hainmuller (2009), foreign media also exposed to the world the presence 
of protest movements, human rights abuses, and those countries’ involvement in foreign wars. 
Furthermore, they enabled the audience in the Communist countries to make a comparison 
between their life standards with those of people in the capitalist countries and familiarized them 
with democracies and freedom in other countries (Kern & Hainmuller, p. 379).  
Foreign media also foster opposition to the authoritarian regimes. For example, during 
WWII, BBC worked hard to promote protests against the Nazi-Germany’s occupation in Europe. 
(Gagliarducci, Onorato, Sobbrio & Tabellini, 2017). For example, in their study on BBC Italian 
Service’s radio program’s coverage of the Nazi’s occupation of Italy during World War II, 
Gagliarducci et al. (2017) identified two strategies the radio program used to foster protests. 
First, it targeted groups or individuals who wanted to engage in resistance, and second, it 
provided information and counter-propaganda messages to the broader section of the society.  As 
Gagliarducci et al. (2017) put it: 
The Italian program was giving counter-propaganda messages against the fascist regime 
along with information on the war events both within and outside Italy, as well as 
encoded messages for the resistance. These “special messages” [sic] aimed at delivering 
logistic and military information to resistance fighters (upcoming military operations, 
shipments of supplies, weapons, movements of troops, etc.). (p. 6).  
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The Western media generally pay less attention to issues in Africa (Kalyango & 
Onyebadi, 2012; & McNulty, 1999). When they cover the continent, they focus on areas where 
the Western countries have interests (Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012). It is “almost always in direct 
proportion to the scale of direct Western involvement (NGO or military intervention), or to the 
degree of clamour for such interventions (the ‘something must be done response)” 
(McNulty,1999, p. 269). For example, in their study of the 30 years of coverage of Africa by 
three U.S. television networks (ABC, NBC & CBS), Kalyango and Onyebadi (2012) found that 
Africa received less coverage (19%) than the networks’ coverage of Europe (54%) and South 
America (27%).   
Another area that attracted the attention of media scholars has been how the Western 
media represent conflicts in Africa. The media representation of Africa is generally negative 
(Gruley & Duvall, 2012) focusing mainly on conflicts and crises (Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012) 
and stereotypical tribalism (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; & McGulty, 1999). 
     Different factors affect the Western media coverage and frames of issues in Africa. 
These include the interest of the Western countries (Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012; McNulty, 
1999; colonial stereotypes (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; Vladisavljevic, 2015), political context 
(Baum & Zhukov, 2015), and journalistic professionalism (Nwosu, 1987).  
For example, Kalyango and Onyebadi (2012) found that three U.S. based networks’ 
(ABC, NBC, & CBS) news events focused on topics that included the involvement of the U.S. 
government and its militaries. According to these authors, this explains why only a few 
geographic locations, e.g., southern and northern parts of Africa, received media coverage. They 
concluded that the “coverage of Africa focused on the northern and southern part of the 
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continent, possibly because several countries in both regions such as South Africa and Egypt are 
geographically linked to the interests of the United States” (p. 681).  
Some scholars have also found that colonial stereotypes influence the Western media 
coverage of conflicts in Africa. For example, in their study of how The New York Times and The 
Washington Post covered the conflicts in Darfur, Sudan, from 2003-2009, Gruley and Duvall 
(2012) found that the newspapers represented the disputes stereotypically and linked it with 
tribalism, using terms associated with it, such as ethnic and tribe. Gruely and Duvall also found 
that the newspapers’ coverage of conflicts in Darfur lacked detail. Vladsavljevic (2015) also 
made similar assertion saying: “…media representation of political conflicts in African states 
have long involved negative stereotypes and relied on the themes of ‘ancient hatreds’ and 
‘tribalism’” (p. 12).  
The nature of the regimes, whether democratic or undemocratic, can also affect how the 
international media cover conflicts. That is, the media underreport conflicts in undemocratic 
states compared to their coverage of conflicts in democratic countries. For example, in their 
studies of international newspapers reporting of the crisis in Libya in 2015, Baum and Zhukov 
(2015) found media bias against opponents of the Libyan regime which included underreporting 
protests and collective action by protesters, ignoring violence committed by the government, and 
highlighting on violence committed by the opponents.    
The way the news media cover Africa’s democratization process varies from media to 
media. For example, Alalawi (2015) who studied how Fox News and Al Jazeera covered the 
Arab Spring found a great discrepancy between the two media. That is, for example, Fox News 
gave negative coverage to protests in Egypt against the incumbent President Hosni Mubarak. Fox 
News associated the Muslim Brotherhood, the most organized political party that led the protest, 
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with terrorism and extremism. However, Alalawi found that Aljazeera portrayed the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a peaceful political movement. Alalawi concluded that Fox News informed the 
American audience that the movement was radical and extremist and described the group as anti-
democratic.  
As reviewed in this section, foreign media play a significant role in the process of 
democratization. But the Western press generally gives less attention to issues in Africa. Even 
when they give attention, their coverage and framing of issues depend on different factors such 
as the economic and interests of the Western countries and colonial stereotypes. The following 
section discusses the literature on counter-movement framing by opponents and government 
officials.  
2.5 Theories of International Relations, News Media, and NGOs 
International relations and media studies are two separate fields of studies. However, 
scholars have attempted to establish a link between the two recently. Non-Governmental 
Organizations such as human rights groups, which received less attention in the literature of 
international relations, have also received some attention in recent years. This section will give a 
summary of the major theories of international relations, and will then review literature that links 
international relations theories, news media, and NGOs.  
2.5.1 Major approaches to the study of international relations  
Scholars of international relations have long tried to provide a theoretical explanation of 
why and how states form a relationship—be it political, diplomatic, economic or otherwise—
with other states. Although there are many theories of international relations, four major 
theoretical models dominate the literature on international relations.  They are realism, 
institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism.   
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The realist approach to study international relations stems from its assumptions about 
states (Mearsheimer, 1992). According to realists, states are always in the state of anarchy; they 
have some “offensive military capacity;” they always live in uncertainty; their motive is survival, 
and they are rational” (Mearsheimer, 10). The realists hold the view that cooperation among 
states is possible but that it is unsustainable (p.12). The main reason cooperation among states 
cannot last long in the eyes of realists is due to two main reasons: cheating and relative-gains 
considerations. Mearsheimer pointed out that “the bottom-line, however, is that cooperation 
takes place in a world that is competitive at its core—one where states have powerful incentives 
to take advantages of other states” (p.13). 
The institutionalist model shares many of realist’s assumption about the world. That is, 
the world is characterized by anarchy, offensive capacity, uncertainty, survival, and rationality. 
According to liberal institutionalists, institutions lead to international stability and strengthen the 
connection between institutions and economic cooperation. However, they part company with 
realists on how to deal with a security dilemma that has roots in anarchy. Unlike realists, they 
believe that it is not alliance formation or balance of power that allays states’ fear for security, 
but it is institutional cooperation among nations (Mearsheimer, (p.16). According to Keohane 
and Martin (1995), cheating and lack of trust among states can be dealt with through established 
institutional rules. Liberal institutionalists give four reasons why institutions bring cooperation 
that results in world stability: they increase transactions among states; result in issue-linkages 
and reluctance to cheat; increase information flow; and reduce transaction costs. 
The liberalist theoretical model holds the view that it is essential to pursue “policies that 
can be termed to be in the common good, rather than what is good for the individual state” 
(Kaufman, 2014, p. 53). This theoretical model accepts cooperation and interdependence among 
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states. Many scholars in international relations believe that “because of its broad worldview and 
its acceptance of interdependence, there are many in international relations who think that the 
liberal model is more appropriate than realist theory in describing and explaining international 
relations in a globalized post– Cold War world” (53). Like institutionalists, liberals accept the 
idea that cooperation among countries is possible. However, unlike realists and institutionalists, 
liberalists argue that a state is not unitary, i.e., there many actors and interest groups who can 
affect international cooperation. According to liberalism, domestic interest affects international 
relations. In her book: “Interests, Institutions, and Information” Helen V. Milner (1997) 
described how domestic politics impact international relations.  She argued that domestic politics 
and international relations are inseparable: “A country’s international position exerts an 
important impact on its internal politics and economics” and “conversely, its domestic situation 
shapes its behaviors in foreign relations” (Milner, 1997, p.1). Milner also claimed that three 
variables—interests, institutions, and information— in domestic politics have impact on 
international relations (p.11). 
The fourth approach to study international relations is constructivism. This approach 
looks at relations within “a larger set of social and political interactions and the ways in which 
those relationships help a state frame the answers” (Kaufman, 2013, p. 57). Constructivists argue 
that ideas are socially constructed. Elaborating on constructivist claims Wendt (1994) said: 
1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; 2) the key 
structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and 3) state 
identities and interests are an important part constructed by their social structures, rather 
than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. (p. 385).   
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Scholars have indicated that the constructivist approach to international relations explains 
the role of media in foreign affairs. According to Dell’orto (2013), “…while power, interests and 
institutions matter, they need to be understood as constituted by ideas that exist within their 
specific cultural and historical times” (p. 238).  In the process of construction ideas, 
communication is important because it is “a necessary locus for the negotiation of those 
meanings within widely accepted, historically and culturally specific understandings” Dell’orto, 
2013, 2018). That is, if ideas are socially constructed, as the constructivists argue, then 
communication plays a fundamental role, as it is “a site for the formation of meaning around 
foreign realities” (Dell’orto, 2013). 
2.5.2 Media and international relations 
In today’s world, people of one country have exposure to the media of a foreign country. 
As O’Hefferman (1991), pointed out:  
every country is penetrated by the media of other countries, from international magazines 
and newspapers brought in by tourists and business travelers to news and entertainment 
directly broadcast from satellite to homes, offices, and cable systems in dozens of 
countries simultaneously. (p. 85).   
Exposure to foreign media has significant bearings on international relations. According 
to Moulana (2015), the international pollical affairs which were once characterized by 
“geographical and physical level” are being replaced by “cultural and communication” where the 
news media plays a role (p. 92). Mass communication is important in international relations 
because “it remains an essential locus for the creation, definition and transformation of the power 
relationships that lie at the heart of international affairs” (Dell’orto, 2013, p. 1). Dell’orto further 
pointed out that media “…has been a crucial factor—an irreplaceable mediator—in international 
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affairs historically and currently, by functioning as the public arena where meanings for things 
literally foreign become understandable realities that, in turn, serve as the basis for policy and 
action” (p. 1). The media helps create a country’s image in foreign countries. As Dell’orto (2013) 
argued, they play a key role as the “images of national identities it helps create and negotiate 
influence expectations and consequently policies” (p.2). 
News media are also essential in international relations. as controlling the global agenda 
is a “source of power” (Moulana, 2015, p. 93). Scholars have emphasized the role of media in 
agenda setting. For example, in their study on the role of international news on setting agendas, 
Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004) found the link between international news coverage of 
international issues and people’s perception. In their study on the link between the U.S. news 
media coverage of international news and audience perception, they found that the more the U.S. 
news media cover a foreign country, the more audience members perceive that country as 
important to the United States. Additionally, their study also found that negative coverage of a 
foreign country led to negative audience perceptions of that country.  
2.5.3 Non-Governmental Organizations and international relations 
Scholars give marginal status to the role of Non-Governmental Organizations in 
international relations (van Boven, 1989). Van Boven then argued that although many 
international organizations such as the United Nations rely on NGOs for information, the latter's 
contribution to promoting human rights did not get the attention they deserve. Accordingly, it is 
less well known that a good number of NGOs are performing many other functions for the sake 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. That fact that NGOs also make contributions—and 
often very significant ones—to the development of human rights norms is an aspect of NGO 
activities that is generally overlooked. (p. 207). Other scholars, however, acknowledged the role 
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of NGOs such as human rights organizations. For example, Sikkink (1998) found that NGOs 
such as human rights organizations can influence the other countries’ domestic policies by 
“norms and ideas” (p. 517).  
2.5.4 Non-governmental organizations and news media 
Scholars of media studies mainly focused on the role of the news media in shaping the 
discourse about social movements. This is so perhaps because the news media dominated 
coverage of international issues. However, studies also indicate that the news media are facing 
competition from Non-Governmental Organizations (Powers, 2018). This section reviews 
literature on the relationship between NGOs and news media.     
2.5.4.1 The role of NGOs in news production  
In recent years, there is scholarly work that indicates the role of the non-governmental 
organization in shaping discourses about social movements around the world. Non-governmental 
organizations not only play a key role in shaping discourse about human rights situations, but 
they also produce news, an area traditionally considered an exclusive domain of the news media. 
According to Powers (2018), they “play an increasingly crucial role in shaping and in some cases 
directly producing news coverage about some of the most pressing humanitarian and human 
rights issues of our time” (p. 4).   
Powers (2018) explained why NGOs are involved in news production. NGOs see 
“communication as both a way to garner credibility as actors in international politics and a 
means to raise funds—either directly (through public donations) or indirectly via (via 
branding)—that are necessary for their survival and growth” (Powers, 2018, p.5).  
The involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in news production led them to 
work with the news media as well. That is, NGOs hire journalists who prefer “a news-making 
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sensibility to advocacy organizations” (Powers, 2018, p. 5). NGO’s working together with 
journalists also affects the type of information they gather. As Powers pointed out: 
 Although the development of such sensibilities boosts these organizations’ overall 
chances of garnering news coverage, it also ensures that advocacy groups produce 
information that largely accords with rather than challenges media preferences. Donors, 
government officials, and news organizations—each in different ways and for distinct 
reasons—further reinforce these tendencies by incentivizing NGOs to focus their efforts 
primarily on appearing in the mainstream news media. (p. 5).   
2.5.4.2 News media’s dependence on NGOs  
As NGOs need journalists, the news media also rely on NGOs. That is, news media use 
NGOs as a source of information, because of what Wright (2018) described a shift in their 
“political economy” (p.5). Wright explained the cause of the shift in the political economy, 
saying: “the decline in revenues of the news organization caused by the decline in circulation and 
shift of advertising to online media have led the news organization to cut back on the number of 
foreign bureaus and journalists” (p. 5). Wright also pointed out the rise in “‘costs of news 
production’ to compete with other news organizations is also a factor in change of the political 
economy” (p.5). 
2.6 Counter-Movement Framing by Governments and Non-Governments 
Social movements cannot always impose their interpretations of events on others as their 
construction of reality is challenged by others who do not support them. That is, the process of 
framing in social movements is a contested arena (Benford & Snow, 2000; Mc Adam, 
McCarthy& Zald, 1996; Noakes, 2005; Zald, 1996). It is “the subject of intense contestation 
between collective actors representing the movement, the state and any existing 
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countermovement” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996, p. 16). According to Benford and 
Snow (2000), activists who are engaged in the construction of collective action frames cannot 
“construct and impose on their intended targets any version of reality they would like,” because 
they face different challenges from movement opponents (p. 625).  
Boscarino (2016) defined frame contestation as “an explicit and confrontational 
engagement with opposing frames and framers” (p. 285). There are framing contests between 
movements and counter-movements; between movements and the media; and between 
movements and authorities. The framing contests between movement and countermovement are 
mainly to “demonstrate who has the most support and resources at their command” and “to 
persuade authorities and bystanders of the rightness of their cause” (Zald, 1996, p. 269).  
According to Benford and Snow (2000), counter-framing is any “attempts to ‘rebut, undermine, 
or neutralize a person’s or group’s myths, version of reality, or interpretative framework’ 
(Benford, 1987, p. 75)” (p. 626).   
Opponents of social movements challenge different aspects of movements’ frames. For 
example, Benford and Snow (2000) pointed out that they mainly challenge the diagnostic and 
prognostic collective action frames.  But Zald (1996) argued they challenge the mobilization 
frames as well. As discussed in the preceding section, media and movements are also engaged in 
“the struggle over framing” (Gamson & Wolfsefeld, 1993, p. 18). Frame contestants use 
different framing tactics.  
Opponents of movement frames used different techniques to counter-frame collective 
action frames. For example, in her study on the frame contestation between two interest groups 
of energy policy—the Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)— Boscarino (2016) 
identified four framing techniques: discrediting frames, utility frames, perversity frames, and 
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character frames. For example, the study indicated that the EDF used the discrediting frame 
technique against the Sierra Club’s utility claims by accusing it of “presenting misleading 
information on energy usage” (p. 297). Also, while the Sierra Club used the “futility frame” to 
“assert that the competing proposal was inadequate and would not solve the problem at hand,” 
the EDF used the “perversity frame” by claiming “their opponents plan would actually 
exacerbate energy issues” (p. 298). Both groups used character frames to “delegitimize” their 
opponents (Boscarino, 2016, p. 299).  
In their study on frame competition between supporters and opponents of abortion in the 
United States, McCaffrey and Keys (2000) identified three strategies: “polarization-vilification,” 
“frame saving,” and “frame debunking” (p.56). McCaffrey and Keys’ study indicated that the 
New York State National Organization for Women (NYSNOW) used the dichotomy of ‘us vs. 
them’ to polarize conservatives who opposed abortion. In their analysis of the polarization-
vilification strategy used by NYSNOW in National NOW Times newsletter McCaffrey and Keys 
(2000) said: 
This newsletter [National NOW Times] suggested that there was ‘a nationwide criminal 
conspiracy’ and that ‘these fanatics have instituted a reign of terror against women 
nationwide.’ Antiabortion activists ‘have use illegal violent tactics to close clinics, 
including smashing medical equipment, invading clinics and intimidating patients and 
medical staff. (p.51). 
McCaffrey and Keys’ study also revealed how NYSNOW debunked their opponents’ use 
of the term, ‘pro-life’ saying “‘the pro-life is a term used to make anti-abortion, and anti-choice 
seem positive and good’ (Mid Suffolk NOW June 1987’” (p. 53). In addition, the study showed 
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NYSNOW used a frame saving strategy, for example by arguing they were ‘pro-choice, not pro-
abortion.  
Scholars also argued that state officials are also engaged in the activity of counter-
framing the collective action frames of social movements.  That is, as social movements are 
“signifying agents” engaged in the construction of meanings (Snow and Benford, 1988), states 
are also “active signifying agents engaged in the construction and maintenance of official 
frames” (Noakes, 2005, p. 105). McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) argued states engage in 
counter-framing activities, especially when they realize “the movement is able to establish itself 
as a serious force for social change” (p.17). 
Scholars established some similarities between social movements’ collective action 
frames and government officials’ frames. The first being both social movements and states (state 
agencies) are “signifying agents” engaged in meaning construction. The second, both 
movements’ collective action frames and official (state) frames of an issue value frame 
resonance (Noakes, 2005). Benford and Snow (2000) referred to frame resonance as “the 
credibility of the preferred frame and its relative salience” with target audiences (p. 619). 
Another similarity, according to Noakes (2005), is like social movements, state officials also 
“draw on familiar repertoires of interpretations to construct official frames” (p. 101). 
Accordingly, states not only ensure their frames have cultural resonance but also aim to preserve 
“political legitimacy” and maintain “sentiments attaching citizens to the state’s activities” (p. 
104).   
Scholars also compared the impact of a movement’s collective action frames with official 
frames. For example, Noakes (2005) argued that official frames of issues have a greater chance 
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of winning than the collective action frames of movements because of the differences in the 
amount of resources each has at its disposal. According to Noakes: 
In terms of both materials and cultural resources, state managers enjoy significant 
advantages over social movement entrepreneurs and that the official frames they 
construct have a greater chance of triumphing in the struggle for cultural supremacy than 
do collective action frames mobilized by social movement entrepreneurs. (p. 105). 
2.7 Summary  
As discussed in this chapter, the social movement by the Oromo people is decades old. 
The question of self-determination and land rights raised during the Ethiopian student movement 
in 1960 was also the question of the Oromo people. Although those questions were addressed 
and enshrined in the Constitution, the Oromo people continue to protest against the government 
policy on land and self-governance. However, this time, the Oromo people’s protests utilized 
social media and received global attention more than at any time in history.  
  The literature on media and social movements gives important insights into how social 
movements engage in the process of meaning construction to create collective action frames that 
will gain positive media attention. It sheds lights on the core collective action framing tasks of 
movements: diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. In addition, the literature on government 
officials’ framing of issues also indicates that as movements engage in constructing collective 
action frames, government officials also engage in constructing official frames, which often 
results in counter-framing contests.  
From the literature on the media-social movement interaction, there are three major 
takeaways. First, social movements need media coverage for validation, mobilization, and scope 
enlargement. Second, the media and social movements engage in negotiation over meaning, or 
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what Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) termed “struggle over framing.”  Third, media frames and 
the social movement’s frames of an issue do not always match, but it is preferable for a social 
movement for the media’s framing to be congruent with their own.  
On the link between social media and social movements, while the question of whether 
social media has an impact on movements remains controversial, there is an agreement among 
scholars on social media being used as a forum to organize collective action. They enable 
movements and the audience both to share information and to frame issues. Movements use 
social media to frame issues using all framing strategies identified in the literature: diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational framing strategies.  
On the Western media coverage of the democratization process in Africa, there is enough 
scholarly work that suggests the continent receives less media attention compared with other 
continents. As discussed in the preceding section, the Western media give coverage to issues in 
Africa where the Western countries have economic or military interests. This may suggest that 
the Western media coverage of the democratization process in Africa is helpful to social 
movements in areas where the Western countries have interests and when those interests are best 
served by supporting the democratization process.   
This project is aimed at examining how the Oromo protest movement was covered by 
different actors, i.e., Oromo protest movement activists, news media, government officials, and 
international organizations. It analyzes how international news media, Oromo protest movement 
activists, and human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) 
covered the Oromo protest movement.  The next chapter will discuss the methods used to inquire 
into these questions.   
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3 METHODS: MAIN STUDY  
3.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine, via a textual analysis, the major themes 
of the Oromo protest movement as covered by different actors who play key roles in shaping 
discourse about protest movements, namely, the news media, activist messages, human rights 
organizations, and the Ethiopian government officials. It also aimed at looking at whether or not 
the themes and frames highlighted by the news media were congruent with the themes and 
frames emphasized by other actors. This chapter provides a detailed description of how the study 
was conducted. It begins with listing and explaining each of the major research questions, and 
then it describes the research design, i.e., the data sample and procedures (data collection and 
data analysis).  
3.2 Research Question  
This dissertation examined texts produced by the news media, key Oromo activists, 
human rights groups, and government officials in order to uncover the themes highlighted during 
three key events in the Oromo protest movement and how each actor framed those themes. To 
this end, it attempted to answer the following five research questions, discussed in these 
subsections below. 
3.2.1 Major themes of the international news media  
As discussed in chapter two, the mass media play an important role in shaping the 
discourse about social movements. They cover the existence of movements, “define and interpret 
the situations,” and create a “shared definition of the situation” Klandermans (2014, p.42).  They 
also frame issues by defining a problem, interpreting the causes, evaluating the morals, and 
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suggesting solutions (Entman, 1993). As regards social movements, studying news media is key 
to understanding how they “coalesce, build, and maintain themselves, as well as how they decide 
to frame their dissident messages.” (Boykoff, 2016, p. 193). So, this project sought to look at the 
major themes of the news media on the Oromo protest movement and how those themes were 
framed. By answering the following research question: 
RQ1: What were the major themes of the international news media on the Oromo protest 
movement? How did they frame those themes? 
3.2.2 Major themes of the messages of the Oromo activists 
As discussed in chapter 2, social movements are “signifying agents actively involved in 
the framing of events and conditions, and thus in the production of meanings and ideas” (Snow 
& Benford, 1988, p. 213). By engaging in the construction of collective action frames, activists 
create a common understanding on the definition of a problem that needs change, attribution on 
who is responsible, or what to blame, solutions to the problem, and actions needed to change it 
(Benford & Snow, 2000). According to these authors, these core collective action framing tasks 
can be defined as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. In addition to studying the 
news media texts, understanding the social movements also requires studying the movements 
themselves. So, this dissertation sought to understand the themes highlighted by the social media 
activists of the Oromo protest movement and how those themes were portrayed, by answering 
the following research question:  
RQ2. What were the major themes of the messages of the key Oromo activists? How did they 
frame those themes?  
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3.2.3 Major themes of human rights organizations 
One area that receives little scholarly attention in social movement studies is the 
discourse of international organizations such as rights-oriented NGOs. As discussed in the 
preceding two chapters, international human rights organizations also play a key role in reporting 
on issues that involve human rights violations around the world. The news media also use them 
as a source of information, especially with the rights violations in the case of Ethiopia. 
Therefore, this project also sought to assess the themes of the Oromo protest movement as 
highlighted by two influential internatonal human rights groups, namely, Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International, by answering the following question: 
RQ3. What were the major themes highlighted by international human rights organizations 
(Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International)? How did they frame those themes?   
3.2.4  Major themes of the Ethiopian government officials 
The dissertation also looked at the major themes of the response by the Ethiopian 
government officials to the Oromo protest movement. Governments are not only the targets of 
the protest movement, but they are also sources of information for the news media. Furthermore, 
government officials are not passive onlookers; they are involved in shaping the discourse about 
the protests against them as well. As Noakes (2015) argued, governments are “engaged in the 
construction and maintenance of official frames” (p. 105). So, the project also answered the 
following research question: 
RQ4. What were the major themes of the Ethiopian government officials’ response to the 
protest? How did they frame those themes? 
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3.2.5 Comparison of news media frames with the frame of other actors.  
As discussed in chapter two, social movements operate in a contested arena where 
“intense contestation” takes place between “collective actors representing the movement, the 
state, and any existing countermovements” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, p. 16). Hence, 
this project sought to understand the framing dynamics between the news media frames and 
frames other actors (Oromo activists, international human rights groups, and the Ethiopian 
government officials) by looking at the following question: 
RQ5. How did the international news media frames compare with the frames of other actors 
(activists, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian government officials), especially in 
terms of reflecting the Oromo activists’ frames on the protests?  
3.3 Data  
In order to answer the research questions, texts produced during the Oromo protest 
movement provide an ideal source of data. They are important to study messages in general and 
how those messages are presented in particular. According to Lindolf and Taylor (2011), texts 
give insights into how behaviors and interpretations are coordinated. They also argued that texts 
are sites where power, legitimacy, and reality are claimed. Texts are important sources of data 
for researchers who study frames and framing as well.  According to Johnston (2002), “frames 
are based on text” (p. 66). Johnston provided three main reasons as to why texts are important 
sources of data for researchers who study frames and framing activities: 1) movement 
participants always accomplish framing activities though texts; 2) researchers get access to 
frames and framing activities mostly through texts; and 3) “verification of framing and framing 
activities or of frame’s content is based on evidence embodied in what people say and do” (p. 
66). For the purpose of this study, I adopted Johnston’s (2002) definition of texts, which are 
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“symbolic behaviors and their structures” that include “written documents; verbal behaviors such 
as conversations, speeches, slogans, songs; and sometimes visual representations such as 
pictures, cartoons; and combinations of all three” (p. 66).  
So, for a sample, this project analyzed news stories on the Oromo protests published by 
international media; Facebook posts of the eight key Oromo activists; statements of the 
Ethiopian government officials (press releases and interview transcripts); and reports, news, and 
dispatches of the human rights groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). 
Explanation of why these materials were important and fitting to analyze is discussed here (3.3), 
followed by more specifics on the sample in the next section (3.4). 
3.3.1 News stories of international news media  
The stories international news media outlets covered about Oromo protests are important 
materials to analyze. According to Wanta, Golan, & Lee (2004), international news media play a 
vital role in informing foreign audiences. These authors also pointed out that the media shape the 
policy of foreign governments on issues.  Moreover, it is a tool of diplomacy (Price, 2003). The 
association between news coverage of an issue and public perception of importance of those 
issues has been well established by studies on agenda setting. For social movements, getting 
access to media coverage also helps protest movements to achieve the three major goals 
identified by Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993): mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement. In 
many cases, reports of international media are also used as sources for different human rights 
organizations.  
3.3.2 Facebook posts of the Oromo protest activists 
In recent years, Facebook has become an important area of study. According to Wilson, 
Gosling, and Graham (2012), social media like Facebook provide scholars with the opportunity 
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to examine human behavior that was not easy to assess previously. These authors also pointed 
out that activities of Facebook users such as connecting to others, expressing their preferences, 
and updating their status provides scholars with important data. According to these authors, 
Facebook's popularity also deserves scholarly attention. Mark Zuckerberg on his Facebook post 
on June 27, 2017, stated that the number of Facebook users has reached 2 billion people per 
month. Facebook's positive and negative impact on users demands scholarly attention as well 
(Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). In addition, social media may play a role in changing 
regimes through protests (Balci & Golcu, 2013).  
Facebook posts of the key Oromo activists were used to conduct this project for several 
reasons. First, Oromo activists used this platform extensively during the protests. They published 
and shared different posts about the protests including textual messages, pictures, and videos. 
Second, Facebook posts provide a primary document, i.e., messages produced or shared by the 
activists themselves. Unlike studying only media reports on movements, analyzing materials 
produced by protesters themselves help to get direct insights into their thinking. Third, in a 
country like Ethiopia where media and information were under strict control of the government, 
social media, especially Facebook, were an ideal platform to freely discuss political issues. 
Fourth, prominent Oromo activists used Facebook more than any other media platform to 
communicate about the protests. For example, activist Jawar Mohammed, whose Facebook posts 
were analyzed, used this platform to share information about the protests with his more than 1.2 
(now it reached 1.5) million followers.  
3.3.3  Statements and reports of human rights groups 
The Oromo protest movement also captured the attention of the international human 
rights organizations. International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
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International not only document injustices and violations against human rights by governments 
around the world, they can be an additional voice for the activists. Their documents are often 
used as news sources by news media.  
3.3.4 Statements and press releases of the Ethiopian government officials 
Analyzing responses from government officials to the Oromo protest movement was also 
important. First, Oromo protesters’ major demands such as canceling the Addis Ababa Master 
Plan, releasing political leaders, and stopping the jailing and killing of protesters were directed at 
the government officials. Second, protesters’ call for collective actions (such as demonstrations, 
stay-at-home campaign, and market boycotts) were aimed at pressuring the government officials 
to answer their demands. Third, government officials also engaged in countermovement 
activities.   
The Ethiopian government officials issued numerous statements. First, they denied the 
claim the protesters made that the Master Plan aimed at displacing farmers from their ancestral 
lands, and instead, said it aimed at building infrastructures such as roads and social services 
centers such as hospitals. Then they said the protesters’ demand to cancel the Master Plan was 
the question of the few that did not represent the majority of people. As the intensity of the 
protest increased, however, they accused organizers of the movement of hidden political 
agendas. For example, at a press conference he gave on February 25, 2016, Getachew Rada, 
Government Communications Affairs Office Minster, said the demands of the Oromo protest 
movement “has no relation either with the integrated master plan or the lack of good 
governance” and rather, “subversive elements have taken advantages of the grievances of the 
people and diverted it into their own hidden political agenda” (The Ethiopian News Agency, 
2016, para. 9).  
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So, analyzing government officials’ responses to the demands of the protesters was 
important to get insights into the dynamics of collective action frames and government official 
frames. 
3.4 Data Collection  
This section discusses procedures and techniques of data collection from each actor’s 
sample texts. It also discusses the number of data (in terms of the unit of analysis) analyzed to 
answer each research question discussed in the preceding sections.  
3.4.1 Data from the news media 
In order to answer RQ1, the texts of eight international news media were collected. The 
news media outlets are: The Associated Press, The Agence France Presse, Reuters, The 
Washington Post, The New York Times, CNN, BBC, and The Guardian. These media outlets 
were selected based on: (1) the amount of coverage they gave to the Oromo protest movement, 
(2) the fact that most of them are Western-based media (as activists want their stories heard by 
audiences of influential countries), and (3) their popularity (audience size). The unit of analysis 
for the data on international media was news stories (N=73), editorials (N=3), and op-eds (N=2). 
News stories were selected as they are the primary information source that tells the public what 
happened, citing many sources. Editorials are also chosen not only because they also tell what 
happened, but they also reflect the opinions of the news organizations. Op-eds were selected 
because, although they might not reflect the opinion of the news organization, they are at least a 
primary platform for expert opinion. 
Lexis/Nexis Academic was used to search for stories produced between November 12, 
2015 (the day the Oromo protests started) and November 1, 2016 (a month after the Irreecha 
incident) using keywords: "Oromo," "Oromo Protests," "Ethiopia," and "Ethiopia Protests," 
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"Feyissa Lilessa," and "Irreecha 2016," and “Oromia grand rally.” The names of key Oromo 
activists whose Facebook pages I analyzed as they were cited by many media outlets. These 
activists are: Jawar Mohammed, Etana Habte, Girma Gutema, Tsegaye Ararsa, Najat Hamza, 
Henoke Gabisa, and Ezekiel Gebissa, and Geressu Tufa.   
The search resulted in 132 articles in total. However, 54 articles that mentioned the 
Oromo protests marginally were rejected, and the remaining 78 were analyzed. The number of 
articles analyzed based on the source are: BBC (N=14), The Agence France Presse (N=13), 
Reuters (N=12), The Associated Press (N=10), The Washington Post (N=9), The New York 
Times (N=8), CNN (N=7), and The Guardian (N=5).  Out of these articles, 73 were news stories 
while three and two were editorials and op-eds respectively. In addition, 12 were also analyzed.  
3.4.2 Data from the Facebook posts of the key Oromo activists 
To answer RQ2, Facebook posts of eight Oromo activists were collected: Jawar 
Mohammed, Etana Habte, Girma Gutema, Tsegaye Ararsa, Najat Hamza, Henoke Gabisa, 
Ezekiel Gebissa, and Geressu Tufa. These activists were selected based on their prominence: 
their participation, number of their posts, their appearance in different media, and the number of 
followers they have. They were seen working together in different ways. Most of them appeared 
together on Oromia Media Network (OMN)—a U.S.-based satellite television station they 
control – to give their opinions and analysis on Oromo protest movement. Most of them also 
appeared on international media such as BBC. They not only appeared together in media, they 
also shared and “liked” each other’s Facebook posts. 
The unit of analysis of the Facebook data was activists’ posts (written texts, photo 
captions, videos and audio) and shares (written texts, photo captions, videos and audio). The 
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posts and “Shares” of the activists reflect not only their thinking, but also what they want their 
follower to pay attention to.  
The search term “#OromoProtests,” Irreecha 2016, “Feyisa Lilesa,” and “#GrandOromia 
Rally” were used to collect posts produced and posted during three significant events during 
Oromo protests: the August 6, 2016 Grand Oromia Rally, the October 2, 2016 "Irreecha 
Massacre," and Feyissa Lilessa' s August 21, 2016 Rio Olympic Marathon. The August 6, 2016 
Oromia Grand Rally was a major event. Activists called an Oromia-wide rally to protest against 
the government for its marginalization of Oromo people and human rights abuses. As a result, 
hundreds of thousands of people participated in the demonstration in more than 200 cities and 
towns, which led to the death of more than 50 people (Opride, 2016)  
The August 21, 2016 Rio Olympic Marathon is a significant event in the history of the 
Oromo protest movement. Athlete Feyisa Lilessa, an Oromo, who crossed his arms above his 
head—as a symbol of resistance—at the 2016 Rio Olympics brought the Oromo cause to the 
attention of global media. As a result, Oromos called him a “hero” who took a risk to himself and 
his family who were in Ethiopia at the time. His action created curiosity among international 
media, which as a result, gave significant coverage to the Oromo protests. The European Union 
invited him on November 10, 2016, to explain the human rights situation in Ethiopia.  
The October 2, 2016 Irreecha (the annual Thanksgiving festival of the Oromo people) 
also marks an important event in this history of Oromo protest movement. At the event where 
more than 2 million people gathered (Al-Jazeera 2016), a clash broke out between the people and 
government security forces, and resulted in the death of 55 people, according to the government, 
but 678 deaths according to the Opposition political party (Allo, 2017). Following this, activists 
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called for “five days of rage” and angry protesters attacked many private and foreign-owned 
investments. Like the Rio Olympic event, this event also received significant media attention.   
For the Grand Oromia Rally and “Irreecha Masacre,” I analyzed materials posted five 
days before and after the event. The purpose of including the pre-event, during, and post-event 
materials is to examine how activists framed issues up to, during, and after these events and to 
see whether frames changed. For Rio Olympic event however, however, there was not a plan for 
it, and hence, there were no materials produced for it.  
The search resulted in N=1,539 posts in total. In order to reduce the number for a 
qualitative in-depth analysis, however, the data were arranged according to the date they were 
published and every 5th number was picked, which resulted in N=308. 52 more posts which were 
counted more than once because they were shared by more than one activist, and the remaining 
256 posts (texts: N=235; pictures: N= 11; & videos: N=8) were analyzed.  
3.4.3 Data from International human rights organizations 
As the data produced by human rights groups were limited in number, all available 
materials that were published between November 12, 2015 to October 2016) were analyzed. In 
total, N=18 reports, ten from Human Rights Watch, and eight from Amnesty International were 
examined. The unit of analysis for the data from human rights groups was reports and dispatches, 
and letters.  
3.4.4 Data from the Ethiopian government officials 
The data to analyze the major themes of the Ethiopian government officials’ response to 
the Oromo protest movement were press statements and interview texts of the officials. Since the 
responses of the government officials were limited in number, all publicly available materials 
that were produced from November 2, 2015 (the day protests started) until October 22, 2016 
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were analyzed. In total, eight texts: four interview transcripts from government officials were 
analyzed: one by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn; three by Getachew Reda, Director of 
the Ethiopian Government Communications Affairs; and four newspaper interview transcripts by 
Addis Ababa and Oromia government officials. 
3.5 Data Analysis  
To answer the research questions discussed in the preceding section, the qualitative 
research approach, specifically, qualitative framing analysis was used.  Framing has been defined 
in different ways by different scholars. For example, Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, 
and Ghanem (1991) cited by Weaver (2007) defined media frames as “the central organizing 
ideas for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of 
selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (p.143). This definition emphasizes providing 
context as an important aspect of news content. It also highlights different techniques used by 
news media to frame issues: “selection,” “emphasis,” “exclusion,” and elaboration.” According 
to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient  in a communicating  text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” 
(p. 52). While Tankard et al. (1991) provided a description of what frames are—“the central 
organizing ideas,”— Entman’s definition offers description of what framers want to achieve— 
“to promote a particular problem,” and how it should be defined, understood, evaluated, and 
recommended.  
From the above definition, it is important to note that all issues are not equally important 
for the news media and, therefore, the ones that are deemed more important are picked and 
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highlighted while the ones that are considered to be less important are given less emphasis or 
rejected altogether.  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter and chapter 2, framing has also been a 
prominent approach to studying social movements (Johnston, 2002, p. 62). Borrowing the 
concept of a frame from Goffman (1974), Snow et al. (1986) defined frames as “interpretative 
schemata” which “enable individuals to locate perceive, identify, and label…occurrences within 
their life space and the world at large” (p. 464). Johnston (2002) described the function of frames 
as interpretative schemata which “indicate what to look at and what is important, and thereby 
indicate what is going on” (p. 64). He further said: “A frame may also indicate, by directing 
attention away from other things, what is not important” (p. 64). 
This project used the qualitative frame analysis to answer the research questions. Reese 
(2010) described qualitative frame analysis as an interpretative research approach that 
emphasizes “the cultural and political content of news frames and how they draw upon a shared 
store of social meanings” (p. 18).  Johnston (2002) described qualitative frame analysis as a 
description of “collective action frames and their roles in movement development” (p. 72). 
Qualitative frame analysis is “based on relatively small samples that should mirror discourse” 
(Matthes, 2009, p. 351). With regards to social movements, it relies on “convenience samples of 
movement documents and/or transcribed ethnographic interviews with movements activists as 
the database” (Johnston 2002, p. 72). Frames describe texts “with detailed quotes” in depth, “but 
without quantifications” (Matthes, 2009, p. 351). Qualitative frame analysis involves “data 
reduction” which “orders a wide variety of written or spoken textual materials by categories that 
represent more general factors” (Johnston, 2002, p. 69). 
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Qualitative frame analysis has its limitations. The results are not generalizable. It does 
not also provide the cause and effect relationship between variables, such as “exposure to media 
frames and issue opinions” (Brewer & Gross, 2010, p. 173). In spite of its limitation, however, a 
qualitative approach to frame analysis helps scholars understand how people “use their reasoning 
skills, their experiences, their knowledge, and their conversations with fellow citizens to 
engage—and sometimes reconstruct—the frames that they encounter” (Brewer & Gross, 2010, p. 
173-174). 
This project used the four procedures qualitative research methods suggested by Glaser 
and Strauss (2006/1967): 1) code data to identify categories that emerge from data; 2) integrate 
categories and their properties: place categories according to their properties and rules that define 
them; 3) delimit theory: look at any overlapping categories and the changes to be made; and 4) 
write the theory- findings. 
The raw data were categorized into four broad categories based on their sources—
international news media, Oromo activists, human rights organizations, and the Ethiopian 
government officials.  Texts were printed, and video and interviews were transcribed. Further 
categories were also made based on the names of the news media organizations, activists, human 
rights organizations, government officials, and the date of publications of each data (news 
stories, editorials, reports, etc.). 
 In order to identify the themes, concepts, and meanings, the data were coded using the 
three coding stages—open coding, axial coding, and selective coding used in grounded theory 
(Corbin & Srauss, 1990) which were also used by scholars who study the frame analysis of news 
content (e.g., Gorp, 2010).  Open coding was used to identify the initial concepts, ideas, and 
meanings of the data in sentences. Then axial coding was used to see the relationship between 
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the codes identified during the open coding stage. Selective coding was used to determine the 
relationship between the major codes identified during the open coding stage. Then each 
category identified at the selective coding stage was integrated based on their common feature, 
properties, conditions, and contexts.  As discussed in the next chapters, for example, killing, 
torture, beatings, arrests, and disappearances were categorized under the major theme of 
“government response to the protests” while different categories such as economic, political, and 
cultural complaints are categorized under the theme of “the cause of the protests.” Once the 
themes emerged, their frames were also identified based on the text.   
The next four chapters are the analysis of the data from each actor—international news 
media, Oromo activists, and human rights organizations, and the Ethiopian government officials. 
They are organized based on the research questions outlined in this chapter. Hence, chapter 4 
presents the result of the analysis of the international news media. Chapter 5 analyzes Oromo 
activists' Facebook messages. Chapters 6 and 7 give the analysis of data from human rights 
organizations and Ethiopian government officials respectively.  
Each chapter starts by introducing the major themes uncovered from the study followed 
by a detailed analysis of the themes and how they were framed with examples and evidence from 
the texts analyzed. Each chapter wraps up with a summary of the findings to segue to the next 
chapter. 
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4 ANALYSIS: NEWS MEDIA  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter answers RQ1: what were the major themes of the international news media 
on the Oromo protest movement?  It discusses the major themes highlighted by the international 
news media and how they were framed.   
The results of the analysis of the texts news media indicate that the Oromo protests 
received significant media attention. The news media focused on various themes, but the major 
ones are the root causes of the Oromo protest (the problem), how the government handled it, and 
suggested solutions. However, there were variations among the different media outlets and 
among sections of the same media outlet (such as news story, editorial, and opinion piece) on the 
degree of attention given to each theme.  
All news media gave significant attention to both the root causes of the protests and how 
the government handled the protesters and framed them alike as grievance and violence 
respectively. However, they gave similar solutions but varied on how they framed those 
solutions. For example, while the Washington Post both in its news stories and editorials was 
more direct in calling for a solution such as third-party intervention (to stop the violence), the 
news media outlets such as Reuters, The Associated Press, Agence France Press, The New York 
Times, BBC, Al-Jazeera English, CNN, and The Guardian made indirect calls reflecting the 
views of activists, opposition political party leaders, and human rights groups.  
However, solutions suggested by the news media were aimed at ending the violence 
against protesters rather than addressing the root causes that prompted the protests in the first 
place. To be clear, they focused more on justice for victims of the violence than a halt to the 
Masterplan or other administrative issues that were also important to the protesters. In this 
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regard, the news media departed from the protesters’ demands. This section highlights the 
following news media themes in detail: causes of the protests, government response, and calls for 
action. 
4.2 Causes of the Protests 
The news media gave significant coverage to the causes of the Oromo protests. In 
covering the cause of the protests, they focused on 1) the immediate trigger of the protests, and 
2) on long-standing issues. While they described the Addis Ababa-Oromia Special Zones 
Integrated Masterplan, also known as the Masterplan, as the immediate trigger of the protests, 
they also highlighted long-standing economic, political, and cultural issues. The news media 
framed the causes of the Oromo protests as grievances. The four main grievance frames will be 
discussed next: economic, historical, political, and a chain of causes. 
4.2.1 Economic grievance 
At the heart of the economic grievance was the Masterplan, the government project that 
would expand the territory of Addis Ababa into the surrounding areas of the Oromia region. The 
news media portrayed the Masterplan as an attempt by the government to take away lands from 
Oromo farmers against their wishes. To this end, they used different descriptive and vivid words 
and phrases such as “landgrab” (e.g. BBC), “confiscation” (e.g. The Washington Post), and 
“annexation” (e.g., CNN).    
 The news media used the landgrab frame to describe how the Oromo people viewed the 
Masterplan. For example, CNN published an opinion piece on its website on August 9, 2016 
authored by Awol Allo, an Oromo activist himself, who claimed that the Oromo people viewed 
the Masterplan as a “blueprint for annexation” (Allo, 2016, para. 6).  On January 12, 2016, the 
BBC ran a short video clip taking the views of Mohammed Ademo, another Oromo activist, who 
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portrayed the Masterplan as “…. the landgrab disguised as a development plan” (BBC, 12, 0:45). 
Similarly, on 2 October 2016, The Washington Post’s Paul Schemm wrote an article in which he 
described the Oromo protests as a protest against land confiscation. He alluded to the 
contradiction between the numerical majority of the Oromo with marginalization and loss of 
land, saying: “The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, making up a third of the population, 
have for the past year been protesting their marginalization and the confiscation of their land for 
factories” (Schemm, 2016, para. 4).  
The news media also described the intent of the “landgrab” as a wealth transfer from 
Oromo farmers to investors. For instance, on September 13, 2016, Rick Maese of The 
Washington Post ran a short video on its website in which Athlete Feyisa Lilesa, an Oromo 
activist, said: “The Ethiopian government forced Oromo farmers off their land to sell it to foreign 
investors” (Maese, 2016, 0:39). In its article published on January 14, 2016, Schemm, the writer 
of the article, repeated the views of the Oromo people, saying: “protesters from the Oromo ethnic 
group say the government is trying to take away their lands and use them for everything from 
industrial development to luxury housing projects” (Schemm, 2016, para. 4). 
The news media associated the “landgrab” with its likely impact on the Oromo people. 
Particularly, they highlighted people’s fear of displacement/eviction without alternative means of 
livelihood. For example, on January 14, 2016, the BBC aired the views of Mohammed Ademo 
who said that the Masterplan would “evict farmers with little compensation” (BBC, 2016, 0:49). 
According to the BBC, the protests were triggered by the fears that the Masterplan would evict 
the Oromo farmers. Likewise, the Associated Press published a news story on December 23, 
2015 where Elias Meseret, the writer of the news story, quoted Merera Gudina, the leader of the 
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Oromo Federalist (OFC) party who said the Masterplan would ‘“rob famers of their land and 
rights…”’ (Meseret, 2015, para. 10).  
The fear of the impact of the landgrab was further explained by linking the loss of land to 
the loss of everything else. For example, the Agence France Press (AFP) described land as 
“everything” for the Oromo people. Boulo Justin, the writer of the news article, used a direct 
quote form Felix Horne, a researcher at Human Rights Watch who said: “for famers of Oromia 
and elsewhere in the country, their land is everything” (Justin, 2015, 2015, para. 22). AFP further 
cited explanation from Horne who said the land is ‘“critical for their food supply, for their 
identity, for their culture”’ (para 23). Similarly, The Washington Post portrayed land as a ‘means 
of livelihood” for the Oromo people. Paul Schemm, the author of the article, wrote the worries of 
Tarecha Guttama, an Oromo farmer, saying: “surrounded by three generations of family he 
supports on his farm, he said can’t imagine what he would do if the order ever came to confiscate 
his land for an investment project” (Schemm, 2016, para. 22).  
Some news media also used past experience as evidence to give legitimacy to people’s 
fear of the impact of the Masterplan. To this end, they used quotations from Oromo politicians 
and activists and explained how the lives of the Oromo people who lost their land in the past 
were affected. For instance, on August 11, 2016 Sally Hayden of Reuters quoted Merera Gudina, 
the leader of the Oromo Federalist Congress, an opposition party, as saying “many farmers who 
have been moved from land already are now living in poverty, with some women forced to turn 
to prostitution” (Hayden, 2016, p. 22). In her Reuters’ news article published on August 25, 
2016, Hayden also highlighted how the people describe their past experience due to the landgrab. 
She quoted athlete Feyisa Lilesa who described people’s experience such as being hired as a 
guard to someone on their own land as:  
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When the city expands the [authorities] would take away their land and build hotels or 
buildings, the owners of the land would them become guards [for] someone else’s 
property…that’s what the Oromo people have had to deal with again and again. (Hayden, 
2016, para. 15). 
In its news story published on October 7, 2016, Reuters also highlighted the story of 
Mulugeta, another Oromo protester, whose life was affected by the landgrab. Maasho (2016), the 
author of the article quoted Mulugeta as saying: “I went to apply for a job at a steel factory that 
was built on my family’s land, but I was turned away when they discovered I was the son of the 
previous land owner” (para. 13).    
4.2.2 Historical grievance  
In addition to the immediate trigger, the Masterplan, the news media also portrayed the 
cause of the Oromo protests as having deep roots in history. They used the historical grievance 
frame to highlight complaints about marginalization and discrimination in the political and 
economic arena. For example, the BBC on January 13, 2016 described the Oromo protests as 
something that evolved over time. It referred to unnamed “observers” who said: “Oromo protests 
build on long-standing complaints that the community has been excluded from political and 
economic power” (The BBC, 2016. para. 13). The Washington Post’s Schemm (2016) also 
provided a broad historical context by linking the establishment of Addis Ababa city and Oromo 
people’s past grievances to how they view the Masterplan now saying:    
Addis [Ababa] was established 150 years ago by Ethiopia’s dominant Amhara people in 
the heart of Oromo territory, and its expansion has come at the expense of the local 
Oromo farmers. The announcement of a “Masterplan” to manage the city’s expansion 
was seen as the latest attempt to take more land (para. 14).  
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Likewise, Reuters quoted Feyisa Lilesa as saying, the “conflict over Oromo land began 
more than 100 years ago and the marginalization of his people is equally longstanding” (Reuters, 
25 August 2016, para. 4).  
4.2.3 Political grievance  
The news media also framed the cause of the Oromo protests as a political grievance. 
They emphasized the control of the political and economic sectors by one group, especially the 
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a member party of the coalition of the ruling party of 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Force (EPRDF). TPLF represents the people of 
Tigray who constitute only 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population.  The news media used the 
political grievance frame to highlight inequality, majority rule over minority, and lack of 
democracy. 
The political grievance frame was also used by the news media to pinpoint the Oromo 
people’s complaints over inequities. The Washington Post, for example, drew attention to the 
blame on the ethnic group Tigrayans for the inequality of good work opportunities, and 
marginalization. Schemm (2016) of the Washington Post described this complaint saying the 
protesters have “increasingly singled out Tigrayans for their woes, accusing them of getting the 
best jobs and dominating the economy” (para 10).  Likewise, the New York Times’ Kushkush on 
September 13, 2016 used human rights groups as a source and wrote: “Human rights groups have 
said an authoritarian government, dominated by the Tigray ethnic group, has marginalized 
regions outside the capital, including Oromia and has engineered economic projects on lands 
without local input” (para. 6). The Washington Post’s Paul Schemm on January 14, 2016 
described how the Oromo people feel about inequality, saying they “feel they are treated like 
second-class citizens…” (para. 15). 
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The news media used the minority rule over the majority frame to underline the 
dominance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the political and economic spheres. 
Agence France Presse’s Karim Lebhour on August 10, 2016), for example, stated that political 
dominance by the minority group from Tigray is a cause of the protest by stating: “the protesters 
have different grievances but are united by their disaffection with the country’s leaders, who 
largely hail from the northern Tigray region and represent less than 10 percent of the population” 
(Lebhour, 2016, para 11). Lebhour cited opinion leaders such as Getachew Metaferia, an 
Ethiopian professor who lives in the U.S. who said: “the state [Ethiopia is] ‘controlled by an 
ethnic minority imposing its will on the majority,’ is a crucial factor in understanding the 
protests” (para.14). Victor and Gettleman (2016) of the New York Times also used the minority 
rule over the majority rule frame using population size of the Oromo and Tigray people and the 
control they have on the political, economic, and security sectors. They wrote: “Protests in the 
Oromo ethnic group, Ethiopia’s largest, say they feel marginalized. The Tigrayan ethnic group 
makes up about 6 percent of the population but dominated in politics, the military, and 
commerce” (2016, para.11).  
The Washington Post’s Maese (2016) used the minority rule over majority rule frame to 
show the Oromo people’s marginalized voice in the political arena despite their numerical 
majority. Maese pointed to the contradiction between the numerical majority and their role in 
politics by stating: “By most estimates, Oromos make up about 40 percent of the population, but 
few hold positions of power” (para. 6). Similarly, Agence France Presse in its October 5, 2016 
edition used the minority rule over the majority frame, saying: “the protesters accuse the 
country’s leaders, who largely hail from the northern Tigray region, of monopolizing power” 
(para. 17). Furthermore, it used the minority rule over majority to emphasize the feeling of 
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discrimination and marginalization as historical. It took a direct quote from Human Rights 
Watch’s statement that said “‘many Oromos have felt marginalized and discriminated against by 
successive Ethiopian governments and have often felt unable to voice their concerns over 
government policies’” (para 10).  
The news media also framed the cause of the Oromo protest as lack of democracy in the 
country. Particularly they focused on issues such as elections, the authoritarian nature of the 
government, and people’s frustration about it. They magnified protesters’ claims about “rigged’ 
elections. For example, on December 25, 2016, Paul Schemm of the Washington Post used a 
direct quote by an Oromo farmer who complained that government officials were not the ones 
the people voted for, saying: ‘“During the past elections [in 2015], those that came to power 
were not the ones chosen by the people…. we don’t know where the ballots of the people go’” 
(para. 27). Schemm on The Washington Post’s edition of January 15, 2016 also tried to draw 
attention to the 2015 national election in which the ruling party won all parliamentary seats 
whereas opposition political parties did not win even a single seat. Schemm linked the accusation 
of vote fraud to the May 2015 election “in legislative elections in May [2015], not a single 
opposition candidate won a seat, prompting accusations of widespread vote fraud by the ruling 
party” (para. 27). Likewise, on October 3, 2016, Schemm also wrote that “government-allied 
parties won every seat in parliament in the 2015 elections” (para. 21). Schemm on January 15, 
2016 also associated the cause of the Oromo protest with authoritarianism. For example, it cited 
activist Seyoum Teshome as saying the country was under the authoritarian system. In a similar 
manner, Jocey Fortin of The New York Times on December 16, 2015 used the lack of democracy 
frame to indicate the government’s nature of authoritarianism. She criticized the government by 
alluding to the 2015 national elections, saying: “In a telling sign of its dominance, the governing 
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Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front and its allies won all 547 seats in national 
elections in May” (para. 9). Furthermore, Fortin (2015) used a quote by Merera Gudina, the 
leader of Oromo Federalist Party, who said: ‘“people are frustrated to live under this 
government, frustrated with the election, frustrated with their local governments, frustrated with 
their whole lives”’ (para. 13). She described the contradiction of the government system itself 
saying:  
The central government presides over a federalist system that, on paper, ensures equal 
rights for more than 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia. But many Oromo activists complain of 
political and socioeconomic marginalization that stretches back generations. The 
masterplan has become a rallying point. (para.14). 
Some news media also highlighted protesters’ claims that government officials violated 
their constitutional rights. For example, the Masterplan was also portrayed as a violation of 
federalism. Fortin (2015) of The New York Times emphasized this by quoting Hallelujah Lulie, 
an activist, who said:  
However, beyond the issue of the proposed master plan, the protests are caused by 
broader issues, including the proper implementation of federalism and the capital’s 
relationship with the Oromo Community that surrounds it. The movement, which is 
informed by historic injustices, also targets bad governance and calls for respect for 
human and political rights. (para15). 
Generally, the news media gave significant coverage to the cause of the Oromo protest 
movement by focusing both on the immediate trigger and long-lasting issues. The following 
quote from Merera Gudina, the leader of the Oromo Federalist Congress, by Hayden (2016) of 
the Reuters summarizes most of the findings discussed in this section: ‘“people are demanding 
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their rights…. people are fed up with what the regime has been doing for a quarter of a century. 
They protest against landgrab, reparations, stolen elections, the rising cost of living, many 
things”’ (para. 3).  
4.2.4  Chain of causes  
The news media also highlighted a chain of causes; the protests were sustained by new 
demands. That is, although the news media portrayed political, economic, and historical issues as 
contributing factors to the Oromo protests, they also highlighted that government responses to 
the protests were escalating factors. For example, the protests were originally prompted by the 
Masterplan, but as the government started arresting and killing some protesters, new demands 
such as the release of political prisoners and demand for justice for those who were killed by 
security forces were added to the list of demands. Hence, the protests did not stop even after the 
government announced the cancellation of the Masterplan, the initial demand.  
Agence France Presse in its article published on October 3, 2016 summarized how the 
Oromo protesters expanded their questions to include other questions saying: “the project was 
binned; however, a brutal crackdown on the protests kindled simmering anger against iron-fisted 
leaders who largely hail from the northern Tigray region and represent less than 10 percent of the 
population” (para19). Similarly, Elias Meseret of The Associated Press on October 11, 2016, 
described how the protests continued due to a chain of causes despite the cancellation of the 
Masterplan. To quote it directly, he wrote: “while the government later gave up the idea [of the 
master plan], the protests broadened into a demand for more rights and for the release of detained 
activists, opposition figures and journalists” (Meseret, 2016, para. 2). Reuters’ Maasho (2016) on 
August 8, 2016 also covered how the protesters’ demands shifted from a specific demand, the 
cancellation of the Masterplan, to the government itself saying:  
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Unrest flared in Oromiya for several months until early this year over plans to allocate 
farmland surrounding the regional capital for development. Authorities scrapped the 
scheme in January. But protests flared again over the continued detention of opposition 
demonstrators. (para. 2).   
4.3 Government Response 
Two lifeless bodies lay on the ground as the terrified crowd, armed only with sticks 
against gun-toting Ethiopian security forces, fled the fierce crackdown on protesters. 
Blood seeped a sheet covering one of the bodies on the road outside Wolenkomi, a town 
just 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the capital Addis Ababa. (Boulo, 2015, para, 1). 
The above quote from Agence France Presse’s Justine Boulo on December 22, 2015 is 
just an example of another theme—government officials’ response to the Oromo protests—that 
received significant attention from the news media. Under this theme, the news media 
highlighted the use of force by security forces that resulted in the arrest, torture, and death of 
protesters. The news media used the violence frame to describe the government response against 
the Oromo protesters.  
In order to highlight the level of violence, the news media used different descriptive 
words and phrases such as “crackdown”/ “bloody crackdown” (e.g., Al-Jazeera); “brutal 
crackdown” (e.g., BBC); “politics of death” (e.g., Reuters); “shot dead” (e.g., The Associated 
Press); and deadly protests” (e.g., Agence France Presse). They published news stories with 
titles that directly show the type (e.g., arrests and killings) and level of violence against the 
Oromo protesters. The following Table 1 shows some examples of the news media that used 
titles that show the violence.  
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Table 1 Examples of the News Media that that Show Violence Against Oromo Protesters  
 
News Media  Title 
Al-Jazeera -
English 
• “Ethiopia’s crackdown on dissent takes rising toll: Rights groups say 
140 people killed in recent as government moves forward with 
controversial development plan (10 January 2016) 
• “‘Ethiopia accused of bloody crackdown on protesters….” (22 
February 2016) 
 
BBC • “Amnesty warns against “brutal crackdown’ on protesters” (17 
December 2015)  
• “Ethiopian government ‘kills 140 Oromo Protests’” (8 January 2016) 
• “Ethiopian forces ‘killed 400 Oromo protesters’” (16 June 2016) 
 
Reuters • “Ethiopian opposition figures arrested over land protests” (25 
December 2015) 
• “Ethiopian students demand end to police crackdowns in rare protest” 
(8 March 2016) 
• “Politics of death: The map maker who finds the bodies in Ethiopia’s 
land battle” (28 June 2017) 
• “At least 90 protesters killed in Ethiopia: residents, opposition” (8 
August 2016) 
 
The Associated 
Presse 
• “Several dozen shot dead in weekend protests across Ethiopia” (8 
August 2016) 
 
Agence France 
Presse 
• “Rights groups criticize Ethiopia suppression of deadly protests” (17 
December 2015) 
 
The Washington 
Post 
• “Ethiopia silences its critics with deadly crackdown on dissent” (8 
January 2016 
• “Ethiopia meets protests with bullets” (11 October 2016) 
 
4.3.1  Different types and levels of violence  
The news media used vivid and descriptive language to highlight the nature of the 
government violence against the protesters. In the excerpt quoted earlier, Boulo (2015) of 
Agence France Presse, for example, described the death of protesters as “two lifeless bodies lay 
on the ground….” In the same excerpt, she also described the ensued emotion using the phrase 
(“…terrified crowd…”). She further highlighted imbalance of force between participants 
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(“…armed only with sticks against gun-toting Ethiopian security forces”). To the level of 
violence, it used the phrase “fierce crackdown on protestors.” Boulo also tried to create further 
images of the violence in the readers’ minds by saying “Blood seeped a sheet covering one of the 
bodies on the road….” (para, 2). 
Like Agence France Presse, The Washington Post also used similar descriptive language 
to highlight the violence against Oromo protesters. For example, Paul Schemm, the author of the 
news article, published on August 9, 2016, used a picture of many pairs of shoes with the caption 
that read: “protesters’ shoes lie scattered on the sidewalk in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on Aug. 6 
after demonstrators were arrested and taken away by police.” In this news story, Schemm gave 
salience to how the government treated the protesters, for example, by forcing them to walk 
barefoot and beating them: “the detained protesters walked barefoot through the rain, escorted by 
grim-faced police officers who casually beat them with batons to keep them moving” (para.2). 
By referring to what was going on in different parts of the country as a “bloody story” and citing 
the Human Rights Watch’s estimation of 400 deaths over months, he portrayed the action of the 
government against protesters as “harsh” (para. 13).  
In its editorial published on October 11, 2016, The Washington Post was even more 
direct in describing government officials’ violent response to the protesters. For example, in its 
choice of the title: “Ethiopia meets protests with bullets,” it clearly indicated the means of the 
violence, i.e., bullets. By referring to the death of protesters at Irreecha festival in Bishoftu on 
October 2, 2016, the editorial framed the government response as “tragic and emblematic of the 
government’s wrongheaded use of force” (The Washington Post Editorial, 2016, para. 2). The 
stampede at the Irreecha festival resulted in the death of more than 52 people after security forces 
used teargas and live ammunition to disperse protesters.  
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In another editorial published on January 8, 2016 with the title: “Ethiopia silences its 
critics with a deadly crackdown on dissent,” The Washington Post also highlighted the 
government response as “devastating violence” (para. 1). It used the “devastating violence” 
frame as a choice the government officials made over “dialogue” to address the protesters’ 
demands. CNN also used the violence frame to describe the security forces’ response to the 
protesters. For example, Awol Allo, in an opinion piece published on August 9, 2016, described 
the level of force against the protesters as “overwhelming.”  He wrote that “the government used 
overwhelming force to crush the protests, killing hundreds of protestors and arresting thousands” 
(para. 8).  
Likewise, The New York Times highlighted a violence theme. For example, in its news 
story titled: “A Generation is Protesting in Ethiopia, Long a U.S. Ally” (16, September 2016), 
Gettleman used a 32-second video by posted Upadhye (2012) captioned: “Demonstrators 
demanding political change in Ethiopia have been met with violent resistance by the 
government.” The video shows security forces beating protesters with sticks. At one point it also 
shows a police officer kicking a protester in the face with a military combat boot. In order to 
highlight the violence theme, the New York Times article also hyperlinked to another video of the 
Human Rights Watch posted on June 15, 2016. The video shows, among other things, police 
officers whipping protesters with sticks and forcing others to do handstands.  
Gettleman (2016) of The New York Times also drew attention to different types of 
violence against protesters. For example, he quoted human rights groups saying: “opposition 
within the country has been limited, with dissents effectively silenced. Many have been exiled, 
jailed, killed or driven to the far reaches of the desert” (para. 5). In its other article published on 
September 13, 2016, Kushkush, the author of the article, used the violence frame to emphasize 
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how even children and pregnant women were victims. For example, it quoted Athlete and activist 
Feyisa Lilesa who said:  
I had been witnessing the suffering of my people….This is not new to me, but we have 
not seen what we are seeing now when young children and pregnant women and elderly 
are being killed; things got worse by the day in the last nine months (para. 11).  
In the New York Times’ edition of August 21, 2016, Victor Daniel and Jeffrey Gettleman 
also referenced human rights groups saying: “…they [protesters] have been met by brutal 
crackdowns by the government including the shooting death of unarmed protesters” (para. 10).  
Reuters also used the violence frame to describe the government response to the protests. 
For example, in its news story published on October 2, 2016, titled: “Dozens killed in stampede 
in Ethiopia after police fired warning shots at protests,” Maasho (2016) posted a video. The 
video clip shows many men and women in cultural attire converging on Hora Harsadee, a 
lakeside where the annual Irreecha festival is celebrated, singing the Irreecha songs.  After a few 
seconds, the video shows many young people shouting “we need justice” by crossing their arms 
above their head—a symbol of resistance used by Oromo protesters. Then, the video shows 
police firing teargas to disperse the protesters which led to a stampede, which in turn resulted in 
the death of more than 50 people.  Then, it showed people being plunged into ditches and many 
of them trying to come out of the ditches, some falling down. In the same text, Reuters used 
pictures of some injured protesters lying on the ground with a caption: “Injured protesters wait 
for help after several people died during the Irreecha, the thanksgiving festival of the Oromo 
people in Bishoftu town of Oromia region, Ethiopia, October 2, 2016. REUTERS/Tiksa Negeri.” 
Maasho (2016) also used description of a witness who “saw people dragging out a dozen or more 
victims, showing no obvious sign of life” (para.9).  It also quoted another witness who said, 
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“Half a dozen people, also motionless, were seen being taken by pick-up truck to a hospital...” 
(para. 9).  
4.3.2 Violence frame to blame the government  
The news media used the violence frame to portray government security forces as 
perpetrators of the violence. As shown in the preceding paragraph, Reuters’ Maasho (2016) used 
a video showing security forces firing tear gas on peaceful protesters. Likewise, the Associated 
Press’ Meseret (2016) on October 2, 2016 accused the government security of committing 
violence against peaceful protesters at annual Irreecha event of 2016. He quoted Mulatu 
Gemechu, an opposition leader, who said the protesters were “peaceful and did not carry 
anything to harm police” (para. 11).  Meseret also cited its own reporter at the scene as a witness 
saying: “Before the stampede, an AP saw a small group of people walking in the crowd and 
holding up their crossed wrists in a popular gesture of protest. The reporter also saw police firing 
tear gas and, later, several injured people” (para 12 – 13).   
In its March 9, 2016, the BBC also characterized government security forces as the 
perpetrators of the violence. It describes how the attempt by police to force peaceful people to 
turn off a nationalistic song turned into a violence that resulted in death and injury as follows:  
A bus filled with a wedding party taking the bride to the groom's home was stopped at a 
routine checkpoint on 12 February near the southern Ethiopian town of Shashamane. 
Local police told revellers [] to turn off the nationalistic Oromo music playing. They 
refused and the bus drove off. The situation then rapidly escalated and reports indicate at 
least one person died and three others were injured after police fired shots (para. 2-4)  
The Associated Press’ Elias Meseret on August 22, 2016 also mentioned a video clip he 
said the Associated Press obtained (but it didn’t post) claiming it showed security forces 
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committing acts of violence including “beating, kicking and dragging several protesters” (para. 
11). On June 16, 2016 Emanuel Igunza of the BBC cited the Human Rights Watch as a source to 
allege the government was “using excessive force” against protesters (para. 19). Referring to the 
same source, he said “some of those interviewed [by Human Rights Watch] allege they were 
hung by their ankles and beaten while others described having electric shocks applied to their 
feet while in detention. Several women also claim to have been raped and sexually assaulted” 
(para. 20 – 21).  
4.3.3 Violence frame to describe the impact  
The news media also used the violence frame to describe the impact of the government 
officials’ response on the daily lives of the people.  For example, on December 22, 2015, Boulo 
(2015) of Agence France Presse included in the news a story of a woman whose only son was 
killed by the government security forces as an example. The woman equated the death of her 
only son to her own death saying: “‘That was my only son,’” [she was referring to one of the two 
dead bodies described by AFP as “two lifeless bodies mentioned at the beginning of this section] 
a woman sobbed. They have killed me’” (para. 3). In its article published on February 25, 2016, 
Agence France Presse also indicated how the presence of security forces affected the daily lives 
of the people saying: “Oromia ….is dotted with machine-gun mounted vehicles and Ethiopian 
soldiers who locals say have disrupted daily life with incessant checks, harassment, and 
intimidation” (para. 2). It also used a direct quote from an unnamed “mother of two aged in her 
forties” who said: ‘“I am very scared for our children, for our youths. Our life has become hell 
and it has no meaning’” (para. 4).  
Other media outlets such as Al-Jazeera English, CNN, and The Guardian also highlighted 
the violence theme. Unlike other news media, these media outlets depended more on information 
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from human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and activists 
such as athlete Feyisa Lilesa.    
4.4 Call for Action 
Ethiopia’s human rights abuses and political repression must be addressed frontally by 
the United States and Europe, no longer shunted to the back burner because of 
cooperation fighting terrorism. With the state of emergency, Ethiopia’s leaders are 
borrowing a brutal and counterproductive tactic from dictators the world over who have 
tried to put a cork in genuine popular dissent. It won’t work! (The Washington Post, 
Editorial Bord, 2016, para.5) 
“Oromo Protests: Why US must stop enabling Ethiopia?” (CNN, 9 August 2016)  
The above two excerpts are from the Washington Post’s editorial published on October 
11, 2016, and an opinion piece published on the CNN website on August 9, 2016 respectively. In 
addition to the causes of the Oromo protests, and government response, the news media also 
gave significant coverage to the solution to the problem. The suggested solutions include a call 
for independent investigation, framed as justice, and a call for a pressure by a third party, framed 
as third-party intervention.  
In its editorial page published on October 11, 2016, the Washington Post Editorial Board 
blamed the Ethiopian government officials for rights abuses, the state of emergency (announced 
on October 9, 2016), the death of protesters at the 2016 Irreecha event, and the death of more 
than 500 people during the protests. The editorial characterized the violence by the government 
as a threat to a foreign investment, which it described as “the pillar of the Ethiopia’s 
development agenda” (para. 4).  
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4.4.1 Blame third Party  
The Washington Post’s Editorial Board published on January 8, 2016 played the activist 
role; it blamed the United States government, especially the Obama administration for not doing 
enough to stop the violence against protesters in Oromia. For example, by referring to the 
statement by the United States that stated it was “very concerned over the situation in Ethiopia,” 
the Washington Post Editorial Board blamed the USA for stopping “short of explicitly urging the 
Ethiopian government to refrain from violently cracking down on protesters” (para. 4).  It also 
criticized the Obama administration for characterizing Ethiopia as ‘“a model and voice for 
development in Africa”’ (para. 5). It further suggested that the United States’ unconditional 
praise for the ruling party in Ethiopia would undermine its own commitment to democracy 
saying:  
But as long as Ethiopia’s authoritarian master plan for development included the 
suffocation of political opposition, a blatant disregard for human rights and cracking 
down on media, U.S. praise of the EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front] regime will continue to undermine its claim to support democracy on 
the continent. (para. 5).  
CNN in its opinion piece published on August 9, 2016 also blamed the United States’ 
support for the Ethiopian government. Awol Allo, the author of the piece, criticized the United 
States’ view of Ethiopia as a “critical partner on the Global War on Terror” (para. 18). He 
claimed that this made “administration officials go out of their way to create fantasy stories 
which cast Ethiopia as democratic and its leaders as progressive” (para. 19). Allo was referring 
to statements of three officials of the United States: Susan Rice, the then U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations; Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and President 
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Barak Obama. In 2012, in her speech at the funeral of Meles Zenawi, the former prime minster 
of Ethiopia, Rice described the late prime minister as “uncommonly wise – able to see the big 
picture and the long game, even when others would allow immediate pressures to overwhelm 
sound judgment” (Rice, 2012, 02:16). In 2015, in her press conference with Tedros Adhanom, 
the minster of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Wendy Sherman described 
Ethiopia as “a democracy that is moving forward in an election that we expect to be free, fair, 
credible, open and inclusive” (Sherman, 2015, para.2). In 2015, when he visited Ethiopia, 
President Obama described the government as “democratically elected government” (Obama, 
2015, 0:22:49).    
4.4.2 Third-party intervention  
One of the solutions suggested by the news media was intervention by a third party. That 
is, instead of directly calling on the parties in conflict—Ethiopian government and the Oromo 
protest movement activists—to address the issues, it called on other actors such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United Nations. The Washington Post 
Editorial Board on October 11, 2016 called specifically on the United States and Europe to 
address the violence. It argued that cooperation of these countries with Ethiopia on the fight 
against terrorism should not hold them back from addressing the human rights issue. It tried to 
draw attention to the implication of the state of emergency saying: “Ethiopia’s leaders are 
borrowing a brutal and counterproductive tactic from dictators the world over who have tried to 
put a cork in genuine popular dissent” (para. 5).  
4.4.3 Intervention—use your money  
The news media called on the West to use its aid money to help Ethiopia to stop the 
violence against the Oromo protesters. For example, in its editorial published on August 9, 2016, 
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the Washington Post Editorial Board carried a title with a question mark, also suggestive of a 
solution: “Ethiopia’s regime has killed hundreds. Why is the West still giving it aid? By 
juxtaposing the loss of life (the killing of hundreds by security forces) with the aid money that 
goes to the same government that kills protesters, it put a moral challenge to the West. By 
referring to the killing of at least 90 people by security forces in the weekend of August 6-7 (it 
hyperlinked to Reuters’ news story published on August 8, 2016), the Washington Post Editorial 
Board suggested the West use its aid money to influence Ethiopia saying: “the weekend’s 
bloodshed should prompt the West to reconsider its aid to the regime [of Ethiopia] (para. 2). The 
Editorial Board also suggested cooperation with Ethiopia to fight terrorism should not be at the 
expense of the human rights situation in Ethiopia. Hence, it criticized the United States for 
focusing on cooperation on terrorism while ignoring the human rights situations saying:  
The United States has long relied on Ethiopia as a partner in the fight against al-Shabab’s 
terrorism in Somalia and sends the country tens of millions of dollars in development 
assistance, tiptoeing around Ethiopia’s human rights abuses and resistance to democratic 
reforms…. The Obama administration should encourage a credible investigation into the 
killings and publicly make clear that Ethiopia’s continued crackdowns are unacceptable. 
(para. 4). 
BBC in its post published on March 9, 2016 also suggested the role of the third-party 
intervention to stop violence against protesters. For example, in its discussion of the 
government’s arrest of the leaders of the Oromo Federalist Congress, it took a direct quote from 
Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist, who challenged the governments of the United 
States and the United Kingdom saying: “Also what is the UK and US doing? As major donors to 
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Ethiopia they should be taking the lead to get the government to work out an agreement [with 
opposition political party leaders]” (para. 28).   
Some news media also highlighted the need for third-party intervention to ensure justice. 
For example, the Washington Post Editorial on August 9, 2016 called on the United States to 
“encourage a credible investigation into the killings and publicly make clear that Ethiopia’s 
continued crackdowns are unacceptable” (para. 4). It also called on the European Union to look 
into its ‘“cash for cooperation”’ relation with Ethiopia. By “cash for cooperation” it meant EU’s 
support for Ethiopia with aid and trade benefits in exchange for the latter’s help in solving the 
migration and refugee issue in Europe. It characterized the violence in Ethiopia as a challenge to 
the EU saying: “Now Ethiopia is providing a litmus test of the stated E.U. commitment to human 
rights” (para. 4). It demanded the EU to make the “cash for cooperation” with Ethiopia 
conditional on addressing human rights violations and maintaining justice. Hence, it wrote:  
If Ethiopia continues its pattern of abusing its citizens and stifling dissent, and if it fails to 
credibly investigate the recent killings, the European Union should make clear to the 
regime that it risks being dropped from the migrant agreements. (para. 5).  
The news media in their news section also highlighted the need for third-party 
intervention. However, unlike the editorials and opinion piece seen in the preceding paragraphs 
which made a direct call for third-party intervention, the news media in their news sections 
highlighted a call made by activists and human rights groups for third-party intervention. For 
example, Agence France Presse in its news story published on September 13, 2016 cited athlete 
and activist Feyisa Lilesa who said the United States can influence Ethiopia. Blanc (2016) of the 
Agence France Presse quoted Lilesa as saying: ‘“I want to tell the world what is happening”’ 
(para. 12). Likewise, Aaron Maasho of Reuters in the news story published on October 9, 2016, 
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highlighted the call by U.N. experts for international investigation into the government response 
to Oromo protests. In its news story on October 5, 2016, Agence France Presse also cited an 
official of Amnesty International who called for investigation into the violence by government 
security forces against protesters. It quoted Michelle Kagari, Amnesty International’ regional 
office as saying: “given the contradictory accounts [different numbers on casualties at Irreecha 
event], it is critical that an investigation be held to unearth the truth and identify law enforcement 
officers criminally responsible” (para.8). 
4.5 Summary  
As indicated at the outset, this chapter answered RQ1: What were the major themes of the 
international news media on Oromo protests? How were they framed?  In sum, three major 
themes were identified: the cause of the protest, the government's response, and the solution (end 
to violence).  
The news media portrayed the trigger of the protest as mainly political, economic, and 
historical grievances (although, acknowledging a chain of causes), while they used the violence 
frame to describe the government's response by highlighting killings, jailing, arbitrary arrests, 
and tortures of the those who participated in the protests. In the call for action (solution) theme, 
the news media called for an investigation into the violence and called for third-party 
intervention to end the violence. They framed the solution theme as getting justice for the 
victims. However, as indicated earlier, the call for action by the news media was mainly aimed at 
ending the violence, not addressing the political and economic causes that prompted the protest. 
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5 ANALYSIS: OROMO ACTIVISTS’ SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS 
5.1 Introduction  
This project also sought to uncover the major themes of the Oromo social media activists 
and their frames in answer to Research Question 2. Hence, this chapter presents the findings of 
the analysis of the texts of the Oromo social media activists on three events: “the Oromia Grand 
Rally,” the Rio 2016 Olympics, and the Irreecha Festival of 2016. Oromo activists highlighted 
different themes during these events. The major themes highlighted by Oromo activits are cause 
of the protest, government action, and call for action.  
Analysis of the texts produced before and after the #GrandOromiaRally indicate that 
activists focused on different themes related to political and economic rights; violence against 
the protesters by the government security forces; justice; environmental issues; and state 
terrorism. On the Rio 2016 Olympic event, they focused more on the implication of Lilesa’s 
action on the Oromo protests by highlighting the global attention the Oromo protests was 
receiving; praising Feyisa Lilesa and discussing the impact of his action on the Oromo protests. 
Following October 2, 2016, however, the major themes that dominated the activists' messages 
were an expression of different feelings that include anger at the news media for not covering the 
incident enough or misrepresenting it, grievance, hope, and determination.  
5.2 #GrandOromiaRally 
The Oromo protest movement held what they branded a “Grand Oromia Rally” on 6 
August 2016. The rally was significant in the history of the Oromo protest movement for three 
main reasons. First, the protests covered a large area of the Oromia region. It took place in 
around 200 cities and towns (Opride, 2016). Second, the government security forces responded 
with with force that resulted in the death of many protesters. Third, it received significant 
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coverage of the international media. This section presents the major themes of social media 
discussion both before and after the rally. 
In the pre-rally social media discussion, activists focused on six major themes:  political 
rights, economic rights, an end to violence, justice, environmental protection, and state terrorism. 
However, analysis of the post-rally activity indicates a shift of the themes of discussion to what 
occurred on the day of the rally: violence against the protesters; expression of solidarity, 
determination, and hope; warning to the government; and defending and praising the protesters.  
 
 
Figure 1 Slogans of Oromo Protesters Before the #GrandOromiaRally 
 
5.2.1  The pre-rally discussion  
On 5 August 2016, one day before the rally, they posted a statement titled: “The grand 
Oromia rally for freedom, justice, voice, and peace,” for “immediate release.”  In the statement, 
the activists portrayed the aim of the rally as an expression of “deep-seated mass grievances, 
country-wide anguish []and suffering, widespread violations of rights” (Ararssa, 2016a, para. 1).  
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In the statement activists also provided the plan to hold rallies in more than 200 cities, 
advising protesters to stay connected and share information. They also made a call to others to 
join them: “We march in the company of all people who, like the Oromos were wronged by the 
regime’s ruthless dictatorial, at times, even terroristic practices” (Ararssa, 2016 para.5)  
They justified the rally by pointing out that it “comes at a time when the regime lost all 
kinds of reason by placing elite political benefit over public service, self-interest over justice, and 
oppression over inequality, and most importantly, privileging members of one ethnic group over 
those of others” (Ararssa, 2016, para, 5).  
Before the rally, the Oromo social media activists also shared some demands in the form 
of slogans to be carried by protesters on the rally (see figure 1 above). The analysis of these 
slogans showed that activists highlighted six major themes which were: demands for political 
rights, economic rights, an end to violence, justice, environmental protection, and an end to state 
terrorism. The following table (Table 2) summarizes the major themes, specific demands, and the 
pre-rally slogans shared by Mohammed (2016a). 
Table 2 Summary of the Major Themes, Specific Demands, and Slogans 
 
Themes Specific 
demands 
Slogans  
Political rights    
Self-rule  
“Agaaziin Oromiyaa keessaa haa ba’u” [“Agazi out of Oromia”] 
“Self-rule now” 
“No to military rule” 
“Genuine federal self-rule now” 
“Oromiyaa raayyaa waraanaatin bulchuun haa hafu” [“stop military 
rule in Oromia”] 
“Bulchiinsa raayyaa waraanaa didneerra” [“No to military rule”] 
“End Agazi rule in Oromia” 
“Finfineenn haandhuura Oromiyaati” [“Finfinnee is the core of 
Oromia”] 
“Finfinnee bulchuu barbaanna” [We need to rule Finfinnee”] 
Freedom 
of the 
press 
“Unchain press media and information” 
“Gaazexxeessummaan yakka miti” [“journalism is not a crime”] 
“Blogging is not a crime” 
91 
Religious 
rights  
“Bilisummaan amantii haa kabajamu”[“respect religious freedom”] 
Human 
rights  
“Migi namoota maraaf haa kabajamu” [“respect the of all”] 
“All human right for all now” 
“Mirgi mursi jiraachuu haa kabajamu” [“respect right to life”] 
Language 
and 
Identity 
“Our language, Afaan Oromo; Our land, Oromia; Our identity, 
Oromummaa are non-negotiable” 
“Afaan Oromo for Ethiopia, Ethiopia for Afaan Oromo [“Afaan Oromo 
for Ethiopia, Ethiopia for Afaan Oromo” 
“Afaan Oromoo Afaan hojii federaalaa haata’u” [“we want Afaan 
Oromo to be the federal language”] 
Economic 
rights  
Lands “Oromia is not for sale” 
“Qonnaan bulaa lafa isaarraa buqqaasuun haa dhaabbatu” [“Stop 
evicting farmers from their lands”] 
“Buqqatootaaf beenyaa gahaan haa kaffalmu” [“fair compensation for 
people evicted from their lands”] 
Violence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End to 
violence 
(killing) 
“Oromo ajjeessuun haadhaabbatu” [“stop killing the Oromo”] 
 
“Ajjeessuun haa dhaabbatu” [“stop killing”] 
“Ajjeechaa fi hidhaan nurraa haadhaabbatu” [“stop killing and 
imprisoning”] 
“Stop killing Oromos: Oromo lives matter” 
“Stop the massacre of our children” 
“Ajjeechaan daa’imman keenyaa haadhabbatu” [“stop killing our 
children”] 
“Stop the killing”  
“Bloodshed breeds bloodshed” 
End to 
violence 
(arrest) 
“Hidhamtoonni siyaasaa haa hiikkaman” [“release political prisoners”] 
“Baqqalaan Garbaa haa hiikamu” [“release Bekele Gerba”] 
“Release political prisoners” 
“Baqqalaa garbaafi Iskandir Naggaa haa hiikaman” [“release Bekele 
Gerba and Eskinder Nega”] 
“Yoonaattan Tasfaayee fi Olbaanaa Leellisaa haa hiikaman” [“Releae 
Yonatan Tesfaye and Olbana Lelisa”] 
“Hidhamtoonni siyaasaa marti haa hiikaman” [“release all political 
prisoners”] 
“Yoonaattan Tasfaayee fi Olbaanaa Leellisaa haa hiikaman” [“Release 
Yonatan Tesfaye and Olbana Lelisa”] 
“Hidhamtoonni siyaasaa hunduu haa hiikaman” [“release political 
prisoners”] 
End to 
torture 
“Stop the torture” 
“Maa’ikelaawiin haa diigamu” [“demolish Ma’ikelawi”] 
“Stop the abuse in Gambella” 
Justice Justice  “Lubbuun Obbolaa keenyaa yakka 1 malee ajjeefamanii haqa haa 
argatu” [“Justice for our brothers who were killed without any crime”] 
“Yakkamtoonni lubbuu balleessan seeraaf haa dhiyaatan” [“Criminals 
who killed lives should be brought to court”]. 
 “No dumping waste in Oromia” 
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5.2.1.1 Political demands  
Oromo social media activists focused on rights in general, and some specific rights they 
want respected. They highlighted four major rights: political, economic, and freedom of speech. 
Activist focused on rights generally. For example, from the slogans posted on social media one 
reads, “All human rights for all.”  Another one reads: “Bilisummaa, walqixxummaa fi dimokrasii 
barbaanna” [we need freedom, equality, and democracy].  
Activists demanded political rights such as administrative rights, particularly self-rule 
respected. They demanded the Agazi force, the special military force perceived to ensure the 
interests of TPLF, to leave Oromia, their state: “Agaziin Oromiyaa keessaa haa ba’u” [“Agazi 
out of Oromia”]. They demanded an end to interference in the administrative affairs of their 
region saying, “self-rule now” and “genuine federal self-rule now.” The self-rule rights also 
included the right to rule Finfinnee (Addis Ababa), the capital city, which is geographically in 
Oromia but has a semi-autonomous administration. On the issue of Finfinnee (Addis Ababa), 
most activists point to the Constitution, which recognizes the Oromia region’s special interests 
(legal jurisdiction) on Addis Ababa, but which has never been materialized.  
Oromo social media activists also highlighted that freedom of the press was one the 
reasons to take part in the Grand Oromia Rally. They used the slogan, “Unchain press media and 
information.” “Unchain” implies both the status of the press freedom and activists demand to 
Environmental 
protection  
“Iddoowaan daraaraa lafa qonnaan bulaa keenyarraa martinuu haa 
diigaman [“shut down all flowers farmings on our farmers’ land”] 
State-
terrorism  
 “Nuti Oromoota, miti shorokeessitoota” [“we are Oromos, not 
terrorists”] 
“We are Oromos, not terrorists” 
“Stop terrorizing people” 
“Ummata shororkeessuun didneerra” [“stop terrorizing people”]  
93 
free it. One slogan reads: “Blogging is not a crime.” They also demanded the release of journalist 
and blogger, Eskinder Nega. 
Among the demands of the Oromo social media protests was the respect of religious 
freedom.  Ethiopian Muslims were protesting against what they believe government’s 
interference in their religious affairs (IRIN, 2012). So, the activists demanded respect for 
religious rights: “Bilisummaan amantii haa kabajamu” [“respect religious freedom”]. 
The Oromo people have long complained about cultural grievances. These grievances 
were also reflected in their slogans for the Grand Oromia Rally. For example, in one slogan they 
highlighted the importance of their language and identity. Our language, Afaan Oromo; our land, 
Oromia; and our identity, Oromummaa [“Oromo-ness”] are non-negotiable. Among their slogans 
are also their demands to make Afaan Oromo the federal language of Ethiopia: Afaan Oromoo 
Afaan hojii federaalaa haa’ta’u [“We want Afaan Oromo to be the federal working language of 
Ethiopia”]. Note: Afaan Oromo is the official language of the Oromia region, but it is not the 
federal language. So, many Oromos complain that their children cannot find a job in the federal 
government offices, as they require Amharic, the federal working language. They also 
highlighted that both Afaan Oromo and Ethiopia need each other: “Afaan Oromo for Ethiopia, 
Ethiopia for Afaan Oromo.”  
Oromo social media activists also used slogans that demanded respect for human rights in 
general. These demands were reflected in their slogans such as Mirgi namoota maraaf haa 
kabajamu” [“respect for the rights of all”], “all human rights for all.” Oromo social media 
activists also demanded the rights of non-Oromos such as Mursi.  
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5.2.1.2 Economic demands 
As discussed in the news media analysis part, the immediate trigger of the Oromo protest 
movement relates to the land, the Addis Ababa Masterplan. So, the Oromo social media activists 
highlighted it at the Grand Oromia Rally. They highlighted that their life is inseparable from 
their lands: “Lafti Keenya lafee keenya” [our land is our bone”]. They framed the Masterplan as 
a government plan to sell their lands to investors. They portrayed it as a scheme to sell the entire 
Oromia region: “Oromia is not for sale.” They emphasized that Oromia belongs to Oromo 
farmers: “Our land for our farmers.” In addition, they demanded compensation for those evicted: 
“Buqqaatootaaf beenyaa gahaan haa kaffalmu” [“fair compensation for people evicted from their 
lands”]. 
5.2.1.3  End to the violence 
Most slogans by the Oromo activists focused on an end to state violence against the 
Oromo people. They listed different types of violence including killings, arrests, torture. They 
demanded the killings to stop in general: “stop killing.” They emphasized the target of the 
killings. One slogan reads: “Oromoo ajjeessuun haa dhaabbatu” [“Stop killing the Oromo 
people”] while another reads: “Stop killing Oromo: Oromo lives matters.” Another slogan 
further specified it saying, “Stop the massacre of children.” Another slogan warned the 
government that killing does not solve the problem, it would rather intensify it: “Bloodshed 
breeds bloodshed.”   
Activists also shared slogans that demand the government end arresting people. They 
used a general call on the government. Some of the slogans referred to the prisoners as “political 
prisoners” suggesting they were arrested not because they committed any crime but for their 
political views. They mentioned some politicians such as Bekele Gerba, the opposition leaders of 
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the Oromo Federalist Congress party, Eskinder Nega, a journalist and blogger, and Yonatan 
Tesfaye, a blogger. 
Oromo social media activists also demanded an end to torture saying, “Stop Torture.”  
Along with the demand to end torture, they also demanded the closure of Ma’ikelawi, saying, 
“Demolish Ma’ikelawi.” Ma’ikelawi is a crime investigation center in Addis Ababa where police 
forces “use coercive methods on detainees amounting to torture or other ill-treatment to extract 
confessions, statements, and other information from detainees.” (Human Rights Watch, 17 
October 2013, para. 3). According to the Human Rights Watch, “detainees are punished or 
rewarded with denial or access to water, food, light, and other basic needs” if they do not comply 
with investigators’ demands (para.3). 
5.2.1.4 Demand for justice  
Another theme highlighted by the Oromo social media activists was Justice. They called 
for those who killed the people to face justice. One slogan referred to the victims as “obbolaa 
keenya” [our brothers”]: “Lubbuun Obbolaa yakka 1 malee ajjeefamanii haqaa haa argatu” 
[“Justice for our brothers who were killed without any crime”].  While they described the victims 
as “our brothers,” they portrayed those who killed them as “criminals” as in “Yakkamtoonni 
lubbuu balleessan seeraaf haa dhiyaatan” [“Criminals who killed lives should be brought to 
court”].  
5.2.1.5 Environmental protection 
Farmers in Oromia have long complained about the dumping of solid waste from Addis 
Ababa into Oromia saying it poisoned water and killed their livestock. In 2016 they forced the 
government to shut down the landfill in Sandafa, Oromia (Davidson, 2017). Likewise, they 
complained about flower farming in Ethiopia, accusing the growers of using chemicals that cause 
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health issues and environmental damage (Hanshaw, 2006).  Hence, the Oromo social media 
activists used the environmental issue as a rallying point during the Grand Oromia Rally. They 
reflected it in their slogans. For example, one slogan reads, “No dumping waste in Oromia.” 
Another slogan says “Iddoowwan daraaraa lafa qonnaan bulaa keenyarraa martinuu haa 
diigaman” [shut down all flower farming on our farmers’ land”].  
5.2.1.6 State terrorism 
Oromo social media activists opposed the government’s framing of the protesters as 
terrorists. They held slogans that not only deny they are terrorists, but also that portray the 
government itself as a terrorist. So, “a terrorist is not me, it is you.” In one of their slogans they 
contrast what the government calls them, the terrorists, with who they are, the Oromo: “Nuti 
Oromoota, miti shororkeessitoota” [“We are Oromos, not terrorists”]. In another slogan, they 
asked the government to “Stop terrorizing people.”  
5.2.2 The post-rally discussion 
Analysis of the post-discussion among the Oromo social media activists indicated that 
four major themes were highlighted. They are violence against the protesters; expression of 
solidarity, determination, and hope; warning the government; and defending and praising the 
protesters.  
5.2.2.1  Violent response to the “peaceful protesters” 
One of the major themes highlighted by the Oromo social media activists was the 
government’s response to the protests that took place on the day of the Grand Oromia Rally. 
Oromo activists mainly focused on the response of the government security forces that resulted 
in the deaths, injuries, and arrests of protesters in different parts of Oromia. They portrayed the 
response as violence against peaceful protesters.  
97 
Activists highlighted the violence in different ways. They posted reports of the violence 
from their own “sources,” and from the news media. They also shared others’ posts that talked 
about the violence.  
5.2.2.2 Report on the violence  
Oromo social media activists reported “news” on the violence from their sources. [Here I 
used “news” in quotation because they cited anonymous sources, their friends, or other 
informants that contacted them through their inbox].  Activists highlighted different types of the 
violence they claimed security forces committed against the protesters.  Table 3 shows examples 
of the report and types of violent response to the protesters.  
Table 3 Examples and Types of Violent Response Against Oromo Protesters 
Activists Dates of report Types of violence 
Girma Gutema 6 August 2016a Detention 
8 August 2016c Arrests, beatings, killings, 
10 August 2016d 
11 August 2016e 
Injuries 
Dispersing, beatings, imprisoning  
Jawar Mohammed 6 August 2016c Killings, injury 
9 August 2016d Killings, beatings, 
12 August 2016e Arrests (of children) 
Etana Habte 8 August 2016d Killings, injury, and disappearance of 
protesters  
10 August 2016e Disappearance, arrests, 
12 August 2016f Beatings 
Henok Gabisa 11 August 2016a Death, injury 
Najat Hamza 8 August 2016k Killings 
Tsegaye Ararsa 6 August 2016b Arrests, beatings,  
 
 
In addition to reporting news of the violence against the protesters from their own 
sources, activists also shared reports from the news media, especially international news media. 
For example, Gabisa (2016b) shared a link to a video by The Reuters (published on 6 August 
2016). The link to The Reuters video shows police officers dispersing the protesters by beating 
them with clubs and kicking those who fell on the ground. Gabisa (2016c) also shared a link to 
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CNN website which published an opinion piece contributed by Awol Allo published on 9 August 
2016. In the opinion piece, Allo detailed the killings, arrests, and tortures committed against 
protesters by security forces of the Ethiopian government.  
Likewise, Hamza (2016a) shared BBC’s news report video published on 6 August 2016. 
The video reported the killings of hundreds and arrest of thousands of protesters. It also showed 
security forces trying to disperse the protesters by beating them. In the video, Emmanuel Igunza, 
the reporter of the BBC also mentioned questions raised by protesters such as demand for the 
release of protesters, an end to the killings, and respect for human rights. Hamza (2016j) also 
posted a link to the Guardian’s news story titled: “Dozens shot dead in anti-government protests 
across Ethiopia says opposition.”  The Guardian reported the death of 33 people citing an 
opposition leader. In addition, Hama (2016l) shared a link to NPR interview transcript held 
between Audie Cornish, the host, and Gregory Warner, NPR correspondent from Nairobi, Kenya 
aired on 9 August 2016. Cornish reported the killing of more than 100 people by the Ethiopian 
government’s security forces. Likewise, Mohammed (2016b) also posted a link to a video by Al-
Jazeera aired on 6 August 2016. Catherine Soi, a reporter from Addis Ababa, reported that there 
was tight security in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country due to the protesters. She also 
mentioned the arrest of many protesters. 
On 12 August 2016 Habte (2016f) shared a link to a short video by The New York Times. 
The video posted by Upadhye (2016) shows police officers beating protesters. The video screen 
has a caption that reads: “police forces have shot and killed scores of unarmed protesters in 
Ethiopia.” The description, “unarmed protesters” seems to resonate well with the news media, 
Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, as discussed in the next subsection. Along 
with the link, Habte tried to introduce his Facebook followers to what the video was all about: 
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“The New York Times published a short video showing violent crackdown on Oromo youth last 
Saturday (06/08/16) at Mesqel Square.” Habte (2016b) also shared a link to a news story by 
Reuters with a title: “At least 30 protesters killed in Ethiopia's Oromiya region: opposition” 
(published on 8 August 2016). By citing an opposition political party official, Aaron Maasho, the 
author of the news article, reported the death of at least 33 people in Oromia. He wrote that those 
were “shot by security forces” (Maasho, 2016, para.1). Similarly, Ararssa (2016k) posted a link 
to Al-Jazeera with a title: “UN Calls for a Probe into Ethiopia Protesters Killings” published on 
10 August 2016. Among other things, Al-Jazeera’s Charles Stratford, a reporter from Addis 
Ababa, reported the death of 90 people and arrest of hundreds (without giving the exact number). 
The Oromo social media activists not only shared news media that reported the violence 
but also disputed the news media they thought did not cover the violence appropriately. For 
example, they disputed the characterization of the cause of the rally. For example, Habte (2016a) 
blamed the international media for limiting the cause of the rally to “unfair distribution of 
wealth” saying:   
#GrandOromiaRally That increasing number of international media reporting on today's 
Oromia wide movement as having been solely caused by "unfair distribution of wealth" 
is a clear mark of clouds of ignorance refusing to fade away even after nine months of 
#OromoProtests, but it is at the same an undertone of how effective we have been in the 
presentation of key issues of our nation's narratives of struggle. 
Habte (2016c) shared a link to Agence France Presse website which published a news 
story on 8 August 2016 with a title: “7 dead Ethiopian police and protesters clash.”  He disputed 
the number of people killed without giving his own number. “Confusion on the side of 
international media continues, especially on the number of deaths.” The following picture is a 
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screenshot from Hamza (2016b)’s post in which she disputed a report by Reuters, describing it as 
“Irresponsible Reporting! Deplorable narrative! @Reuters.” She demanded Reuters to 
“#ReportFactsNotFiction.” Hamza did not specify which reporting she disputed or the narrative 
she did not like. However, the violence reported by the news media was covered in the news 
story. Aaron Maasho, the writer of the story, reported that security forces “used tear gas and 
blocked roads…try to quell protests against alleged rights abuses” (6 August 2016. para.1).  
 
 
Figure 2 Examples of Activists' Protests Against News Media 
 
5.2.2.3 Violence against peaceful protesters  
Oromo activists not only highlighted state violence against the protesters, but they also 
portrayed it as violence against peaceful protesters. For example, in his post on 11 August 2016, 
Gabisa (2016a) shared a picture of Pastor Daniel with a Bible in his hand, leading a march of 
people including many young children in opposition to the government. Gabisa described how 
even a pastor, the symbol of peace, can be a target of the government violence. He wrote: “No 
matter how eternally peaceful one could be in Ethiopia, TPLF military will shoot you!” (Gabisa, 
2016a). Also, Gabisa pointed out that Pastor Daniel was targeted because of his identity and 
being the voice of the people. 
 
Najat Hamza 
 
August 6, 2016 at 1:19 PM 
 ·  
Irresponsible Reporting! Depolarable narrative! @Reuters 
#ReportFactsNotFiction #GrandOromiaRally#OromoProtests #TogetherWeCan 
 
Ethiopia's security forces use tear gas to disperse protests - witness 
www.reuters.com 
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 His only crime is being Oromo and leading the voice of his people and his congregation 
in opposition to the authoritarian regime of TPLF that killed over 700 Oromo people 
since November of 2015, of which over 100 were massacred just over this past weekend. 
(Gabisa, 2016a). 
Mohammed (2016c) in his post on 6 August 2016 claimed that most protesters were 
killed not even during the protests but afterward. He also portrayed the security forces’ response 
as an act of revenge to “teach lesson” to the protesters. He wrote the following:    
A very strange testimony almost from all provinces has emerged. Most of the victims 
were shot NOT during the rally but AFTER they were dispersed while they were 
returning home. Either they were shot by snipers or ambushed in narrow alleyways. 
Why? The regime wanted to 'teach [] lesson. (Mohammed, 2016c, para. 2). 
Oromo social media activists highlighted not only the government’s violence against 
peaceful protests but also its refusal to help victims of the violence. For example, in his 
discussion about Pastor Daniel, Gabisa (2016a) said Pastor Daniel was not only shot but also 
denied medical assistance in hospital. Likewise, Gutema (2016b) reported the government’s 
attempt to deny protesters access to medical help. For example, he wrote the following:     
TPLF forces blocking wounded protesters on #GrandOromiaRally not to get hospital 
treatments in different parts of Oromia” By citing a “personal witness” he said, in West 
Arsi, “people are left helpless with their wounded family members because the military 
closed the only public hospital available in the town. 
5.2.2.4 Expression of solidarity, determination, and hope 
Oromo social media activists also expressed their solidarity with the victims of state 
violence, determination to continue the struggle, and hope for the future.  
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Figure 3 Expression of Determination by Oromo Protesters 
 
Some activists expressed their solidarity with the victims of state violence. For example, 
sharing the above picture, originally posted by Merertu Geleta Kitila, a Facebook user, on her 
Facebook page on 6 August 2016, Hamza (2016c) expressed her solidarity: “We stand with you 
Oromia”! By metaphorically describing the experience Oromia was going through as the 
“darkest,” but also as a “channel,” she talked about the “brighter” future: “This darkest hour 
channel to get to a brighter free Oromia!” She further used hashtags that connect Oromia 
(described as a mother of the struggle) with the size of the struggle (Grand Oromia Rally) and 
hope (Together we can): “#MotherofTheStruggle #GrandOromiaRally #TogetherWeCan.”  
Hamza (2016k) also expressed a mixed feeling of sorrow for the death of a young and 
anger at the world for doing nothing. She shared a picture of a body of a young son and 
expressed her emotion as follows:   
Asasa, Oromia...young life slips away without notice and without a name...tossed aside 
all alone with a shot right through his young heart! Nothing to see here...just another 
Najat Hamza shared a post. 
August 6, 2016 ·  
We stand with you Oromia! This darkest hour is our channel to get to a brighter free Oromia!  
#MothersofTheStruggle #GrandOromiaRally #TogetherWeCan 
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young Oromo kid killed while the world looks away!!! #GrandOromiaRally 
#OromoProtests #TogetherWeCan.   
Activists’ show of solidarity with the victims of the Oromo protests also involved sharing 
of pictures of other people who showed solidarity. For instance, on 6 August 2016, Hamza 
(2016d) a picture posted by Nuredin Sule, a Facebook user. A picture shows a group of people in 
Atlanta, United States, gathered together to show solidarity with the Oromo protesters. The 
people in the picture crossed their hands above of their head, a gesture used by protesters. Hamza 
(2016d) described the picture saying “Atlanta, standing in solidarity with #GrandOromiaRally 
#OromoProtests #TogetherWeCan right now!” (Hamza, 2016d).  
 Ararssa (2016b) also described the resolve with which the people were fighting and his 
hope for victory. For example, on 6 October 2016, he argued: “the people are fighting back with 
resolve. Confrontation is raging. [] Situation is tense…we shall overcome” (para.2). In his other 
Facebook post, Ararssa (2016c) described the situation as a turning point saying, “we are on the 
cusp…” Ararssa (2016d) also expressed determination to continue the struggle: “yet, we say: 
“KILLING WON’T KILL OUR STRUGGLE.”  
Hamza (2016e) also warned about the inevitable defeat of those who committed violence 
against peaceful protesters because it will not last by saying: 
[sic] Ethiopian regime needs to understand violence cannot be sustained indefinately [sic] 
against the entire population of the country! Sooner or later the demand of the people 
must be respected and answered! Those who have inflicted and continue to inflict harm 
on peaceful civilian protesters will face justice.  
Oromo social media activists also expressed their hope on the continuity of their struggle. 
For example, on her Post on 6, 2016 Hamza (2016f) posted a video of small children singing 
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“Oromia, Oromia, Oromia…” Hamza described the children as: “Little Oromian angels also 
have something to say, after all [] we are fighting to give them [] freedom to live” 
by…#GrandOromiaRally #OromoProtests#TogetherWeCan.” In her other post, Hamza wrote 
about the solution to what she described as “hunger for freedom.”: “The hunger for freedom can 
only be quenched with the sweet taste of liberation #GrandOromiaRally #OromoProtests 
#TogetherWeCan” (Hamz, 2016g) 
Like Hamza, Ararssa (2016g) also expressed both determination and hope in the face of 
the violent response. For example, he posted a picture of very young protesters to indicate hope 
of the future saying, “The future is calling…” (Ararssa, 2016g).  On 8 August 2016i, he posted a 
picture of young protesters holding up what many Oromos believe is a “resistance flag” and a 
slogan that reads “‘WE WILL NEVER BE RULED BY TPLF.’” (Ararssa, 2016i) Ararssa 
emphasized the slogan by writing on his Facebook page along with the picture: “We will never 
be ruled by the TPLF’ say the children of hope. Moreover, what does TPLF say? I would rather 
leave it unsaid.” 
5.2.2.5 Warning to the government 
Another theme of the message of the Oromo activists in their social media discussion was 
warning to the Ethiopian government. For example, on 6 August 2016, Tsegaye Ararssa posted a 
picture of a big crowd crossing their hands above their heads, a sign of protest used by the 
Oromo protesters. He described those hands as “hands of peace,” and “hands of protests” 
(Ararssa, 2016f).  However, he also warned the government suggesting those hands would not be 
peaceful forever saying, “Woe unto the regime the day these hands start to reach out for guns, 
which the regime is inviting every passing minute” (Ararssa, 2016f). He also said of the same 
picture in his other post, “Who knows? This may as well be the last appeal to the roughs in 
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power to resolve problems peacefully…it might as well be time to shift gears further…” 
(Ararssa, 2016g).  
Similarly, Najat Hamza in her post on 6 August 2016 shared another Facebook post of 
Ifaa (2016) which warned the government suggesting its violent response does not solve the 
problem: ‘‘violence breeds violence. Bloodshed breeds more bloodshed.” (Ifaa 2016 quoted by 
Hamza, 2016h). The post also warned the government of taking the country to a dangerous 
course: “The EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Force] government is 
driving the country off the cliff!” Furthermore, the post highlighted the choice the government 
made as a root for the crisis: “Wanton killings of peaceful protest expressing the deep-seated 
grievances…instead of addressing the underlying systemic political, economic and social 
causes.”  On her other post on 6 August 2016 she also shared a post by Getu Olana, another 
Facebook user, who wrote, “‘LET IT BE CLEAR TO ALL, PEACE CANNOT BE 
MAINTAINED BY FORCE OR BY THE GOOD WILL OF ONE SIDE’” (Olana, 2016 quoted 
in Hamza, 2016i). The post further said:  
‘Today, protesters are shouting bilisummaa [freedom] and the brutal forces of the 
TPLF/EPRDF regime are firing at people and trying to contain the protest by force, in 
effect turning the protests into violence. Let it be clear to all, peace cannot be maintained 
by force or by the good will of one side. What happened and happens today is likely to 
leave a permanent mark in the history of Ethiopia.’ (Olana, 2016, shared by Hamza, 
2016i). 
Hamza (2016i) reinforced Olana’s comment saying: “You can only maintain chaos with 
violence not peace and order #GrandOromiaRally #Oromo protests.” 
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5.2.2.6 Defending and praising protesters 
Some social media activists defended the actions of the protesters. For example, Ararssa 
(2016h) in his post on 6 August 2016, tried to defended protesters’ road blocking portraying it as 
an act of self-defense. He posted a picture of roads blocked by stones and logs by protesters to 
limit the movement of security forces. He defended the protesters as engaging in self-defense 
who did not have an option but to resist the government violence: “When you meet a civil protest 
with a military means, you turn everyone into a soldier. You turn a peaceful protest into a 
militant resistance” (Ararssa, 2016h). He implied the shift from “peaceful protest” to a “militant 
resistance” because of how the security forces responded to peaceful protesters.   
Activists also praised the protesters by framing their cause as peace and dignity. For 
instance, Tsegaye Ararssa portrayed the march in the face of violence and the sacrifice as a price 
paid for peace and dignity: “They marched for peace even in the face of guns. They marched for 
life even in the face of death produced in mass by a State killing machine. They marched for 
dignity. And those who died, died with dignity, for the dignity of many more” (Ararssa, 2016j). 
5.3 Reaction to Lilesa’s Gesture at Rio 2016 Olympics 
BBC (2016, August 21) carried a news article titled: Ethiopian runner makes protest sign 
as he crosses line in Rio” along with a picture of Athlete Feyisa Lilesa who raised his arms 
above his head in a display of solidarity with the Oromo protest movement in Ethiopia. Lilesa’s 
gesture at one of the biggest events in the world received significant attention. International news 
media covered it for weeks. Users of social media shared and discussed it. Lilesa’s gesture also 
marked a turning point for activists of the Oromo protest movement who, until then, needed 
global attention so badly. This section presents the major themes highlighted by the Oromo 
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social media activists and how they used them to fit into their narrative about the Oromo protest 
movement. 
 The results of the analysis show that the Oromo social media activists highlighted three 
major themes. First, they highlighted that the Oromo protest movement was receiving 
international attention—"the whole world is watching us”—framing it as a “victory.” Second, 
they devoted much of their attention to praising Lilesa for his gesture. They praised Lilesa as a 
“hero.” Third, they emphasized the impact of Lilesa’s gesture on the protest movement, 
portraying it as “inspirational.”  
5.3.1 “We are getting global attention”  
The “we are getting global attention” was a major theme the Oromo social media activists 
highlighted in their discussion about Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture at the 2016 Rio Olympics. Activists 
highlighted this theme both directly by discussing it and indirectly by sharing stories covered by 
the news media.  
All social media activists whose Facebook posts were studied for this project shared links 
to international news media that covered Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture. Some activists shared their own 
articles or interviews published or aired on other media outlets. The following table shows 
examples of the news media stories, along with their titles, the Oromo activists shared on their 
Facebook pages.  
Table 4 Examples of the News Media Shared by Oromo Protest Activists 
 Activists  News Media and Titles of Their Stories  
Mohammed Ademo “Ethiopia on the Precipice: The Regime's Armor Has Been Pierced” 
(OkayAfrica, 23 August 2016). 
“Uncommon courage at Rio Olympics: Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa risks it all 
for his people” (Opride, 22 August 2016) 
Henok G. Gebisa “Silver medalist Feyisa Lilesa: ‘If I go back to Ethiopia, the government 
will kill me’” (Olympics, 21 August 2016) 
Tsegaye Ararssa  “Lelisa’s Message” (Jacobin, 13 August 2016) 
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“Rio 2016 - Feyisa Lilesa shows solidarity with protests back in “Ethiopia 
as he wins Silver in Men's Marathon” (Ethiotube, 21 August 2016) 
Geresu Tufa  “Dr. Awol Allo on the significance of Feyisa Lelisa's Olympic gesture” 
(Arise News, 21 August 2016) 
Etana Habte “With Fists Raised, Ethiopian Stirs Ghosts of '68 Olympics” (NBCNEWS, 
23 August 2016)  
“Runner Fears for Life After Showing Solidarity with Ethiopian Protesters” 
(VOA, 21 August 2016)  
“Rio 2016: Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa gets a silver for running – and a gold 
for bravery” (Daily Maverick, 22 August 2016) 
“Running for more than medals” (Stephenville Empire-Tribune 22 August 
2016). 
Jawar Mohammed  Ethiopian marathoner makes protest gesture at Rio finish line. (CNN, 22 
August 2016) 
“Ethiopian runner fears Olympic protest could get him killed” (Fox News, 
22 August 2016) 
“Ethiopian marathoner makes political protest at finish line” (Yahoo 
Sports, 21 August 2016).  
Girma Gutema  “The Question: Can the Olympics ever be apolitical?” (The Irish Times, 27 
August 2016). 
 
Some activists both shared and commented on the news media that covered Feyisa 
Lilesa’s gesture. For example, Hamza (2016m) shared Yisihak (2016), who posted a list of 13 
media outlets which covered Lilesa. The media outlets on the list were The Daily Mail, CNN, 
BBC, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Independent, Mirror, The Daily Post, 
News.com, Sports News, LetsRum.com, and Reuters. Yisihak described the news coverage as 
evidence that Oromo protest movement was receiving global attention: “International media are 
reporting about Ethiopian Athlete, Feyisa Lelisa, and his brave act Rio Olympic. He exposed the 
dictatorial regime the brutal leaders in Ethiopia” (Yisihak, 2016 Shared by Hamza, 2016m). 
Likewise, Mohammed (2016n) in Facebook post on 25 August 2016 stated that Feyisa 
Lilesa received significant attention by mentioning the google search results saying, “When you 
search Feyisa Lilesa’s name on google, you will find some 2 million results making it the most 
widely reported personality from Ethiopia ever. (Mohammed, 2016n).  Mohammed (2016i) also 
thanked Fox News and shared its link to a short video clip that talked about Lilesa’s gesture at 
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Rio Olympics: “Thank you Fox News for this in depth [] reporting on the cause of Feyisa 
Lilesa’s heroic act of resistance (Mohammed, 2016i). Jim Gray, the contributor of the show, 
cited unnamed activists who claimed that the protests in Ethiopia were in opposition to the 
killings of protesters and the Masterplan. Gray portrayed the Masterplan as “a major [cause] 
because many Ethiopians survive by farming” (Gray, 2016: 1:02 shared by Mohammed, 2016i).  
In the show, Gray also described the cause of protesters as a demand for freedom for the Oromo 
people. So, according to Gray, Lilesa was “drawing even more attention to the deadly protests 
that are happening in Ethiopia” (0:44).  
Similarly, Gutema (2016k) also shared a link to Reuters which ran a story titled: 
“Olympics marathon medalist’s protest shines spotlight on unrest in Ethiopia (25 August 2016). 
On 25 August 2016, Gutema (2016f) also posted a video of Feyisa Lilesa at the finish line of the 
marathon race triumphantly raising his arms above his head. He pointed out that Lilesa made the 
people’s voice, which was suppressed at home, heard around the globe: “TPLF [the dominant 
party in the ruling coalition of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front] suppressed 
people’s voices inside the country only to make it heard in the whole world” (Gutema, 2016f).    
Oromo activists also discussed how the news media reacted to Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture at 
the Rio Olympics. For example, Mohammed Ademo on 21 August 2016 shared a link to his own 
article titled: “Uncommon courage at Rio Olympics: Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa risks it all for his 
people” (22 August 2016).  In the article, Ademo (2016a) expressed his satisfaction with how 
Chris Chavez of the Sports Illustrated, Kevin Seiff of the Washington Post, and Piers Edwards of 
BBC, described Lilesa’s action as follows:   
Chavez was one of the first western journalists to recognize the significance of Lilesa’s 
gesture and live-tweet the athlete’s post-race comments … the Washington Post’s Africa 
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Bureau chief, Kevin Sieff, called it ‘the bravest act at the 2016 Olympics’ … BBC 
Journalist Piers Edwards dubbed Lilesa’s display of courage an ‘extraordinary moment.’ 
They were right” (Ademo, 2016, para. 5 shared by Ademo, 2016a).  
Ademo (2016b) also shared a link to www.okayafrica.com an article with the title: 
Ethiopia on the Precipice: The Regime’s Armor Has been Pierced” (23 August 2016). Hassen 
Hussen, the author of the article, underscored that Lilesa’s gesture at the Rio Olympics 
challenged the Ethiopian government’s attempt to externalize the cause of protesters to some 
members of the Ethiopian diaspora community:  
After Lelisa’s display of solidarity for the protests at the Rio Olympics, after winning a 
silver for his country in a marathon, it [Ethiopia] could not [] longer dismiss the troubles 
as the handiwork of what it likes to call a handful extremist saboteurs in the diaspora. 
(Hussen 2016, para. 14 shared by Ademo, 2016b).  
5.3.2 Impact of Lilesa’s gesture 
 I think this is such a momentous, dramatic day not only for the Oromo people, but also 
for the entire oppressed people within Ethiopia and beyond. The Oromo people have been 
protesting since November of 2015. They were crying to be heard. And they were being 
killed in hundreds just to be heard. And they were crying to be heard. (Allo, 2016, 1:17 
interviewed by Arise News, 2016 and shared by Tufa, 2016a).  
The above quote is an interview transcript Awol Allo, an Oromo activist, gave to Arise 
News on 24 August 2016. It exemplifies how social media activists viewed the impact of Feyisa 
Lilesa’s gesture at the Rio Olympics. Oromo social media activists highlighted the impact 
regarding the global attention it received; the pressure on the Ethiopian government; and 
implications on the Oromo protest movement itself. 
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Some activists highlighted the impact of Lilesa’s action regarding grabbing the attention 
of the international community.  For instance, on 23 August 2016, Habte (2016g) shared a link to 
People’s World, which ran a news story titled: “Ethiopian marathon runner uses win to protest 
killings, oppression in his country” (23 August 2018). Robinson (2016), who wrote the article, 
discussed among other things, the impact of Lilesa’s action. She described it as grabbing global 
attention and pointed out that the news of Lilesa’s gesture quickly spread on social media. 
Robinson also highlighted the diplomatic impact on the Ethiopian government by mentioning 
Lilessa’s suggestion that the western governments had a role in the violence by supporting the 
Ethiopian government: ‘“Now America, England, and France support this government. [] When 
they give this support it buys machine guns, then they kill the people’” (Lilesa, 2016 quoted in 
Chauncey, 2016, Lilesa’s impact section, para. 2 shared by Habte, 2016g). Neither Robinson nor 
Lilesa explained the association between the western governments’ support to Ethiopia and the 
latter’s violence against protesters. However, activists and human rights groups accused the 
Ethiopian government of using the aid money to buy machine guns or to use it to silence 
dissents.     
Likewise, Tufa (2016a) shared Arise News’ video clip, which broadcast an interview with 
Awol Allo. Allo discussed the significance of Lilesa’s gesture in telling the world the story of the 
Oromo people by saying, “This is such a critical moment that sort of propelled the story of the 
Oromo people into the global stage…the Oromo people had the opportunity to be heard for the 
first time by the global audience” (Arise news, 2016, 3:43 shared by Tufa, 2016a).  Allo in his 
interview also discussed how the U.S. was also contributing to the oppression in Ethiopia, for 
example, by mentioning that its top officials such as President Obama and Susan Rice portrayed 
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Ethiopia as a democratic country. So, according to Allo, Lilesa exposed the reality on the world 
stage:  
…the most important message here is that … he [Lilesa] is saying, contrary to public 
knowledge, contrary to these make-believe stories created by the Ethiopian government 
and … aided by powerful figures such as President Obama…Ethiopian people, 
particularly the Oromos, live under a very oppressive situation. (Arise News, 2016, 5:24 
shared by Tufa, 2016a).  
Similarly, Mohammed (2016j) shared an article by Daily Maverick (22 August 2016) 
contributed by Simon Allison. Allison highlighted Lilisa’s impact on the Ethiopian government 
in two ways: damage on its image, and the impact on the aid it receives from donors such as the 
United States. Allison highlighted the likelihood that the Ethiopian government might moderate 
its violence against protesters because of the aid money it receives: “With the world watching, 
and precious aid money on the line, Ethiopia may be forced to moderate its response to further 
protests” (Allison, 2016 para. 10). 
Girma Gutema on his 24 August 2016 shared a tweet by Khaled Beydoun who described 
the impact of Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture by comparing his silver medal with gold medals others 
received at the Olympics: “‘Feyisa Lilesa’s Silver medal is more impactful than any & and all of 
the Gold medal [] at the #Rio2016 #OromoProtests.’” (Beydoun, 2016 shared by Gutema, 2016i) 
Social media activists also highlighted the contribution of Lilesa’s gesture to the Oromo 
protest movement itself. For example, in his post on 21 August 2016, Jawar Mohammed 
expressed his amazement by its impact in raising the spirit of the Oromo people: 
“#OromoProtests What a day, Feyisa Lilesa raised his hand in solidarity and uplifted the spirit of 
the nation mourning hundreds of its martyrs!!” (Mohammed, 2016g). Ademo (2016a) also 
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described the possible impact of Lilesa’s gesture as empowering and inspiring for other athletes: 
“To witness one of their own using the biggest stage of his life to make a bold and unmistakable 
statement, it is to be inspired and empowered” (Ademo, 2016a, para. 6). He portrayed Lilesa’s 
gesture as a source of hope and inspiration for Ethiopians in general and Oromo people in 
particular:  
Lilesa’s defiant protest may not generate similar attention only because the international 
media pays little to no attention to Africans and African stories. But for millions of 
Ethiopians, particularly the Oromo, the symbolic gesture offers hope for a better future. It 
will serve as yet another inspiration to the 9-month old Oromo protests, which has 
already shaken the foundations of the Ethiopian state. (para. 11). 
5.3.3 Praise for Feyisa Lilesa 
Praise for Lilesa was another major theme the Oromo social media activists highlighted 
in their discussion Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture. Activists portrayed Lilesa as selfless, hero, 
courageous, risk taker and brave. The table below shows examples of how Oromo activists 
praised Lilesa for his gesture at the Rio 2016 Olympics.  
Oromo social media activists highlighted how Lilesa’s action at the Rio Marathon was a 
selfless act. For instance, Gutema (2016j) in his post on 24 August 2016 described Lilesa as 
someone who took a risk to expose the grievance of the Oromo people to the world. Gutema 
described Lilesa’s selflessness by juxtaposing what he risked, “his life” and “his career,” with 
what his goal was, exposing “collective grievances” and “institutional discrimination:” “At [sic] 
risk to his life, and at the sacrifice to his career, Lilesa was determined to express at the 
Olympics the collective grievances and institutional discrimination his people suffer in the 
Oromia region” (Gutema, 2016j).  
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Mohammed (2016h) shared a link to VOA Amharic radio which aired Lilesa’s interview 
on 22 August 2016. He showed how Lilesa’s act was selfless by directly quoting what he told the 
VOA saying he did not have any material or personal problem: ‘“I drive a good car. I live in a 
nice house. I have no personal problem. But others are being thrown out of their homes and 
losing their lives. That’s why I had to speak up" #Feyisa Lilesa tells VOA Amharic”’ 
(Mohammed, 2016h). Lilesa compared himself with his people who were the victims of 
government policy but chose to be on their side.   
Table 5 Some Words of Praise Oromo Activists Shared on their Facebook Pages 
 
“The hero, Feyisa Lelisa standing in grace and defiant showing the resistance gesture on the stage at 
the press conference” (Gutema, 2016g) 
“In Ethiopia, long distance runners are heroes. But Feyisa Lilesa must be the most heroic of the lot. 
The marathon runner won a silver in Rio on Sunday, but it is what he did after he crossed the line 
that will be remembered” (Allison, 2016 shared by Mohammed, 2016j. 
“uncommon courage made common at Rio Olympics” (Ademo, 2016a) 
‘“#FeyisaLelisa’s career with the Ethiopian Athletics Federation ended tonight. But his courageous 
act of protests is one for the history books” (Ademo, 2016 cited by Robinson, 23 August 2016, para. 
7).  
“Kana kunooti nama jechuun kana” [“this is what it means to be a man”] (Suleeyman, 2016)—
shared by Mohammed, 2016k) 
“yaa abaaboo fakkeenya hundaa, goota koo baga dhalatte,  badhaasa harmee Oromiyaa, seenaa 
gaarii raawwatte”  [“you, the flower, the icon of everything, my hero, good that you were born. You, 
the gift of the motherland, Oromia, you made history”]. (Bekele & Tadele, 2016)—shared by 
Mohammed 2016L) 
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“When Ethiopian marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa crossed the line at Rio he made a bold political 
statement” (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2016—shared by Mohammed 
“Feyisa Lelisa, the symbol of the moral courage we all needed to see in these very dark days...” 
(Tsegaye Ararssa, 2016L).  
“Feyisa Lelisa, the face of courage, determination, and of living for a cause that is larger than 
himself, larger than even Olympic glory!!!” (Ararssa, 2016m).  
  
On August 23, 2016, Gutema (2016h) shared by link to www.okayafrica.com which 
published an article titled: “Ethiopia on the Precipice: The Regime's Armor Has Been Pierced” 
(2016, August 23). Hussein (2016), the author of the article, praised Lelisa for exposing the 
Ethiopian government to the world.  Gutema (2016h) suggested his followers needed to read the 
article by saying: “A MUST READ.” (Mohammed (2016j) also shared a post by The Daily 
Maverick that published a story about Lilesa with a title suggestive of the worth of his bravery: 
“Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa gets a silver for running—and a gold for bravery” (22 August 2016). 
Simon Allison, the author of the article, compared Lilesa’s reward for running—silver medal—
with his reward for “bravery”—the gold medal. Allison also compared Lilesa’s heroism with the 
heroism of other Ethiopian athletes but highlighted that Lilesa’s heroism was better due to his 
gesture at the Rio Olympics.   
In Ethiopia, long distance runners are heroes. But Feyisa Lilesa must be the most heroic 
of the lot. The marathon runner won a silver in Rio on Sunday, but it is what he did after 
he crossed the line that will be remembered (Allison, 2016, para. 1 shared by 
Mohammed, 2016j).  
Furthermore, Allison compared Lilesa with other athletes “who realise that sport is about 
more than running and jumping and kicking a ball” (para. 11). These athletes were Tommie 
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Smith and John Carlos (Americans), Andy Flower and Henry Oonga (Zimbabweans), 
Mohammed Ali (American). She compared them as follows: 
Lilesa himself has joined that small pantheon of athletes who realise that sport is about 
more than running and jumping and kicking a ball. It is an elite group that includes the 
likes of Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who raised their fists in that iconic black power 
salute in 1968; the Zimbabwean cricketers Andy Flower and Henry Olonga who wore 
black armbands in a match against Namibia in 2003, to symbolise the death of democracy 
in Zimbabwe; boxer Muhammad Ali, whose outspoken opposition to the Vietnam War 
cost him his titles and his fighting licence []. (para. 11).  
Allison used the simile, “Like” to compare Lilesa with the athletes saying, “Like them, 
and at a great personal risk, Lilesa has used his 15 minutes of fame to bring the world’s attention 
to an issue far greater, and more urgent than himself” (Allison, 2016, para. 12).  
 “I halready[sic] ear[sic] the sound of a new song in his name, a tune of longing for 
freedom. A longing throbbing for expression in the hearts of millions and millions of Oromos 
across the globe” (Ararssa, 2016l). On the day Feyisa Lilesa displayed his gesture in solidarity 
with the Oromo protest movement, 21 August 2016, Ararssa (2016L) suggested a new song to 
praise him. He suggested a song be sung in Lilesa’s name. He suggested what the song should be 
about as follows:  
A song of freedom much needed after a long, dark day… 
To the masterful performance you displayed as an athlete; 
To the courageous gesture of solidarity [] you expressed as an Oromo person; 
To the incredible valor you showed in order to do what you did as a person; 
and to you as a person, as a genuine hero 
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...we pray tribute tonight. 
We salute you ilma goototaa [the son of heroes] 
You wrote a new chapter in history today 
And as you belong to the more glorious archives of history, history will own you—to 
remember you, to honor you, and to celebrate you for the ages to come (Ararssa, 2016).  
Oromo social media activists also shared poems and songs that praised Lilesa for his 
display of solidarity with the Oromo protest movement in Rio Olympics. Mohammed (2016k) 
Umar Suleeyman, an Oromo singer. Umar Suleeyman’s video starts off by showing Lilesa 
raising his hands above his head as he finishes the marathon race and showing the clenched fist 
of his right hand, a body language that symbolizes victory. In the background is heard a round of 
applause—a sign of praise. His action followed by a sound of a gunshot, symbolizing a struggle 
for freedom. Then appeared Umar Suleeyman saying, “Kana kunooti nama jechuun kana” [“this 
is what it means to be a man”], praising Lilesa as “the man.” He also praises his act saying, “hujii 
jechuun tana. Hojjatan akkana” [“this is the right action; this is how you do the right thing”]. 
Suleeyman goes on to say, “Isinitti jabaa oduu gammachiisaa” [“I herald to you, the good 
news”]. The “good news” he was referring to was what Lilesa did at the Rio Olympic: “Gootichi 
Oromoo, Fayyisaa Lalisaa [“the hero of the Oromo, Feyisa Lilesa”], “Rio Olympic Biraazil 
keessatti” [“at the Rio Olympics in Brazil”], addunyaatti ibse rakkoo saba isaa” [“told the world 
about the grievance of his people”]. Suleeyman mentioned some of those problems such as 
beatings, killings, arrest, and forced migration. He compared Lilesa’s gesture as (raising his arms 
above his head) with a “shimala,” a traditional stick used by the Oromo men to defend 
themselves from being hit.   
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Mohammed (2016L) also shared a video by Mulu Bekele and Jagama Tadele, both 
Oromo signers. On August 24, 2016, Mohammed (2016l). The video starts off by showing Lilesa 
raising his arms above his head at the finish line of the marathon race. It showed untired and 
determined Lilesa, after he ran the full-distance marathon of 26.2 miles.  In the song, Jagama 
Tadele says, “Ariitee baga dhaqabde. Addunyaa dha qaxxaamurte. Baga gammanne, baga 
gammadde” [“Good that you chased and captured. You crossed the world. Congratulations to us, 
and congratulations to you”]!   
Then, Mulu Bekele praised him saying, “yaa abaaboo fakkeenya hundaa, goota koo baga 
dhalatte, badhaasa harmee Oromiyaa, seenaa gaarii raawwatte” [“you, the flower, the icon of 
everything, my hero, good that you were born. You, the gift of the motherland, Oromia, you 
made history”].  
Tadele also described Lilesa’s selfless act saying, “Qorraa fi aduudha hinjenne; beelaafi 
dheebu osoo hinjenne; dadhabee boqonnaa hinjenne; kaayyoo keetti xiyyeeffattee; biyaa keetif, 
lammii keetif, wabii dhaabbatte” [you did not care for the cold and sun; you did not care about 
hunger and thirst; you did not say, ‘I am tired;’ you just focused on your goals. You stood for 
your country, for your people.” Bekle also said, Lilesa, not the coward, deserve to be praised: 
“…yartuu farsuun, lugna faarsuun anaaf naa hinta’tu.” [“I cannot praise the weak and the 
coward”].  
5.4 The Irreecha Event 
The Irreecha Festival of October 2, 2016 was a significant event in the history of the 
Oromo protest movement. The protests at the festival led to the death of more than 52 people, 
according to the Ethiopian government, or more than 700 people according to the human rights 
groups. The incident captured global attention. It received extensive coverage by the 
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international media. Pictures of dead bodies and injured people widely circulated among Oromo 
social media users. The incident added more momentum to the Oromo protest movements that 
started nine months before the incident. This section sought to answer how the Oromo social 
media activists responded to the Irreecha Festival protests by analyzing the major themes of their 
discussion on Facebook. It uncovered five major themes: Complaining about news media 
coverage, expression of grievance, expression of hope, information sharing, and call for a new 
strategy 
5.4.1 Complaints about the news media coverage   
 “It hurts to have lived through the pain when it happens. It hurts more when the story of 
your pain is either ignored, distorted, un-understood, or misinterpreted” (Ararssa, 2026n). 
The above quote is from one of the Facebook posts of Tsegaye Ararssa, an Oromo social 
media activist of the Oromo protest movement. It is just one example of how many Oromo social 
media activists reacted to the way the news media covered the Irreecha event of 2016. Tsegaye 
Ararssa and other social media activists whose Facebook posts were studied reacted differently 
to the news media coverage of the Irrecha incident. Some of them shared the news stories about 
the incident on their pages without commenting, some shared but also invited others to read or 
listen to those news stories, while others disputed how the news media framed the death of 
protesters, mainly highlighting the cause of the deaths. Still some of expressed their anger at how 
the news media framed the cause of the deaths at the Irreecha incident.   
Some activists reacted to the news media by disputing the framing, particularly of the 
causes of death, of protesters at the event. For example, the following is how Mohammed 
(2016O), disputed the Washington Post’s frame of the cause of the death of protesters as a 
“stampede.”  
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[sic] Washington Post correct your stupid report. Stampede was not the main cause. The 
stampede was a result of people running from machine gun bullets and teargas [] thrown 
from helicopters. You want proof, ask those bunch of diplomats and foreign journalists 
who were sitting there at the VIP lounge. They saw the whole thing and filmed it but 
unwilling to speak the truth. (Mohammed, 2016o).  
In the above quote, Mohammed, challenged The Washington Post’s Paul Schemm who 
wrote the news article on October 2, 2016) on the cause of the death using assertive language: 
“The stampede was not the cause.” Moreover, he provided an alternative frame without denying 
the contribution of the stampede to the death by pointing to what caused the stampede itself: 
“The stampede was the result of people running from machine gun bullets and teargas.”  He also 
suggested The Washington Post ask people (diplomats and foreign journalists) who were at the 
scene.   
However, the researcher noted that: The Washington Post’s article Mohammed (2016O) 
alluded to was updated twice saying, “This article has been updated with new details throughout” 
and “This article has been updated with more details and comment from the government” 
respectively (2 October 2016). The researcher also noted that the article changed its title from 
“Dozens of deaths during stampede at Ethiopia religious event” (2 October 2016) to “Dozens 
killed during stampede at religious celebration in Ethiopia” (2 October 2012). The title of the 
updated article shows a change in the frame of the cause of the death with the word “killed,” 
which is more suggestive of how the protesters died: “dozens killed.…”  
Like Jawar Mohammed, Etana Habte, another Oromo activist, disputed media 
representation of the cause of the death at the Irreecha festival. In his Facebook post published 
on 2 October 2016, Habte (2016h) expressed his disagreement with the way news media framed 
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the death of protesters. He claimed that massacre, not the stampede, was the cause of the deaths 
at Irreecha. He said the news media framing of the death otherwise hurts more than the death of 
protesters for which he blamed journalists as being lazy, ignorant, and irresponsible: “What is 
hurting even more than the death of hundreds of our beloved ones today at Irreecha is lazy, 
ignorant and irresponsible journalism reporting the massacre simply as a stampede” (Habte, 
2016h, para. 1).   
Similarly, Tufa (2016b) disputed the news media’s frame of the cause as a stampede. He 
even went further by equating portrayal of the cause of Oromo protesters’ death at Irreecha as a 
stampede to supporting the “massacre.” As he put it, “Framing today’s #Massmassacare [] as 
simply caused by #Stampede on the side of international media is [sic] amount [sic] to 
condoning the massacre” (Tufa, 2016b)).  
Likewise, Najat Hamza on 5 October 2016 shared a post by Asafa Jalata (which was 
published on 2 October 2016), an Oromo and a professor at the University of Tennessee, who 
accused among other things, the Western media of misrepresenting the cause of the death at 
Irreecha. Jalata claimed that the Ethiopian security forces fired teargas and live ammunition into 
the crowd.  He blamed the Western media for “spreading inaccurate information about the tragic 
events of this day” (Jalata, 2016, para.1 shared by Hamza, 2016n).  
In addition to disputing the news media frame of the cause of the death at Irreecha, some 
activists also expressed their feelings in different ways. Some of it involves the use of profanity. 
For example, Habte(2016i) in his post published on 2 October 2016 called the BBC “idiot.” “ 
[sic] BBC is idiot.” Although Habte did not specify why he described it that way, The BBC he 
was citing framed the cause of the death as “stampede” as opposed to what the activists prefer to 
portray it as, a “massacre.” Likewise, Mohammed (2016p) questioned the quality of the BBC 
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report without specifying the reason or saying which edition of the BBC he was referring to. He 
just wrote: “Shame on BBC. What a shitty report. Who is their reporter who compiled this crap?” 
(Mohammed, 2016p). Mohammed (2016O) also referred to The Washington Post’s news article 
published on October 2, 2016 as a “stupid report.” 
Tsegaye Ararssa also expressed his annoyance at the way the news media covered the 
Irreecha incident. In his post on 2 October 2016, Ararssa (2016n) Ararssa used an emoji that 
says, “Tsegaye Ararssa is feeling annoyed.” Without naming a specific media outlet that 
annoyed him, he wrote about the foreign news media’s reluctance to cover what was going on in 
Ethiopia. Ararssa listed the following as possible reasons for media hesitation to let the world 
know about the incidents in Oromia:  
 Part of it is the result of the fear and self-censorship among their 'informants' close to the 
event for fear of being arrested, tortured, or even killed by the regime. Part of it is their 
deranged sense of history. But part of it is from their liberal fantasy of achieving 
journalistic 'objectivity' and 'balance' in an environment that is so unfair and 
asymmetrical in every imaginable respect. (Ararssa, 2016n, para.1).  
 He described the results of this as “annoying level of inaccuracy, distortion, 
undervaluation or ignoring of weighty events/facts/incidents, decontextualization, and/or 
misinterpretation” (p. 1).  
5.4.2 Expression of grievance 
Expression of grievance about the death of protesters at the Irreecha festival is another 
theme that was highlighted by Oromo social movement activists. Oromo activists expressed their 
grievances by posting pictures and videos with written messages of condolences.  
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On his Facebook post on 2 October 2016, Ararssa (2016o) posted two pictures. The first 
is a picture of a young man with a caption, “black Irreecha.” The picture reflects a young male in 
isolation and despair. His posture suggests he is in deep sorrow and looking down while putting 
his hands on his head. The image symbolizes the expression of grief in Oromo and many 
Ethiopian cultures. The second picture shows a black background on which is written two 
captions: #IrreechaMassacre and #ThanksgivingMassacre suggesting what happened was a sad 
story that took place on an important religious event which was supposed to end peacefully. 
Ararssa (2016s) also posted the following picture along with his feelings that suggested he was 
speechless:   
In the face of excess, the first one to fail is language itself. I guess it’s true, after all, that 
extreme pain nullifies words (a la E. Scarry). Horror, material or discursive, is truly 
unspeakable. So, … I am silent even while my mouth is open… wanting to say 
something…Hence, the quiet noise… (Ararssa, 2016s). 
 
 
Figure 4 Expression of Grievance at the Death of Oromo Protesters 
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On his post on 3 October 2016, Tufa (2016e) shared a link to a short video clip that he 
said shows the funeral service of Aberash Hailu who died at Irreecha. The video shows a big 
crowd of people crying. Geresu wished her to rest in peace.  
On 3 October 2016, Mohammed (2016q) also posted a photo of a young lady and a short 
video clip. Mohammed in his comment section said the people of Najjoo received the body of 
Lalisee Haftaamuu who was martyred in Bishooftuu. The photo was a picture of Lalisee 
Haftamuu. The image shows a happy young lady posed for a camera. The video clip shows a big 
crowd of people, many of them crying, as they receive the body of Lalisee Haftaamuu.   
On October 3, 2016, Gebissa (2016) used metaphor and comparisons to highlight the 
graveness of the violence at Irreecha. For example, he used the metaphor “Bloody Sunday” in his 
article titled: “The Irreecha Massacre: Another Bloody Sunday for History.” He compared the 
Irreecha incident of Sunday, October 2, 2016, to three other massacres that took place in history 
on Sundays but different years: the Hamidian Massacre of October 1, 1985 (Armenia); Russia’s 
Bloody Sunday of January 22, 1905; and the Bogside Massacre of January 30, 1972 (Ireland).   
Gebissa (2016) attempted to show similarities between these incidents. For example, he 
noted that all of them took place on Sundays saying, “Sundays seem to have been the chosen day 
for perpetrating massacres” (para, 2). He also mentioned that all these massacres were committed 
against civilians. Gebissa portrayed massacres as a sign of weakness on the part of governments: 
“Governments perpetrate massacres as an act of desperations by officials who have completely 
other avenues of maintaining legitimacy and stable rule” (Gebissa, 2016, para. 6).  
Tufa (2016f) also invoked another metaphor, “Black Swan” implying what happened at 
Irreecha was unfathomable and unexplainable to him when he asked, “What is the possible 
#Black_Swan in Ethiopian politics?” (Tufa, 2016f). 
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5.4.3 Expressions of hope 
In addition to expression of grievances, Oromo activists also expressed hope of success in 
their movement by highlighting that massacres do not achieve their goals. For example, Gebissa 
(2016), mentioned that both massacres in Russia and Ireland did not succeed in that they did not 
save the Tsarist aristocracy” (para. 8) or help “the British rule Ireland” (para. 9). He expressed 
his hope one day that:  
Oromo nation will rise from today’s pain and will sit in judgement of those who tear-
gassed innocent people and annihilated hundreds. History has shown that clearly that 
massacring people didn’t save the Ottoman Sultans, the Romanovs and British forces in 
Ireland. (para. 13)  
Similarly, Habte (2016L), shared a post by ገብረአብ (Gadaa) (2016) titled “ቢልሱማ በነፃ 
አይገኝም” [“No freedom without sacrifice”]. The post sends a message of condolences saying, a 
human being is born; and like a tree, he will get old and die; the same is true for a regime. ገብረአብ 
(Gadaa) also glorified and congratulated them for making history. Furthermore, ገብረአብ (Gadaa) 
portrayed the death at the Irreecha event as special death saying the Oromo have been dying, and 
so the death in Bishoftu was a bless. ገብረአብ (Gadaa) argued that one’s death for agenda and land 
is an honor, not a sorrow.   
5.4.4 Information sharing  
Social media Oromo protest activists shared information in the form of “news” on what 
was going on in the country. For instance, activists Geresu Tufa, Etana Habte, Henok Gebisa, 
and Tsegaye Ararssa shared different “news.” Here the quotation mark is used to differentiate the 
information activists shared, which they received from friends or other activists through their 
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inbox, from information on the news media. The activists put the “news” in quotation marks, 
suggesting their friends in-boxed (received from their friends back home) them.   
On 5 October 2016, Habte (2016k) shared a post from an unknown source by putting it in 
quotation marks. The “news” stated the continuation of the “struggle” by mentioning an attack 
on two government agents, six police officers, and a driver of a car that belongs to the 
government. It also mentioned that two Kalashnikovs were confiscated from unnamed people. 
Furthermore, the post stated that the targeted people had ignored repeated warnings given to 
them. On 3 October 2016, Habte (2016j) also posted another message that says: "I received 
credible information that a Bull dozer [sic] was set on fire at a construction site of Dambi 
Doolloo University. The contractor who owns it is from Tigray. He was severely beaten by 
Qeerroo and is now on the run or hiding." Qeerroo is the name of the Oromo youth who 
spearheaded the protests against the Ethiopian government. 
Likewise, Ararssa (2016q) on 2 October 2016 published “news” from a source he did not 
mention about the death at Irreecha saying, ‘“hello [sic] dear: ayyaana ilalchisee hammi 
bishaanitti gadi nam’ee hammaa du’e caala jedhamaa jira.” [It is being reported that those who 
drowned are more than those died”]. Ararssa (2016p) also published his own information. For 
example, he posted the following information on 2 October 2016: 
DEVELOPING NEWS: The regime has opened live bullets on irreechaa celebrants in 
Bishooftu killing several people on the spot. The attack is reported to come from the 
Agazi on the ground and and [sic]from a helicopter hovering over the gathering in Horaa 
Arsadii. 
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Similarly, Hamza (2016o), on 5 October 2016, posted “news” on the arrest of Tilahum 
Gemeda Wariyo, an opposition leader. She posted Wariyo’s picture and informed her followers 
he was arrested while he was drinking coffee along with three other people.   
5.4.5 A call for a change of strategy 
Another theme highlighted by Oromo social media activists was a change of tactics and 
strategies. The tactics and strategies were aimed at minimizing the risk of being identified by the 
government security forces on the one hand and strengthening the protests on the other hand.  
5.4.5.1.1 Minimizing the risk 
 Tufa (2016h) his post on 5 October 2016 suggested a specific action such as road 
blocking to limit the movements of security forces. He told his followers to block roads in order 
to limit the movement of the killer-soldiers and their killings. He advised on possible locations of 
road blockade suggesting road blockade should not be in cities as doing so would lead to the 
security forcing the people to remove the boulders.  Tufa (2016h) also encouraged the protesters 
to block roads at some selected and strategic locations far from cities.   
Tufa (2016g) also provided further information. He warned protesters not to disclose the 
locations of the roadblock and not to post a picture of it on social media as doing so would help 
security forces to know about it in advance.  He suggested that the protesters leave the area once 
they blocked the roads. In another post on 2 October 2016 Tufa (2016c) called for the need to 
defeat what he called the war the government waged on the Oromo people. He insisted that the 
war, the kind of which has not been declared on human being, has been declared on his people 
and has to be defeated. Oromo activists also challenged his followers saying if they deserve to 
live while genocide was being waged on the people. For instance, Tufa (2016d) asked his 
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followers if they deserve to live as usual while a genocide was taking place on the Oromo 
people.  
5.4.5.1.2 Change of #Hashtag  
Another strategy suggested by some Oromo activists of social media was a change of 
hashtag from #OromoProtests to #OromoRevolution.  For example, Tufa (2016i) shared an 
article by Bonsa (2016) article on his website. Tufa directly quoted Bonsa’s definition of the 
“‘#OromoProtests was a short [sic]hand for a longer Oromo Peaceful Protests’” (Bonsa 2016 
quoted in Tufa (2016i). The activists explained that the change of hashtag was needed because 
the efforts to bring about change through a peaceful means “‘fell on deaf ears’” (Bonsa quoted in 
Tufa (2016i).   
5.4.5.1.3 Call for a military means  
Some activists also suggested a change of strategy that involves a shift from peaceful 
protests (political means) to military means. For example, Ararssa (2016r) in his post on 2 
October 2016 suggested the use of military force to stop the death of people was the only option. 
Ararssa (2016r) also expressed his doubt of peaceful (political solution). The following is a 
direct quote of his message on Facebook posted on 2 October 2016:  
Unfortunately, it has become increasingly more and more obvious that there is little 
likelihood for political end to this carnage. Regrettably, only military solutions are 
availing themselves. It has become abundantly clear that the matter now is going to be 
settled on the streets and jungles of Oromia, not on the corridors of the political class in 
Addis or on the diplomatic corridors of the regime's foreign patrons. This must be the 
limit of politics, national and international. (Ararssa, 2016r, para.1).  
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5.4.5.2 Call for unity  
Strengthening unity among different tribes was also another theme that was highlighted 
by some Oromo activists. For example, Gebissa (2016) stressed that “the Irreecha Massacre” 
needed to be “seen as a new chapter in the epic of Oromo resistance against a kleptocratic cabal 
parading as an Ethiopian government” (para. 15). He warned his followers if they did not follow 
the advice of Martin Niemöller saying, “We were going to be doomed if we don’t heed the 
counsel of Martin Niemöller applied to our situation” (para. 1). Gebissa borrowed from 
Niemöller’s “First they came…” version to Ethiopia’s situation by taking the examples of 
Sidama and Anuak tribes whose people were killed by the Ethiopian security forces in 2002 and 
2004-2006 respectively. He described it as follows:     
First [sic] they came for the Sidama, and we did not didn’t do much—because we’re not 
all Sidama.  Then they came for the Anuak, and we did not do much—Because we’re not 
all Anuaks. Then they came for the Oromo, again and again, and we didn’t do much—
Because I was not an Oromo. Then they came for us—and there was no one left to speak 
for all of us. They have no struck at the heart of what it means to be Oromo. (para. 15).  
5.5 Summary  
The aim of this chapter was to examine the themes highlighted by Oromo activists on 
three major events during the Oromo protests: #OromiaGrandRally, the 2016 Rio Olympics, and 
the Irreecha event of October 2016.  Analysis of texts on #OromiaGrandRally event show that 
Oromo protests highlighted difference themes. In their pre-rally social media posts, they 
highlighted different demands they wanted the Ethiopian government to answer. These include 
different political and economic demands; a call for an end to violence, which they framed as 
state-terrorism; justice; and environmental protection.  However, as violence erupted on the day 
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of the rally, there was a change in the post-rally themes. That is, the post-rally themes 
highlighted security force’s violence against the protesters, expression of solidarity with the 
victims of the violence; and determination to continue the protests.  
On the Rio Olympic 2016 event, where Feyisa Lilesa showed a defiant gesture at the 
finish-line of the marathon race, Oromo highlighted three major themes: the “the world is 
watching us” by mainly focusing on the news media’s coverage it received; expression of praise 
for Lilessa, and discussion on its impact on the Oromo protests. 
Analysis of the Oromo activists’ posts of the Irreecha event indicate they focused on five 
major themes: complain about how the news media covered the incident; expression of 
grievance; expression of hope; sharing information with the public; and a call for a new protest 
strategy. 
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6 ANALYSIS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the major themes and their framing by two international human 
rights groups: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International respectively, answering research 
question 3. Like the news media and the Oromo activist social media texts analyzed in the 
preceding chapters, human rights groups also highlighted three major themes: causes of the 
protest, government action, and call for action. Both Human Rights Watch and Anesty 
International framed the cause of the protests, government response, and call for action themes 
as grievances, violence, and justice respectively.  
6.2 Human Rights Watch 
Analysis of the Human Rights watch indicated that three major themes—causes that 
triggered the protest, the response of the government to the protests, and solutions. This section 
analyzes each of the themes and how they were framed. Frames include grievances, violence, 
and justice. 
6.2.1 Causes of the protest 
Human Rights Watch gave significant attention to the cause of the protests. It framed the 
cause of the protest as a grievance. Its documents portrayed the Addis Ababa Masterplan as the 
immediate trigger of the protest in Oromia. It highlighted the people’s concern as fear of 
displacement from their ancestral lands.  
Like the news media, Human Rights Watch documents framed the cause of the Oromo 
protest movement as a grievance. Human Rights Watch documents mainly three grievances: 
historical grievance, lack of democracy, and chain causes—grievances caused by the 
government’s action against the protesters every time they demand something.  
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6.2.1.1 Grievance rooted in history  
Human Rights Watch put the cause of the Oromo protest movements into a broader 
historical context emphasizing discrimination, marginalization, and different types of violence 
against them. For example, in its article published on December 18, 2015, the Human Rights 
Watch described the Oromo people faced history as follows:  
Many Oromos have historically felt marginalized and discriminated against by successive 
Ethiopian governments, and Oromos are often arbitrarily arrested and accused of 
belonging to the Oromo Liberation Force (OLF), which waged armed struggle in the past 
and which the government designates a terrorist organization.  (Human Rights Watch, 
2015, para. 16).   
The Human Rights Watch also highlighted the impact of the historical grievance on 
people’s feeling in exercising their rights. For example, in its dispatches authored by Horne 
(2015a), it described how the feeling of marginalization and discrimination prevented the Oromo 
people from opposing government policies saying: “many Oromos have felt marginalized and 
discriminated against by successive Ethiopian governments and have often felt unable to voice 
their concerns over government policies” (Horne, 2015a, para. 2).  
6.2.1.2 Lack of democracy 
The Human Rights Watch also associated the cause of the Oromo protest movement to 
lack of democracy in the country. It mentioned government restrictions on people’s rights, 
problems with elections, and questions on the independence of the judiciary system of the 
country. For example, in its article published on October 6, 2016, Horne (2016b) suggested the 
protests, which he described as “crises,” should not come as a surprise given the lack of 
democracy in the country. Horne (2016b) maintained that: 
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Ethiopia’s current crisis came as a surprise to many European policymakers, but it 
follows years of systematic government attacks on fundamental rights and freedoms, 
cutting off dissent.  Despite widespread frustrations with the government, the ruling party 
is able to hold every one of the seats in the federal and regional parliaments.  The courts 
have shown little independence on politically sensitive cases, misusing anti-terrorism law 
to punish peaceful dissent. There is little scrutiny of abusive security forces in part 
because of restrictions on independent media and NGOs. All of this has contributed to the 
complete closure of political space, creating the perfect storm. (6 para. 7)  
Human Rights Watch also portrayed the government’s suppression of rights as a root 
cause of the Oromo protest movement. For example, in its statement to the European Parliament 
on October 13, 2016, Human Rights Watch (2016c) framed the cause of the protest as “the 
outcome of the government’s systematic and calculated suppression of fundamental rights and 
freedoms that have closed political space and left few opportunities for the peaceful expressions 
of dissent” (para. 6).  
6.2.1.3 Chain of causes   
In addition to portraying the Addis Ababa Masterplan and political grievances such as 
lack of democracy as causes of the Oromo protest movement, Human Rights Watch documents 
also indicate that the intensity of the protests was associated with the response of the government 
to the protests. For example, the anger at government action at Irreecha on October 2, 2016 
exacerbated the protest, which again prompted the government to announce the state of 
emergency. So, by the time the government announced the cancellation of the Masterplan, the 
initial demand of the protesters, more questions were added to the list of their demands. Human 
Rights Watch (2016c) stated:   
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By the time the government announced the cancelation of the master plan in January, 
protester grievances had expanded to include condemnation of the brutality of the 
security forces’ responses to the largely peaceful protests as well as decades of 
marginalization and human rights violations of the Oromo people. (para 2).  
Human Rights Watch also suggested that more violence against protesters would lead to 
more protests. For example, in its letter to Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany who was 
visiting Ethiopia at the time, Human Rights Watch (2016b) stated that the protests may lead to 
“wider crisis” unless the Ethiopian government stopped violations against protesters saying:   
Tensions and public frustrations over security force killings and other abuses against 
protesters in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest region, have spread to other parts of the country 
in recent months and risk spiraling into wider crisis if the Ethiopian government doesn’t 
change course. (Human Rights Watch, 2016b, para. 8).  
6.2.2 Government response to the protests 
Analysis of the Human Rights Watch documents also shows that the government 
response to the Oromo protest movement was a major theme. Like the news media, Human 
Rights Watch also framed the response against the protesters as violent.  
Human Rights Watch used the violence frame to highlight the government’s treatment of 
protesters, which include detention of protesters in unknown places without charge and torture. 
For example, in its article titled: “Yet Again, a Bloody Crackdown on Protesters in Ethiopia,” (5 
December 2015), Horne (2015), a senior Ethiopia and Eritrea researcher for Human Rights 
Watch, described the experiences of Oromo students as follows:  
Those I spoke with told me about the torture they endured as part of interrogations. But 
countless others remained in detention. Some have been charged under Ethiopia’s 
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draconian counterterrorism law for their role in the protests; others languish without 
charge in unknown detention centers and military camps throughout Oromia. (para. 3).  
The Human Rights Watch also used the violence frame to expose different types of rights 
abuses against the Oromo protesters. For example, in its report titled “‘Such a brutal 
crackdown’: killings and arrests in response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests” (15 June 2016), 
Human Rights Watch (2016a) described the violations and denial of rights against Oromo 
Protesters saying: “security forces have tortured and otherwise ill-treated detainees, and several 
female detainees described being raped by security force personnel. Very few detainees have 
access to legal counsel, adequate food, or to their family members” (Human Rights Watch, 
2016a, para. 6).  
6.2.2.1 Impact of violence against the protesters  
The Human Rights Watch also used the violence frame to emphasize the impact of the 
violence on the people. For example, in its dispatches published on 22 December 2016 it detailed 
the impact on protesters. For example, Horne (2016d) narrated about “Iftu,” a 16 years old 
student who took part in the protest in Oromia.  Horne details the killing of her father by security 
forces, the arrest of two of her brothers by the military, days after the funeral of her father, and 
the disappearance of her mother and her other two brothers, her uncle who cannot walk due to 
torture he sustained in prison, and her suspension from school because the military forces found 
a protest song in her phone. Horne described how the government action ruined her family 
saying: “Her family and her future have been torn apart because she, her fellow students, and her 
father took to the streets to protest government policies” (Horne, 2016d, para. 3) 
In dispatches published on 9 November 2016, Horne (2016c) also detailed the experience 
of another case. Horne narrates the story of Meti, who participated in the protest against the 
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Masterplan, ran when security forces started firing a gun, later saw her brother dead, found her 
father and two brothers detained, and was finally told by school officials that she was suspended 
from school due to her participation in the protest. Taking the story of Meti as an example, 
Horne describes the impact of government officials’ violence against protesters saying: “Security 
forces have killed hundreds, detained tens of thousands, and shattered the lives of countless 
families over the last year” (Horne, 2016c, para. 4).  
6.2.2.2 Violation of international law 
 Human Rights Watch also portrayed violence against the Oromo protesters as the 
violation of international law. It did so by citing relevant principles of the international law. For 
example, in its article published on 18 December 2015, Human Rights Watch (2015) stated the 
following:  
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials provide that security forces shall as far as possible apply 
nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force. Whenever the lawful use of force is 
unavoidable, the authorities should use restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness 
of the offense. (para. 10)  
In its report on Ethiopia, Human Rights Watch (2016c) provided a broader context on 
human rights violations in Ethiopia.  For instance, in its statement to the European Parliament on 
October 13, 2016, it described the overall human rights violations as follows:  
Ethiopia is among Africa’s leading jailors of journalists, and there is little space for 
independent journalists to operate. Ethiopian journalists and bloggers must choose 
between self-censorship, arrest, or living in exile. Websites critical of the government are 
blocked, radio stations are regularly jammed during sensitive times, and those providing 
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information to journalists are targeted for arrest.  At various times in the last three 
months, the government has blocked the internet completely in some locations, restricted 
access to social media, and jammed radio transmissions including German broadcaster 
Deustche Welle (Human Rights Watch, 2016c, para. 7).  
6.2.2.3 Restriction on the right to protest  
In addition to the type of violence against protesters, Human Rights Watch (2016c) also 
highlighted how the government prevented people from protests in the first place and how it 
treats those who defy the restrictions. The following is another excerpt from Human Rights 
Watch’s statement to the European Parliament that detailed the problem protesters face in 
Ethiopia:    
The authorities restrict public protests with routine denial of permits and arrests of real or 
perceived protest organizers. Fear of opposing the government has historically kept 
people from protesting, but that fear is rapidly dissipating. For those who do take to the 
streets, as thousands have done in hundreds of locations over the last year, brutal force 
from security forces is often the response. What avenues does this leave to express 
dissent, to question government policies or to voice concern over abusive practices? 
(Human Rights Watch, para. 9). 
6.2.3 Call for action  
The third major theme of the Human Rights Watch was the call for action. The call for 
action theme includes two subthemes: an end to the violence, and investigation into the violence.    
6.2.3.1 End to the violence 
Human Rights Watch called on the government to stop the violence against protesters. 
For example, Horne (2015) called on the government to “ensure the use of excessive force by its 
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security forces stops immediately” (para. 6). Likewise, the Human Rights Watch (2016a) in its 
report published on June 15, 2016 demanded the government officials release all those who were 
detained without legal process saying: “the Ethiopian government should drop charges and 
release all those who have been arbitrarily detained” (para. 11).   
6.2.3.2 Call for investigation  
The Human Rights Watch also demanded government officials to investigate the violence 
against the protesters. The demands include suggesting the steps the government officials have to 
take. For example, Human Rights Watch (2016a) demanded that the Ethiopian government 
“should support a credible, independent, and transparent investigation into the use of excessive 
force by tis security forces, it should discipline or persecute as appropriate those responsible and 
provide victims of abuses with adequate compensation” (para. 11). Likewise, Horne (2015a) 
called for similar action in the report on December 5, 2015, saying it should help with the 
investigation of “an independent and impartial inquiry” on how security forces handled the 
protests (para. 6).   
6.2.3.2.1 Accountability  
In its call for investigation, Human Rights Watch emphasized accountability. It 
demanded holding those responsible for the violence to account. For instance, Horne (2015a) 
stated that “those responsible for serious abuses should be fairly prosecuted” (para. 6). The 
Human Rights Watch also framed holding those responsible to account as a way for the 
government to show it cares about the violence, that it doesn’t support the violence, and that it 
makes sure those who broke the law are punished. Accordingly:  
This would the best way for the Ethiopian government to show its concern about the 
deaths and injuries inflicted on the students, that it does not condone the use of live 
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ammunition against peaceful protests, and that those who break the law are appropriately 
punished. (Horne, 2015a, para. 6).  
6.2.3.2.2 Justice  
Human Rights Watch framed investigation into the violence to bring justice to the 
victims of the violence. For instance, Felix (2016c) on November 9, 2016, called on the 
Ethiopian government and international community. He wrote, “the Ethiopian government and 
its international allies should refocus on the need for justice, accountability, and meaningful 
reform” (para. 8).  
6.2.3.2.3 Call for intervention of the international community 
Human Rights Watch also called for intervention of the international community in the 
process of justice seeking. In its report titled: “Lethal Force Against Protesters: Military 
Deployment, Terrorism Rhetoric Risk Escalating Violence” (18 December 2015), Human Rights 
Watch (2015) called on Ethiopia to involve human rights experts from the African Union and 
United Nations. Likewise, in its letter to Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, on October 8, 
2016, Human Rights Watch (2016b) asked Germany to pay attention to the human rights 
violations in Ethiopia. The letter asked the chancellor to end the use of “excessive force by 
security forces,” release the protesters, “express support for a credible, international investigation 
into the deaths…,” and called for the “lifting of government restrictions on media reporting and 
access to the internet and social media” (para. 7).  
Human Rights Watch also called on the European Union (EU) to intervene in the human 
rights situation in Ethiopia. For example, in its article titled: “EU Needs a New Approach to 
Ethiopia,” (6 October 2016), Horne (2016b), the author of the article, criticized Frederica 
Mogherini, EU’s High Representative, for working on a joint declaration called ‘“Towards an 
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EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement’” with Hailemariam Desalegn, Ethiopia’s prime minister. It 
characterized the declaration as “business as usual” (para 4).  He blamed the EU for being silent 
as demonstrators were being shot, journalists and opposition members locked up, and peaceful 
activists punished…” (Horne, 2016b, para. 4). It portrayed the EU’s long-term relations with 
Ethiopia as negligent on human rights issues.  The Human Rights Watch characterized the EU 
relations with Ethiopia a “quiet diplomacy approach” for being “among many donors that have 
historically been silent about Ethiopia’s human rights abuses, afraid to risk strategic partnerships 
on development, migration, peacekeeping, and security” (Horne, 2016b, para. 8).   
6.2.3.2.4 Abuse of aid money 
Human Rights Watch accused the Ethiopian government of abusing the aid money it gets 
from foreigners, including the European Union, to buy silence from the people. Horne (2016b) 
described the abuse of aid money as a common practice in Ethiopia. He said, “Offering 
government benefits in exchange for silence is something many Ethiopians, particularly in rural 
area, have known for years” (para.9). Horne further said the government “carefully controls 
access to the benefits of development including seeds, fertilizers, food aid, and jobs, much of it 
funded by the EU and its members” (para. 9). Human Rights Watch (2016c) framed the abuse of 
aid money as ‘“a political capture of aid”’ which involves government officials’ “misuse of 
development assistance…. by ensuring that only those who are ruling party members or 
supporters receive the benefits of aid, including access to seeds, to jobs, and to training 
opportunities” (para. 11). It also warned of the negative consequence of the “political capture of 
aid” saying:  
While EU development assistance makes an invaluable contribution to much-needed 
poverty reduction efforts in Ethiopia, it also has the unintended side effect of increasing 
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the government’s repressive capacity, by contributing to the reliance that Ethiopians have 
on the government for their livelihoods and ultimately for their survival. (Human Rights 
Watch, 2016c, para. 11).  
6.2.3.2.5 Solution 
As a solution, the Human Rights Watch calls for a new EU approach to Ethiopia. It 
warned of the danger of not do so saying its “strategic relationships will become obsolete if 
Ethiopia plunges further into crisis” (Horne, 2016b, para. 12). He demanded the EU to “push 
Ethiopia to respect divergent views, and rein in forces that rapidly turn to bullets, beatings, and 
mass arrests” (para. 12). Horne called on the EU to push for international investigation into the 
violence in Ethiopia:  
The EU and its member states should continue to push for an international investigation 
into the killings, press the government to grant the UN access to investigate, and urge the 
government to hold to account security forces members responsible for abuses. By taking 
these steps, The EU and its member states can improve the potential to be stable long-
term partners. (Horne, 2016b, para. 13)  
6.2.3.2.6 Lack of trust in the Ethiopian government.  
Human Rights Watch’s call for international investigation into the violence against the 
protesters was due to a lack of trust in the government. For example, in dispatches published on 
July 28, 2016, Horne (2016a) criticized the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission for claiming 
the force used by the government against the protesters was proportionate. He characterized the 
claim as “sending an ominous message to Ethiopian that security force members can shoot 
unarmed protesters with impunity” (para. 4). For example, he portrayed the killing of more than 
400 people by security forces that did not prompt the government to conduct “meaningful 
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investigation” as indication of the absence of “effort to hold security forces accountable” (para. 
3). Human Rights Watch (2016a) called on the international community. It said: “given that a 
national process is unlikely to be viewed as sufficiently independent of the government, the 
inquiry should have an international component” (Human Rights Watch, 2016a, para. 12).   
6.3 Analysis of Amnesty International Documents 
Like the news media, social media users, and Human Rights Watch, analysis of the texts 
of Amnesty International reports focused on three major themes: causes of the Oromo protests, 
government response to the protests, and call for action. The frames are the same as the frames 
of Human Rights Watch which are grievances, violence, and justice. 
6.3.1 Causes of the protest  
The causes that triggered the Oromo protests is one of the major themes of Amnesty 
International’s documents.  But unlike texts of other actors such as Human Rights Watch and the 
news media, which went further to include historical grievances (marginalization and 
discrimination), the Amnesty International reports focused mainly on the immediate trigger of 
the protests—the Masterplan. For example, Amnesty International (2015), Amnesty International 
(2016c); Amnesty International (2016f), and Amnesty International (2016g) portrayed the 
Masterplan as a factor that triggered the Oromo protests.   
In their articles published and October 5, 2016 and November 9, 2016, Amnesty 
International (2016f) and Amnesty International (2016g) respectively portrayed the cause of the 
protests as “opposition to the Addis Ababa Masterplan.” The Amnesty International focused on 
the underlying reason for the opposition to the master plan as a fear of the consequence i.e., the 
fear of what might happen to the people if the Masterplan was implemented. For instance, 
Amnesty International (2016f) described the underlying reason to oppose the Masterplan as fear 
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of “mass displacement of people from their homes” (para. 9).  Amnesty International (2016c) 
also described the cause as “dispossession of land without adequate compensation in the Oromia 
region” (para. 3).  
Amnesty International also described the intention of the Masterplan in terms of an 
administrative government frame. For instance, Amnesty International (2016f) and Amnesty 
International (2016g) wrote that the aim of the Masterplan was to “extend boundaries of the 
capital Addis Ababa into parts of Oromia (para. 9)  and “to extend the capital Addis Ababa’s 
administrative control into parts of Oromia” (para 2) respectively.  
6.3.2 Government response to the protests  
The government action theme received significant attention from Amnesty International. 
Like Human Rights Watch and the news media, Amnesty International also used the violence 
frame to describe the government response against the Oromo protest movement. It detailed 
different forms of violence against protesters such as detention, torture, and killings. The 
violence frame also highlighted the way the government officials carried out the violence.   
6.3.2.1 Levels of violence 
The violence frame used many descriptive phrases to indicate the level of violence by 
government officials against protesters. These phrases include “use of excessive lethal force,” 
“heavy-handed response,” “the most severe crackdown,” “brutal crackdown,” and “lethal force.” 
For example, in its article published on January 14, 2016, Amnesty International (2016a) 
described the violence against “peaceful protests” saying the government officials “responded 
with excessive force…. including by use of live ammunition against protesters, among them 
children as young as 12” (para. 12).   Likewise, Amnesty International (2016d) described the 
violence against political opposition leaders who it said were “beaten and forced to appear before 
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court inadequately dressed” (para. 1). For example, referring to a complaint by Bekele Gerba, an 
opposition leader and one of the detainees, to the court, the article said: “…. some defendants 
were beaten while in detention, and prison officials confiscated all the defendant’s black suits, 
which they intended to wear to court. The rest of their clothes were taken by other prisoners” 
(para. 2).  
Amnesty International (2016d) framed the violence against the detainees as immoral or 
“a new low.” For example, citing Micelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional 
Director for East Africa, the Horn and Great Lakes, it wrote: ‘“aside from the beatings they [the 
detainees] suffered in detention, degrading the defendants by making them attend court in their 
underpants is a new low in the behavior of the prison authorities and a total outrage”’ (para. 3). 
Amnesty International ((2016a) used the violence frame to describe the continued use of 
violence against protesters as worrisome escalation. For example, it cited Mandeep Tiwana, 
Head of Police Research at CIVICUS, who said the ‘“use of excessive and lethal force against 
protesters, coupled with mass arrests of peaceful demonstrators and human rights defenders 
represent a worrying escalation of the government’s ongoing campaign to silence any form of 
dissent in the country’” (2016, para. 4). 
6.3.2.2 Manner of violence 
The violence frame was also used by Amnesty International to describe the manner of the 
violence against Oromo protesters. Amnesty International used different descriptive adjectives, 
for example, to describe detention of protesters as “arbitrary”, and the killings as “unlawful.” For 
instance, in its June 3, 2016 report, Amnesty International (2016d) criticized the government. It 
stated that the government security forces “arbitrarily arrested thousands of people, and several 
hundreds of people participating in the protests have been unlawfully killed by the security 
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services” (para. 8). In an article published on June 2, 2016, Amnesty International (2016c) also 
accused the government of arbitrarily detaining peaceful protesters even by ignoring a call by 
different groups. It accused as follows:  
Despite repeated calls from CSOs, independent UN experts, the European Parliament, 
and numerous governments, including the United States, the Ethiopian authorities 
continue to arbitrarily detain and prosecute scores of peaceful protestors for exercising 
their rights, using the broad provisions of the ATP [Anti-Terrorism Proclamations] to 
criminalize peaceful expressions of dissent (para.7).  
6.3.2.3 Made-up allegations 
Amnesty International used the violence frame to indicate security force’s use of illegal 
means against protesters. For example, in its article published on February 17, 2016, with a title: 
“Detained Oromo Protesters Must Be Release,” Amnesty International (2016b) narrated the 
story of Dejene Tafa, a member of the Oromo Federalist Congress, an opposition party that 
supported Oromo protests. It mentioned that police searched Dejene Tafa’s house illegally 
(without warrant), planted a banned opposition party’s flag and other items in his house only to 
accuse him of having them, detained him but denied him access to his lawyers, restricted visits 
by his family, and prevented him from discussing the pain in his eyes.  
6.3.3 Call for action  
The Call for Action theme is one of the dominant themes of the Amnesty International 
reports/texts. For instance, the following six articles by Amnesty International have a theme that 
calls for action in their titles (see Table 6):  
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Table 6 Reports of Amnesty International that Called for Action 
 
▪ “Ethiopia: After a year of protests, time to address grave human rights concerns” (Amnesty 
International, 2016g)  
▪ “Ethiopia: Renewed protests underline need to investigate after dozens killed in stampede” 
(Amnesty International, 2016f).  
▪ “Ethiopia: Civil society groups urge international investigation into ongoing human rights 
violations” (Amnesty International, 2016e) 
▪ “End use of counter-terrorism law to persecute dissenters and opposition members” 
(Amnesty International, 2016c) 
▪ “Further information: Detained Oromo protesters must be released” (Amnesty International, 
2016b) 
▪ “Civil society groups urge the international community to address killing of Oromo 
protesters” (Amnesty International, 2016a).  
 
6.3.3.1 A call for an end to violence 
Amnesty International also called for an end to all forms of violence such as detention, 
mistreatment (torture), and killings. As the above table shows, its documents asked for an end to 
violence with a sense of urgency (e.g., “time to address grave human rights concerns…, 
(Amnesty International, 2016g) and necessity, as in “…underline the need to investigate ….” 
(Amnesty International, 2016f). In its article published on June 3, 2016, Amnesty International 
(2016d) called on government officials to “immediately stop the ill-treatment of political 
members and human rights defenders who were beaten in detention and then forced to appear 
before the court inadequately dressed” (para.1).  
6.3.3.2 Repeal the law and procedures responsible that justify the violence 
Along with the call for an end to the violence, Amnesty International called for the repeal 
of the underlying laws and procedures that justified the government’s use of violence against 
protesters, e.g., the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009(ATP). Amnesty International 
justified its call for repealing the law by 1) questioning its quality, and 2) arguing that the 
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government officials used it as a tool of oppression. For example, in its article published on June 
2, 2016, Amnesty International (2016c) characterized the law as not meeting international 
standards. It accused the government of “using laws and judicial processes that fail to meet 
international human rights standards to harass and stifle dissent, targeting activists, human rights 
defenders, opposition party leaders, and activists” (para. 2). 
 Amnesty International also portrayed the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation law as giving the 
government officials too much power to suppress dissidents. For instance, in its article published 
on December 12, 2015 Amnesty International (2015) criticized the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 
652/2009 (ATP) for granting the govern officials “unrestrained force” to silence opponents. In its 
call for repealing the law, Amnesty International juxtaposed the provisions of the law with the 
impact it had on the people as follows: 
Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009, permits the government to use 
unrestrained force against suspected terrorists, including pre-trial detention of up to four 
months. People that have been subject to pre-trial detention under the anti-terrorism law 
have reported widespread use of torture and ill treatment. (Amnesty International, 15 
December 2015, para.7-8).   
Furthermore, Amnesty International portrayed the use of the law as a cover up to target 
people who hold a view different from the government. For instance, Amnesty International 
(2016c) it cited Hassan Shire, the Executive Defend Defenders who said “‘The Ethiopian 
government’s use of counter-terrorism as a smokescreen to target the peaceful work of human 
rights defenders is an affront to its regional and international obligations”’ (para. 8). 
Amnesty International also called for the repeal of the law suggesting it both justified the 
violence against the protesters and contributed to the protest itself. For example, Amnesty 
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International (2016g) cited Micelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director 
for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes, demanding that government officials change. She 
said: ‘“They should also repeal the repressive laws that imprisoned them in the first place, 
including the draconian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation that has also contributed to the unrest”’ 
(para. 4). 
6.3.3.3 Investigation of the violence  
Amnesty International also called for investigation into the violence against the 
protesters. It called for truth and accountability and independent and impartial investigation.  A 
third aspect of the call for action is also a call for investigation into the violence against the 
protesters. It framed the call for investigation as doing justice for victims of the violence. It also 
framed the purpose of the investigation as finding the truth. For example, in its article published 
on October 5, 2016, Amnesty International (2016f) quoted Michelle Kagari, Amnesty 
International’s Deputy Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes who 
said: it is “‘critical that an investigation be held to unearth the truth and to identify law 
enforcement officers criminally responsible and hold to account in open and fair trials”’ (para. 
5). Amnesty International also suggested that truth and accountability aimed at helping the 
victims of the violence as well. For instance, in its article on 14 January 2016, Amnesty 
International (2016a) demanded that government officials help victims. It wrote: “the Ethiopian 
authorities must ensure that victims of human rights violations by law enforcement officials have 
access to an effective remedy and obtain adequate reparation, including compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition” (para. 11). 
In its call for truth and accountability, Amnesty International documents also highlighted 
the need to conduct independent and impartial investigation into the violence against the 
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protesters. The emphasis on the independent and impartial investigation emanated from lack of 
trust of the government of Ethiopia. For example, in its article on 30 August 2016, Amnesty 
International (2016e) cited Sarah Jackso, Deputy Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and 
the Great Lakes who “lack of independent and transparent investigation of human rights 
violations in Ethiopia strongly implies that the Ethiopian government’s investigation of the 
ongoing human rights crises will be independent, impartial, and transparent” (para. 4). For the 
lack of trust of the government of Ethiopia, it also referred to Ethiopia’s National Human Rights 
Commission’s statement on the violence saying:  
Ethiopia’s National Human Rights Commission, which has the mandate to investigate 
rights violations in Ethiopia, has failed to make its own June report on the Oromo 
protests, while concluding in its oral report to Parliament that the lethal force used by 
security forces in Oromia was proportionate to the risk they faced from protesters. (para. 
10). 
In its call for independent and impartial investigation into the violence, Amnesty 
International also specified the type of violations that needed to be investigated. It suggested 
investigation into human rights violations in general, and the killings and arrests of the protesters 
in particular. For instance, it reflected on a civil society group’s call for: “an independent and 
impartial international investigation into human rights violations in Ethiopia, including the 
unlawful killing of peaceful protesters and a recent spate of arrests of civil society members 
documenting this crackdown” (Amnesty International, 2016e, para.1). 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter answered RQ3, that is, the main themes and frames highlighted by 
international human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). 
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Like the news media, both Human Right Watch and Amnesty International focused on three 
major themes: the cause of the protest, government response to the protest, and a call to action 
(solutions). Human rights organizations framed the cause of the protest as a grievance. But while 
the Human Rights Watch focused on the political and historical grievances, Amnesty 
International emphasized the economic grievance, especially the Masterplan. Both Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International framed the government response to protests as 
violence. Like the news media, they highlighted on the different types of violence such as 
killings, mass arrests, and torture of the protesters by security forces of the Ethiopian 
government. The call for a solution also focused mainly on justice to the victims. 
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7 ANALYSIS:  THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyzed texts (statements and interview transcripts) of the Ethiopian 
government officials on the Oromo protest movement to answer research question 4. As with 
other actors (the news media, social media activists, and international organizations), three major 
themes—causes of the protest, violence, and solutions—were highlighted. However, the 
government officials framed all themes differently than other actors. It attributed the cause of 
protests to internal forces, a frustrated youth in Ethiopia, and external forces or diaspora 
Ethiopians and foreign countries who want to overthrow the government. It framed the violence 
theme as violence caused by the protesters against security forces, civilians, and public 
infrastructures. The government framed the solution theme as “deep reform within the 
government” in order to grow the economy and serve the interests of the people.   
7.2 Cause of the Problems 
The Ethiopian government officials highlighted the causes of the Oromo protest 
movement. They attributed the causes of the problem to two factors: internal factors they framed 
as “frustration” by the people, especially the youth, due to “unmet expectations,” and external 
factors they characterized as forces that sought to use the protests to destabilize the country and 
seize government power.  
7.2.1 Internal factors 
The government described the Oromo protest movement as an “expression of 
frustration.” It portrayed the sources of the “frustration” as a disappointment by the youth about 
“unmet expectations” on economic and political issues. For example, in his interview with the 
Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) on 7 October 2016 Getachew Reda, the minister of 
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Government Communications Affairs, mentioned the economic factors as inequality in wealth 
distribution and unemployment. However, Reda also used vague language at times. For example, 
in similar interviews, he described the “inequality” as “real and perceived inequality” indicating 
that protesters’ claims were inaccurate or exaggerated.  
Although the government admitted that economic issues such as wealth distribution and 
unemployment explain “frustration” among the youth, it also sought to put a positive spin on it. 
For example, it claimed that the big expectation on the part of the youth was in part the result of 
the country’s success in economic growth. For example, while it cited sending millions of 
students to school as a source of pride, it also admitted that it did not meet the raised expectation 
about job opportunities for the graduates.   
The government officials also depicted youth frustration as a frustration created by 
economic development, saying the economic growth in the country did not trickle down to some 
parts of the society, especially the youth. So, the frustration was the “result of a very success that 
which the EPRDF has unleashed as a result of progressive policies” (EBC, 11 September 2016, 
1:52). Reda mentioned the “result of progressive stories” such as sending millions of students to 
schools and graduating every year but not getting a job. Reda described this as “unmet 
expectations.”  “We have been victims of our own successes” (EBC, 11 September 2016, 3:35).   
The government also attributed the “frustration” to political factors, such as issues of 
good governance and corruption. Like social media activists and international news media, the 
government officials then blamed bad official practices. However, unlike the Oromo protest 
activists or the international news media, which portrayed the problem as the problem of the 
government system itself, the officials portrayed it as a problem with “some officials” who 
“abandoned their responsibility.” For example, Reda said, “With some government officials’ 
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practices ur departing slightly er and even in some cases significantly from the kind of 
developmental er focus that EPRDF has been er known for.” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 2:42). These 
officials, according to Reda, do not represent the government which “was basically a service-
oriented government, a government which was, which puts the interest of the public front and 
center” (EBC, 7 October 2016). 
The Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Masterplan that triggered the Oromo protest 
movement was also highlighted in the officials’ discussion about the protest, especially in the 
context of responding to the protests. However, unlike the Oromo protest activists, who framed 
the masterplan as a “landgrab” intended to displace farmers from their lands, the government 
officials portrayed it as the “development plan” aimed at improving the lives of the people. They 
represented the Masterplan as mutually beneficial to both Addis Ababa and surrounding towns of 
the Oromia region. For example, in his interview with The Ethiopian Reporter on 30 August 
2015, Hayelom Tawuye, the Deputy General Manager of the Addis Ababa City Development 
and Management Office said the following:  
እነዚህ አካባቢዎች በተቀናጀ መንገድ ቢያድጉ ሁሉም ተጠቃሚ ይሆናል፡፡ ማንም ይኼን ያምንበታል፡፡ ይህንን 
ድንቅ ሐሳብ አዕምሮውን ክፍት አድርጎ የመተለከተ ሁሉ የሚያደንቀው ነው፡፡ [“If these areas [Addis 
Ababa and Oromia towns] growth together all will benefit. Everyone believes this. 
Anyone who sees this with an open mind will appreciate this novel idea”]. (The 
Ethiopian Reporter, 30 August 2015).  
Tawuye counteracted opposition to the Masterplan saying it was caused due to 
misunderstanding. He said that integrating a cities’ masterplan with surrounding areas is a 
common practice in other countries, without mentioning those countries by name.  
Tawuye explained what the integration plan means and how it can benefit Addis Ababa 
and Oromia towns as follows:  
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ግለሰቦች ከግንዛቤ ጉድለት ወይም ሆን ብለው ችግር ሊፈጥሩ ይችላሉ፡፡ ነገር ግን ማቀናጀት ምን ማለት ነው? 
የተወሳሰበ ጉዳይ አይደለም፡፡ አንተ እንዳልከው ቁምነገሩ ማኅበራዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊና አካባቢያዊ ጉዳዮችን እንዴት 
እናሳድግ የሚለው ነው፡፡ የአንድ አካባቢ ዕድገት ከተጎራባቹ ጋር አብሮ መሄድ ይኖርበታል፡፡ የአዲስ አበባ ዕድገት 
በዙሪያው ያለውን ይዞ መሄድ አለበት፡፡ አዲስ አበባ ውኃ ከልዩ ዞኑ ትጠቀማለች፡፡ ሌሎች ሰፋፊ ጥቅሞች 
ይኖራሉ፡፡ በተመሳሳይ ልዩ ዞኑም ከአዲስ አበባ የሚጠቀመው ይኖራል፡፡ መንገድ ስትሠራና ባቡር ስትዘረጋ አንድ 
ላይ የተሳሰረ ነው፡፡ መዋቅራዊ ፕላኑ ለሁሉም የሚበጅ ግዙፍ ዕቅድ ነው፡፡ የሁለትዮሽ ጥቅምን በሚመለከት 
መንግሥት የጠራ ግንዛቤ አለው፡፡ የጋራ ማስተር ፕላኑ ይህንን ከግንዛቤ ከቶ የተዘጋጀ ነው፡፡ [Individuals may 
create a problem either because of lack of understanding or intentionally. However, what 
does integration mean?  It is not a complicated issue. As you said, the important thing is 
how we can address the social, economic, and environmental issues. Development in one 
area should be integrated with the development of the neighboring areas. The 
development of Addis Ababa should go along with the areas that surround it. Addis 
Ababa will get water supply from the special zone [Oromia]. There are other benefits. In 
the same way, there are benefits the special zone gets from Addis Ababa. When you 
construct roads and railways, you link the two. The Masterplan is a big plan that benefits 
all. The government has a clear understanding regarding the mutual benefit. The 
Masterplan was prepared to take this into consideration]. (The Ethiopian Reporter, 30 
August 2015).  
In his interview with The Ethiopian Reporter published on 27 December 2015, Fekadu 
Tesemma, the head of the Oromia Regional Government Communications Affairs, also 
highlighted the benefits of the master plan. He described the masterplan as “infrastructural plan” 
aimed at promoting trade and investment, protecting the environment by ensuring mutual 
benefits of Addis Ababa and surrounding towns of the Oromia regions. He further stressed the 
benefit the masterplan gives to Oromia towns saying Addis Ababa was a big market. 
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Government officials also sought to dispel the fears by the Oromo people concerning the 
quality to the masterplan by highlighting the master plan was prepared based on the experience 
of other countries and with the participation of international experts.  For example, in his 
interview with The Ethiopian Reporter on 13 September 2015, Diriba Kuma, the Mayor of Addis 
Ababa, explained that the Masterplan was prepared by professionals from France. He indicated 
that it took the experience of the city of Lyons (France) and the experience of how cities in 
Europe integrated and developed together. He also described the master plan as a sign of 
modernity, not a source of the problem.    
In addition to highlighting the benefits of the master plan in terms of development, 
government officials also highlighted the master plan as unproblematic. For example, in his 
exclusive interview with The Ethiopian Reporter TV on 30 November 2015, Prime Minster 
Hailemariam Desalegn said the master plan would not cause any problem. He said the protest 
against the masterplan was unnecessary as it was not ratified by the Parliament, and hence open 
for discussion with the public. Like other officials, he portrayed the master plan as a 
“development plan” aimed at building infrastructures that connect Addis Ababa with 
surrounding towns of the Oromia region. He mentioned railway, electricity, and water supply as 
an example.  
Hailemariam Desalegn also counter-framed protesters accusation that the master plan was 
aimed at expanding the territory of Addis Ababa Oromia lands. For example, he said the 
following:  
“የአዲስ አበበ ማስተር ፕላን ሲሰራ ኦሮሚያ ዙሪያ ያሉ የኦሮሚያ ከተሞች ማስተር ፕላኑ አካል ሆነው ቢሠሩ 
ከአዲስ አበበ ጥቅም ያገኛሉ። ይህ ማለት አዲስ አበበ በአዲስ አበበ የኦሮሚያ ከተሞች በኦሮሚያ እየተዳደሩ ማለት 
ነው” [“If the design of the Addis Ababa Masterplan includes Oromia towns, the Oromia 
towns will get benefit from Addis Ababa. This means Addis Ababa will be administered 
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by Addis Ababa, and Oromia will be administered by Oromia”] (The Ethiopian Reporter 
TV, 30 November 2015, 1:22:42). 
Hailemariam went further saying: “አዲስ አበበ የራሷ ድንበር አላት። ከድንበሩ አንድ ኢንች ወደ ኦሮሚያ 
አትገባም አዲስ አበበ” [“Addis Ababa has its own territory. It will not expand an inch into Oromia”] 
(The Ethiopian Reporter TV, 30 November 2015, 1:23:55). Diriba Kuma, the mayor of Addis 
Ababa also tod The Ethiopian Reporter the same thing saying the following:   
ሁለት የአስተዳደር አካላት የተቀናጀ ዕቅድ ይዘው መሥራታቸው በምንም ዓይነት አንዱ የሌላውን አስተዳደራዊ 
ሥልጣን የሚነካ አይደለም፡፡ ቁም ነገሩ በጋራ እንልማ ነው፡፡ አንዱን መሬት ወደ ሌላ የመውሰድ ዓላማም 
የለውም፡፡ በቅንጅት የማልማት ጉዳይ ነው፡፡ [“For two administrations (Addis Ababa and Oromia) 
working on integrated plan does not interfere into the jurisdiction of another 
administration. It has no plan to take other’s lands. It is about growing together]. 
7.2.2 External factors 
The Ethiopian government officials also attributed the cause of the protests to external 
forces. It divided the external forces into state and non-state actors. For example, in his interview 
with EBC on 7 October 2016, Getachew Reda mentioned three types of actors: nation states, the 
diaspora-based Ethiopian activists, and opposition political parties. By state actors, the Ethiopian 
officials allude to Egypt and Eritrea. Egypt has always been considered a country that does not 
want peace in Ethiopia because of the long-standing issue over the water politics, the Nile River. 
Egypt depends on 85% of its water needs from the Nile, which gets 85 percent of its water from 
Ethiopian highlands. Ethiopia’s ongoing construction of a huge dam on the river created fear in 
Egypt that it may lose some water from the river. Likewise, Eritrea was considered an enemy 
country that supported oppositions against the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought 
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a bitter border war in 1998-2000 that resulted in the death of more than 80,000 people from both 
sides (Gebrekidan, 2018). They portrayed these forces as forces that want to destroy the state: 
But there are also other explanations here, especially with the government being very 
serious about addressing the kinds of challenges…the people are facing, meeting the 
demands of the people, there are some elements which are in the business of, in fact, 
allowing the government to, to itself because, they are ready to take …every opportunity 
at their disposal to make sure this government and the state apparatus is dismantled. 
(EBC, 7 October 2016, 9:06)    
Reda suggested that these forces do not want the government to reform itself because if it 
does, they would not have an excuse to protest. He said: “Of course, they are trying to take 
advantage of the situation because if the government manages to reform itself, which it will, and 
then, they will have lost their rallying cry” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 9:35). 
The Ethiopian officials portrayed the diaspora-based Ethiopians as the “rejectionist 
elements” who want to overthrow the government. Here is how Getachew Reda explained who 
these elements are saying, “the rejectionist elements in the Ethiopian diaspora who have always 
been trying every means, every means at their disposal to short-circuit the process to power” 
(EBC, 11 September 2016, 9:54). Reda described the Ethiopian diaspora group as wanting to 
dismantle the constitutional order to overthrow the government.  
7.3 Violence  
As with the international news media, Oromo social media activists, Human Rights 
Watch, and Amnesty International, violence was a major theme of government officials’ 
discussion about the Oromo protest movement. However, unlike these actors, who framed it as a 
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state-violence against peaceful protesters, the government officials highlighted the violence by 
the protesters.  
7.3.1 The cause of the protests is also the cause of the violence  
For protesters and other actors, the cause of the protesters—the government officials who 
caused the economic, social, and political grievances—also responded violently to peaceful 
protesters for demanded their rights. For the government, the source of the protests, especially 
the external forces—foreign states (Egypt and Eritrea) and the “rejectionist diaspora-based” 
Ethiopians caused violence in order to “dismantle the constitutional order.” 
7.3.2  “Protesters cause is not the real cause”  
Government officials rejected the claim that the Masterplan was the cause of the 
protesters. They rejected the Masterplan as a “cover-up.”  For example, in his press conference 
on 17 December 2015, Getachew Reda, Minister of Government Communications Affairs, 
rejected this as a “cover-up” saying, “የማስተር ፕላን ጥያቄ ሽፋን ነበር እንጂ የመጨረሻ ጥያቄ አልነበረም [“The 
question of the master plan was a cover-up; it was not their ultimate question”] (Awramba Times, 
17 December 2015, 3:51). According to government officials, although there was a 
misunderstanding on the Masterplan by some people, it was hijacked by “some elements” inside 
and outside the country who want to overthrow the government through violence. For example, 
the following was how he described opposition political parties who operate in the country 
legally:  
እዚህ ሀገር ላይ በህግ የሚንቀሳቀሱ ሀይሎች አሉ። በህጋዊ ስባል ያው ለምዝገባ ሲባል ህጋዊ የሆኑ በተቻለ መጠን 
ግን በግርግርና በሁከት አመካኝቶም ቢሆን ራሳቸውን ቤተመንግሥት እናገኘዋለን የሚል ቅዠት ያለቸው ወገኖች 
አሉ። [“in this country, there are folks who operate legally. But ‘legally means just for the 
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sake of registration [by electoral commission] but as much as possible use the violence to 
find themselves in the Palace”]. (Awramba Times, 17 December 2015, 4:49).  
The “terrorists” the officials were alluding to are Ethiopian opposition parties who 
engaged in armed struggle to overthrow the government. Three political parties: the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Ginbot 7 were 
deemed terrorist groups by the Ethiopian Parliament.  
7.3.3 Self-defense 
The Ethiopian government portrayed the violence against protesters as an act of self-
defense and maintaining law and orders by security forces. By denying the accusation of the 
violence against the protesters, they justified the use of force as an action that was done to 
protect security forces. For example, in his interview to Al Jazeera’s Inside the Story, Getachew 
Reda, the minster of the Ethiopian Government’s Communications Affairs, said, “Look, security 
forces are taking measures when there are violent protests, and when people are particularly 
using deadly forces against security forces and civilians in the name of protests” (Al Jazeera, 14 
August 2016, 08:13). Reda framed the violence by security forces against protesters as a 
response to the violence by the protesters. For example, in his answer to Al Jazeeera’s Fuli 
Batibo’s question to explain the justification for the killing of 30 protesters in the City of Bahir 
Dar, he answered the following, “… there was a violent incident involving people among the 
protesters throwing grenades at institutions and at people, and of course, security forces … 
would normally respond when there is a violent reaction” (Al Jazeera, 14 August 2016, 9:03).  
7.3.4 Exaggerated number of casualties 
The Ethiopian government officials also contested the numbers of casualties that were 
reported by the activists and the news media. For example, he described the information on 
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casualties by activists as “being plucked out of thin air” (Al Jazeera, August 14, 2016, 8: 28).  He 
described exaggeration of the casualties as aimed at “creating a cloud of suspicion and fear 
throughout the country” when he said, “…simply because we are trying to inflate figures of 
casualties and fatalities simply to because we are trying to create a cloud of suspicion and fear 
throughout the country” (Al Jazeera, 14 August 2016, 12:12).  
7.3.5 Demonizing the protests 
The Ethiopian government official not only externalized the problem to outside forces, 
political parties, and diaspora-based terrorists, he also demonized them as such.  Getachew Reda 
framed the organizers of the protests as “gannen”[demon]. በነገራችን ላይ ሁከት የጠራው ወገን፣ ጋኔን 
የጠራው ወገን ጋኔኑም ራሱ መቆጣጠሩ እርግጠኛ አይደለም። [“by the way, the folks who called for the 
violence, the folks who were called by the demon, even the demon himself is not sure if he can 
control it”]. (Awramba Times, 17 December 2015: 6:07).  
7.4 Solution 
Solution to the problems was also a major theme that was highlighted by the government 
officials in their discussion about the Oromo protests movement. The solutions, according to 
government officials, were “deep reform” or “deep renewal.”  “Deep reform” or “deep renewal,” 
according to Getachew Reda in his interview with the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation on 7 
October 2016) was “to bring EPRDF [The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front] 
back to its fundamental …to its original promises to its people … to revitalize the state in such a 
way that it will once again become at the service of …of the people” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 
6:43). The government officials maintained that the EPRDF government is the government of the 
people that always prioritizes the interests of the people. So, the purpose of the “deep reform,” 
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according to Getachew Reda, was to create a “servant state” in which officials do not use the 
state power for personal gains, saying: 
It will once again become the kind of servant state and government that it is …expected 
to be with the renewal line. Also make sure state power is not source of private gain and 
private wealth, but a platform to serve the interest of the public (EBC, 7 October 2016, 
7:10). 
7.4.1 The source of the problem is the source of the solution too 
By framing the source of the economic problem as economic growth, the government 
officials also suggested the same as solutions to the problem: “So, the government clearly 
realizes that the best way to address this youth bulge, to address this frustration, through more 
not less growth, through more, not less change, and of course, this is what the government is 
doing” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 15: 09). 
7.4.2 Defending government policy 
In contrast to the Oromo social media activists, the news media, and international 
organizations, the Ethiopian government officials sought to defend its policy. That is, they 
admitted problems with ‘some officials” and they portrayed the policy as having no problem.  
For example, in his interview with EBC, Getachew Reda defended his government policy as a 
policy with no problem although some government officials did not deliver to the people. The 
following is how he defended the government policy: 
Of course, our policies are proven they are mettle, proven they are caliber…throughout 
the last 15 years but…frustrations here and there are manifestation of the kind of 
departure, some practices are taken from...what I said the renewal line is clearly spelt out 
15 years back. (EBC, 7 October 2016, 7: 14).  
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The officials also sought to defend government’s policies by comparing its government 
with other governments of African states. For example, in his two interviews on EBC on 7 
October 2016 and 11 September 2016, Getachew Reda compared the Ethiopian government with 
the governments of other African countries which he described as “predatory states.” The 
following is how he differentiated the Ethiopian state from African states:  
 EPRDF is not a quintessential predatory er African governments. What EPRDF er 
succeeded [in] in the last 20 years is to er create a state apparatus that is absolutely 
different. A clear departure from the traditional predatory Africans states, which uses [] 
the state power to in a manner that benefits the people at large. Not as a source patronage 
mechanism used to line the pockets of officials and their their their cronies. (EBC, 11 
September 2016, 4:06).  
In contrast to African states he characterized as “predatory states,” the Ethiopian state 
“has been very successful in creating state apparatus that is primarily driven by the need to 
protect the interests of the people” (EBC, 11 September 2016, 4:42). 
7.5 Summary 
As discussed in this chapter, government officials also highlighted the major themes 
emphasized by other actors but framed them differently. They stressed the cause of the problem 
as both internal and external factors. As internal factors, they emphasized economic and political 
grievances. On the economic grievance, the government officials attempted to frame the problem 
as caused by the fast-growing economy which led to unfulfilled expectations by the youth. On 
the political grievance, they framed it as an issue caused by a “few” governments officials. This 
contradicts other actors’ frames that accused the government as a system, not as a “few” 
officials. 
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Like other actors, government officials also highlighted the government response. But 
unlike other actors who framed it as violence against peaceful protesters, they highlighted the 
violence created by protesters. They magnified the attack of public properties by protesters. They 
framed their actions as a government duty to maintain peace and order. 
On the solution, the government officials focused mainly on addressing the economic 
grievance by growing the economy so that the people benefit from economic development. On 
the political grievance, they highlighted “deep reform” as the solution. “Deep reform” according 
to government officials refers to sticking to the ruling party’s “revolutionary democracy.” 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction  
This project aimed to discover the frames highlighted by media and non-media actors on 
the Oromo protest movement in Ethiopia. To be clear, it aimed at uncovering the major themes 
and their framing by the news media, activists, human rights organizations, and the Ethiopian 
government officials. The qualitative framing analysis was used to discover the meanings, 
concepts, themes, and frames of each actor to answer the following research questions: (1) What 
were the major themes of the international news media? (2) What were the major themes 
highlighted in social media posts by key Oromo activists? (3) What were the major themes of the 
human rights groups Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International?  (4) What were the major 
themes of the Ethiopian government officials? (5) How did the international news media frames 
compare with the frames of other actors (activists, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian 
government officials)? 
The data of the study were the texts of the news media (news reports, blogs, editorials, 
videos); social media messages of the Oromo protest activists; press statements and interview 
transcripts of the Ethiopian government officials; and reports and press releases of the human 
rights groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). 
This chapter has four sections.  The first section provides summaries of the findings of 
the analysis of the texts of each actor that was studied (answering research questions 1 – 4). The 
second section of the chapter presents the results of the study. It outlines the patterns of each 
theme and discusses the similarities and differences between and among the themes and their 
framing. It also discusses theoretical implications of these patterns (this answers research 
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question 5). The third section describes the limitations that may have a bearing on the study. The 
last section concludes the chapter by suggesting areas of future studies.    
8.2 Major Findings 
Analysis of the texts of each actor indicates that three themes dominated discourses about 
the Oromo protest movement. The themes each actor addressed are 1) causes of the protest (such 
as political, economic, and cultural grievances); 2) government response to the protests (typically 
framed as violence); and 3) and a call for action (for example, an end to the violence). The study 
revealed the similarities in how the actors framed those themes, especially on the grievance and 
violence frames. However, it also showed some disparities in how they framed themes, 
especially the government and the call for action theme. 
8.2.1 Major themes of the news media  
As indicated in Figure 12 below, the three major themes that dominated the international 
media’s discourse about Oromo protests—cause of the protests, government response to the 
protest, and a call for action—have several subthemes framed differently.   
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Figure 5 Themes of the International News Media Coverage of the Oromo Protests 
 
The news media framed the causes of the Oromo protest movement as a grievance. Three 
types of grievances were identified: economic, political, and historical. In their discussion about 
the economic grievances, the news media focused mainly on the immediate trigger of the protest, 
the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Masterplan, also known as the Masterplan. The 
Masterplan was framed as a “land grab,” a frame that also resonated well with the frame of the 
•Cause of the Protest
•Grievance
•Economic grievances
•Landgrab
•Impact
•Past experience
•Political grievances 
•Inequality
•Minority rule over majority rule
•Lack of democracy
•Historical grievances
•Past political grievance
•past economic grievance
•Response to the Protest
•Violence
•Killings
•Beatings
•Arrests
•Torture
•Call for Action
•Third-party Intervention
•Political intervention
•Economic intervention
•Justice
Major Themes of the International 
News Media
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Oromo protest movement activists. The news media also highlighted how the Masterplan would 
have affected the lives of the Oromo people by underscoring past experiences of the people who 
were displaced from their lands. Some media outlets also magnified how important the land is 
for the Oromo people. Furthermore, the news media highlighted grievances by putting Oromo 
grievances in historical contexts. The political grievances highlighted by the news media were 
inequality, minority rule over the majority, and lack of democracy. 
The news media also highlighted the theme of the government response to the protesters. 
They framed the government response as state violence against peaceful protesters. The news 
media used the violence frame to highlight different types of violence such as killings, beatings, 
arrests, and torture of protesters by government security forces. 
In the theme of call to action, the news media highlighted the need to end government 
violence against peaceful protesters. They called for an investigation into the violence, which 
they framed as justice. In addition to the investigation, some news media also called for third-
party intervention, which involves calling on others to pressure the Ethiopian government to end 
the violence. For example, The Washington Post in its three editorials called for the United 
States and the European Union to use the economic and diplomatic clout they have on Ethiopia 
to end the violence.  
8.2.2 Major themes of the Oromo activists’ social media messages 
Analysis of social media (Facebook) posts of the Oromo social media activists indicated 
that three major themes—causes of the protest movement, government response to the protest, 
and call for action—were highlighted. Oromo activists framed the causes of the protest as a 
grievance. As Table 7 below shows, Oromo activists highlighted three main grievances: political, 
economic, and violent. They used political grievances to highlight administrative issues (e.g., 
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self-rule); democracy (e.g., freedom of the press and freedom of religion); and rights (e.g., 
human rights and language and identity). They used the economic grievance frame to emphasize 
the masterplan and its possible consequences such as displacement of Oromo farmers from their 
ancestral lands, and environmental issues. And they used the violent grievance frame to portray 
the government as unjustly violent against innocent Oromo people, causing the need to rise up in 
protest. 
In the government response theme highlighted by the Oromo activists, they highlighted 
different types of government violence against Oromos, such as killings, arrests, torture, and 
disappearance of protesters. Activists used the news media, human rights groups (Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch), and sometimes their “anonymous” sources as a source 
of information about these types of violence.  
The call for action was also a major theme highlighted by the Oromo social media 
activists. The activists called on both the government officials, third-party intervention, and the 
protesters themselves. They called on the government to address their demands, i.e., address their 
political and economic demands. They also demanded an end to violence they highlighted such 
as killings, arrests, torture, and disappearing of activists. The Oromo activists also called on their 
fellow protesters to continue the protest. The protest was used not just as an expression of 
disapproval of the government policy but also as a means to an end, i.e., to put pressure on the 
government to address their demands. For example, in their discussion about Feyisa Lilesa’s 
gesture at the Rio Olympics, they highlighted its significance in telling the world about the 
protest and its impact on the government. Activists also encouraged more protests; praised those 
who protested as “heroes”; and paid homage to those who lost their lives as “martyrs.” So, the 
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call for action theme was not only aimed at ending the violence against the protesters but also 
answering the major economic and political demands (grievances that caused the protests). 
 
Table 7 Summary of the Themes of Oromo Activists 
 
Causes (Grievances) Government Response 
(Violence) 
Call for Action  
• Political Grievances 
• Administrative (e.g. self-rule),  
• Democracy (e.g., freedom of 
the press, freedom of religion),  
• Rights-oriented (e.g., human 
rights, language and identity)   
• Economic grievances (landgrab,  
• Environmental issues) 
• Grievances related to state violence 
 
• Killings; 
• Beatings,  
• Arrests, 
• Torture,  
• Disappearances 
 
• Call for more protests 
• Call on others (third 
party for justice) 
• Call on the government 
to address their 
demands  
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8.2.3 Major themes of the human rights groups 
Human rights groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) emphasized 
three major themes: the causes of the protest, government response to the protest, and calls for 
action. As Table 8 below shows, each major theme has several subthemes framed differently. 
Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International portrayed the cause of the protest as a 
grievance. As the following figure shows, Human Rights Watch used the grievance frame to 
highlight both political and historical issues as major causes, while Amnesty International 
emphasized the economic aspect, especially the masterplan.  
Table 8 Summary of the Themes of International Human Rights Groups 
 
Human Rights Watch                Amnesty International 
• Causes of the Protests (Grievances) 
o Historical Grievances 
o Political Grievances 
o Chain of Causes 
• Government Response (Violence) 
o Impact of the violence 
o Violation of international law 
o Violations of rights 
• Solution 
o End the violence 
o Investigate  
-  Justice 
-  Accountability 
• Third-Party Intervention 
- Use of diplomacy 
- Use of aid money  
 
 
• Cause of the Protest (grievances) 
o Economic grievance 
• Government Response to the Protests (violence 
grievances) 
o Level of violence 
o Manner of violence 
o Made-up allegations 
• Solution  
o End the violence 
o Change laws 
o Investigate 
- Truth and accountability 
- Independent and impartial investigation 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlighted the ‘government response’ 
theme and framed it as violence against peaceful protestors. However, while the Human Rights 
Watch used the violence frame to highlight the impact of violence and describe the violation of 
international law and human rights, Amnesty International used the violence frame to talk about 
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different types of violence such as killings, arrests, torture, and disappearance. Amnesty 
International also blamed the government officials for “made-up allegations” against the 
protesters.  
The ‘call for action’ theme was highlighted by human rights organizations. They framed 
the needed action as the government serving justice to the victims of the government violence. 
They called for an end to violence and an investigation into the violence. 
8.2.4 Major themes of government officials  
Like all other actors, analysis of the government officials’ reports and interview 
transcripts also yielded three major themes—causes of the protest, government response, and call 
for action. The government officials linked the cause of the protests to internal and external 
factors. They portrayed the internal factor as a grievance due to “unmet frustration” on the part 
of the youth on political and economic spheres. The government officials framed the political 
and economic grievances differently from other actors. That is, unlike other actors who framed 
political grievance as caused by the government system, the government officials framed it as a 
problem of “good governance,” such as corruption by “a few” government officials, not the 
whole system of the government. Likewise, they framed the economic grievance, not in 
connection with the land grab, but portrayed it regarding the fruits of the development not 
trickling down to the youth. In other words, the government boasts of its economic achievement 
but regrets its inability to enable the youth to receive the benefit of it.  
The external factors the government officials wanted to associate with the cause of the 
protest were the diaspora-based Ethiopians, opposition parties, and foreign governments, who 
want to change the government by force. According to the government officials, the diaspora-
based Ethiopians and opposition parties wanted to overthrow the government through violence to 
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take the state power. However, it also accused foreign governments of inciting a takeover, 
specifically Eritrea with which it fought a border war, and Egypt, which for geopolitical reasons 
wants to maintain its share of water from the Nile River, where it gets 85% of its water from 
tributaries in Ethiopia.  
The theme that received significant attention was the government officials’ response to 
the Oromo protests. The government officials highlighted violence by the protesters and 
characterized the response by the government security forces as a measure taken to defend 
citizens and government institutions against violent protesters. A solution was also highlighted in 
the government reports and interview transcripts. The solution suggested by the government 
officials was “deep reform,” which means adhering to the revolutionary democracy.  
8.2.5 How did the frames of all actors compare?  
As the discussion in the preceding paragraphs indicate, all actors—the news media, 
Oromo activists, the human rights organizations, and the government officials highlighted the 
basic themes of 1) causes of the protest (problem), 2) the government response, and 3) a call for 
action (solution). In answering the last research question (number five), this section (8.2.5) 
describes similarities and differences of the major themes and their frames. The following 
section (8.3) will then discuss theoretical explanations for the similarities and differences in 
framing of the themes, according to scholarly literature. It particularly focuses on why the news 
media’s framing of the themes was congruent with activists and human rights groups while it 
was not generally congruent with the government’s framing.  
8.2.5.1 Similarities and differences of themes and their frames.  
As Table 9 below shows, the findings indicate that some themes, especially those 
highlighted by the news media, were congruent with the themes highlighted by the Oromo social 
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media activists and human rights groups. The government was the outlier in terms of not having 
its frames supported and reflected by other actors in most cases. Regarding the cause of the 
protest, all actors except Amnesty International (AI) highlighted political grievances while the 
news media and Human Rights Watch (HRW) emphasized historical grievances and the chain of 
causes as well. Chain of causes refers to the grievances caused by security forces’ response to 
past protests such as killings and detention. For example, the killings and arrests of protesters 
who went out to the streets to protest the masterplan will become another cause for the next 
protests.   
In discussing the government’s response to the protests, all actors (besides the 
government officials) portrayed it as government violence against protesters by highlighting the 
killings, mass arrests, beatings, and tortures by the security forces. The government officials, by 
contrast, justified their response as a duty to maintain peace and security, the government also 
emphasized its duty to protect citizens from the violence by the protesters and different forces 
who wanted to overthrow the government and others who wish to disturb the peace and security 
of the country (for geopolitical reasons).  
 
Table 9 Similarities and Differences of the Major Themes by Actors 
 Major Themes 
Cause of the protest  Government 
response  
Calls for action  
News media Grievances 
- Political 
- Economic 
- Historical 
Violence 
- Killings 
- Arrests 
- Torture 
- Disappearances 
End to violence 
- Investigation into 
the violence 
- Third-party 
intervention 
 
Oromo activists  Grievance 
- Political 
- Economic 
- Ongoing state violence  
Violence 
- Killings 
- Arrests 
- Torture 
End to violence 
- Address the 
political & 
economic demands 
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The calls for action by the news media, human rights groups, and activists all aimed at 
ending the violence against the protesters. They called for an investigation for justice and third-
party intervention to pressure the Ethiopian government to stop the violence. Activists also called 
upon the government to answer their economic and political demands, not just to stop the 
violence against protesters. While the news media and human rights groups called on the 
Ethiopian government and international countries such as the United Nations, European Union, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom to get involved, Oromo activists additionally called 
on the Oromo people to keep protesting. 
The protest dynamic of framing and counter-framing between Oromo activists and the 
government is interesting, as Oromo activists and the government officials framed their issues in 
different ways, not surprisingly. The first has to with the emphasis each gave to grievances. 
While Oromo activists highlighted many aspects of the grievance frame (political, economic, 
- Disappearances - Third-party 
intervention 
- More protests 
Human Rights Watch  Grievance 
- Political 
- Historical 
Violence  
- Killings 
- Arrests 
- Torture 
- Disappearances  
End to violence 
- Investigation into 
the violence 
- Third-party 
intervention 
 
Amnesty 
International  
Grievance  
- Economic 
Violence 
- Killings 
- Arrests 
- Torture 
- Disappearances 
 
End to violence 
- Investigation into 
the violence  
- Third-party 
intervention 
Government officials  Grievance 
- Economic (inequality) 
- Political (corruption by 
some gov’t officials) 
Protesters are 
violent. Gov’t 
duty to maintain 
peace and safety 
of the citizens 
and gov’t 
institutions 
“Deep reform” and 
grow economy 
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rights violations, environmental issues, language and identity), the government emphasized 
mainly just the political and economic grievances issues, admitting to some problems but making 
them less severe and comprehensive. 
The second framing dynamic between Oromo activists and government officials concerns 
how each framed the government—the target of the protest. The activists framed the whole 
government structure as a culprit. But the government officials counter-framed this using two 
framing strategies: defensive and externalizing. They defended the government structure by 
portraying the culprit as a “few” officials who did not conform to the government policy and 
ideology of the developmental state revolutionary democracy. They used the externalizing frame 
strategy on the whole protest by portraying the protests as being manipulated by external forces 
who have a hidden agenda. As discussed in chapter 7, the foreign countries are mainly Egypt and 
Eritrea, whom they accused of wanting to destabilize Ethiopia for geopolitical reasons, and the 
Ethiopian opposition political parties, whom they blamed for wanting a short-cut to the 
government power. It contradicts the activists’ frame that portrayed the protests as a protest by 
the Oromo people, for example, by using the hashtags #OromoProtests and #OromoRevolution.   
The third dynamic relates to using the same issue to put the blame on each other. For 
example, Oromo activists and government officials did not deny the existence of violence, but 
they blamed each other for it. While activists used the violence frame to highlight government 
actions such as killing, beatings, mass arrests, and tortures of the protesters and Oromo people 
more broadly, the government used the same frame to blame the protesters by highlighting road 
blockades and attacks on government facilities. Even for the violence to which they admitted, the 
government officials tried to justify it as a duty to maintain peace and security.  
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Both the international news media and human rights groups seem to reflect and support 
many collective actions frames of Oromo activists, which the government officials did not. The 
media and human rights groups reinforced the grievance frame of the cause of the protest and 
counteracted the government claims in some cases. For example, in countering the government 
officials’ frame of externalizing the cause of the protest, the Washington Post in its Editorial 
Board wrote:  
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn blamed ‘anti-peace forces,’ and ‘foreign enemies’ 
whom he claimed are trying to destabilize Ethiopia. But attempts to point to foes abroad 
masks the truth that unrest is being fueled by a deep sense of anger at home. (2016, 
October 11, para. 4). 
The Washington Post framed the “anger” as economic (land), political, and violence against the 
protesters by the government officials saying, “anger over plans for reallocating their land, 
political disenfranchisement and detention of opposition activists” (para. 2). This contradicts the 
government officials’ frame of the masterplan as a “coverup,” political, and as a “hidden agenda 
of external forces.” Human rights organizations also counter-framed the government officials’ 
use of the externalizing frame to accuse the protesters of being manipulated by others who have a 
hidden agenda. In its article on 18 December 2015 Human Rights Watch quoted Lefkow (2015), 
deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch as saying: “the government’s labeling of largely 
peaceful protesters as terrorists and deploying military forces is a very dangerous escalation of 
this volatile situation” (para. 3)  
The news media and human rights groups also reinforced activists’ violence frame of the 
government action. For example, as the analysis in chapter 4 shows, the Washington Post in the 
title: “Ethiopia meets protests with bullets” (2016, October 11) highlighted the government 
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officials’ violence by suggesting the perpetrator (the government), the victims (protests), and the 
means of violence (bullets). Similarly, Human Rights Watch carried the title “Yet Again, a 
Bloody Crackdown on Protests in Ethiopia” (2015, December 5). Amnesty International also 
counter-framed government claims of use of the law to maintain peace and security. For 
example, in the article published on 2 June 2016, it carried a title, “End use of counter-terrorism 
law to persecute dissenters and opposition political members” by highlighting the need for a call 
for action. 
There are also visible supportive frame dynamics between Oromo activists and the 
international news media and international human rights groups, especially on how they framed 
the call for action theme. Both the international news media and human rights groups 
emphasized an end to the state violence as the main goal. But Oromo activists went beyond just 
an end to the violence call and demanded the government address grievances that caused that 
triggered the protests in the first place. The international news media (especially op-eds and 
opinions piece) called for a third-party intervention aimed at ending the state violence and 
bringing justice to the victims of the violence through economic (e.g., cutting aid) and diplomatic 
means. Unlike Oromo activists who also demanded economic justice as a solution, the 
international news media and human rights groups focused primarily on the human rights aspects 
of the grievance.   
8.2.5.2 Political explanation of similarities and differences of media and activist frames 
As discussed in chapter two, the Western media give little coverage to issues in Africa, 
and when they do, they focus on areas where the Western countries have interests. So, it is no 
wonder that the protests in Ethiopia have received wide coverage from the Western media. The 
Western countries, especially the United States and Europe have geopolitical interests in 
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Ethiopia. Ethiopia is the ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism and peacekeeping 
missions in Africa (Shinn, 2013). These countries have cooperation on intelligence, and Ethiopia 
allowed the United States to use its territories to launch drone attacks against terrorist bases in 
Somalia (Shinn, 2013; Gettleman, 2016). In return, the United States provides Ethiopia’s military 
with funds for training and equipment (Shinn, 2013). Likewise, Ethiopia has a strong relationship 
with the EU countries. In addition to the war on terrorism in Somalia, the EU countries need 
Ethiopia to help with African refugees that cross into Europe, most of them from the Horn of 
Africa including Ethiopia. As a result, The EU supports Ethiopia with financial aid (Toga, 2014).  
Hence, what explains the Western news media’s framing that was supportive of Oromo 
activists and human rights organizations’ frames might be a shift in the Western countries’ 
policies towards Ethiopia that favors the protestors. For example, on June 28, 2016, 19 U.S. 
lawmakers issued a Resolution titled: “Supporting respect for human rights and encouraging 
inclusive governance in Ethiopia.” The Resolution highlighted different human rights abuses by 
the Ethiopian government, which they suggested contradicted with one of the United States core 
policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: “… to advance peace and security, including supporting 
sector reform.” (p. 2). Different high-level United States government and EU officials also 
publicly expressed their concern about the human abuses in Ethiopia. For example, Samantha 
Power, the United States Representative to the United Nations on October 18, 2016 put up a 
tweet that says: “#Ethiopia must end crckdwn on peaceful oppo. Mass arrests, incl rearresting 
Blen Mesfin, show cont'd backslide on rts & are self-defeating.” The news media and social 
media users of Oromo activists widely quoted this tweet and other statements by officials of the 
United States and the European Union.  
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The reason the news media’s coverage of the Oromo protests was congruent with the 
preferred frames of the Oromo protests might also explain the media’s frame congruence with 
the human rights organizations (who were supportive of the local activists in Oromo). However, 
since the literature on the link among the news media, human rights organizations, and grassroots 
activists is sparse, future studies might be needed to expound on this dynamic.   
8.3 Discussion  
To round out an explanation of research question five, this section discusses the 
implication of the findings in the context of media studies and social movement framing 
scholarship. It also makes some theoretical propositions for future studies. 
8.3.1 News media and Oromo activists  
The findings of the study support existing scholarly arguments for example, by 
Klandermans (2014) and Gamson and Wolfsfeld (2001), that the news media covers the 
existence of social movements, sets a stage for collective action, provides definitions and 
interpretations, and takes part in the creation of the situations. That is, the news media covered 
the existence of the Oromo protests by making them the headlines of their news stories. They 
also set stages for collective action by framing the issue (causes of the problem and solutions). 
Furthermore, some news media provided broad historical contexts to the Oromo people’s 
struggle for freedom in general and the 2015-2016 protests in particular. 
The findings on the news media and Oromo activists support previous studies on the 
relationship between social movements and the media. For example, Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
(2001) pointed out that protest activists use the media for validation, mobilization, and scope 
enlargement. The Oromo social media activists not only shared the media that covered the 
Oromo protest movement, they also took it as evidence that the world was paying attention to 
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their protests. Some activists listed the media outlets that gave coverage to the protests. Others 
added their commentaries by highlighting the idea in the news media that resonated with their 
views.  
The findings on the news media and Oromo social media activists also concur with 
previous research evidence that suggests media and protest movements are engaged in a 
“struggle over framing” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 2001), as media framing and protesters’ issues 
framing do not always match, as argued by Ryan (2001) and Undrakhbuyan (2001). For 
example, as discussed in chapter 6, there were times when Oromo social media activists 
complained about the misrepresentations of issues related to the Oromo protest movement. Some 
activists contested the new media’s framing of the causes of the deaths of protesters; others 
disputed the choice of words used to describe the death of Oromo protesters (e.g., stampede vs. 
massacre regarding the death at Irrecha), and even the number of deaths.  For example, in his 
Facebook post on October 2, 2016, Ararssa (2016n), one of the Oromo activists, wrote the 
following: 
So frustrating to listen to the hesitation and the all-too-odd non-committal posture of 
foreign journalists in covering Oromo/Ethiopian affairs. Part of it could be explained by 
the barrier (political, linguistic, and physical) between them and the sites where the 
events take place. Part of it is the result of the fear and self-censorship among their 
'informants' close to the event for fear of being arrested, tortured, or even killed by the 
regime. Part of it is their deranged sense of history. But part of it is from their liberal 
fantasy of achieving journalistic 'objectivity' and 'balance' in an environment that is so 
unfair and asymmetrical in every imaginable respect. The result is this annoying level of 
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inaccuracy, distortion, undervaluation or ignoring of weighty events/facts/incidents, 
decontextualization, and/or misinterpretation. 
The literature on media framing of social movements suggests association between the 
news media and social movements’ framing congruence and mobilization efforts (Cooper, 2002). 
But this dissertation did not look at whether the framing contest between the news media and 
Oromo activists on some issues did affect the Oromo protesters’ mobilization. As discussed in 
the preceding section, the major frames of the news media were congruent with the frames of the 
Oromo activists.  
The findings on Oromo social media activists also concur with existing literature on 
social movements’ “collective action” framing of issues. The three types of collective action 
frames identified by Snow & Benford, (1988)—diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
frames—were highlighted by the Oromo social media activists and often by the news media. 
According to Snow and Benford (1988) the diagnostic frame of social movements “involves 
identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” (p. 200). The cause of the 
protest theme highlighted by the news media fits this type of framing. As discussed in the 
analysis part (chapter 4) and summary of the findings in the preceding section, the news media 
identified the triggers (causes of the Oromo protests), which they framed as grievances. These 
grievances include political, economic, and historical grievances. The news media attributed the 
political grievance of the Oromo protest movement to inequality, minority rule over the majority 
rule, and lack of democracy. Some news media highlighted the 2015 parliamentary election in 
which the ruling party won 100%. They make the government officials mainly responsible for 
the politically motivated arrest of journalists and opposition political leaders. Likewise, the news 
media also attributed the economic grievances of the Oromo people to policies such as land use.   
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The news media was also involved in prognostic framing. Prognostic framing involves 
“the articulation of proposed solutions to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, or and the 
strategies for carrying out the plan” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). The news media suggested 
solutions to the problems. Under the “call for action theme” in this study, the news media called 
for an end to violence. As a strategy, instead of calling on the Ethiopian government, the main 
culprit of the violence, the news media called for a third-party intervention. For example, CNN, 
on its opinion piece called on the United States to stop its diplomatic and economic support to 
Ethiopia, suggesting it would help solve the problems. Similarly, The Washington Post in its 
editorials called on the United States and the United Kingdom to stop supporting the Ethiopian 
government through financial aid.  
The news media also engaged in motivational framing which, according to Benford and 
Snow (2000), aimed at providing “‘call to arms’ or rationale for engaging in ameliorative 
collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” (p. 617). The 
motives were reflected in justice and equality frames which might emanate from news media’s 
tendency to focus on human rights issues and promote democratic values. The news media used 
the violence frame under the “government response.” As indicated in chapter 4, they used 
different terms to describe the types of violence such as killings, tortures, forced disappearance, 
and arbitrary arrests to describe the violence as the violation of human rights.    
As discussed in Section 8.2.5.1, the international news media collective action frames 
were supportive of the collective action frames of Oromo activists. In the cause of the protest 
theme, they engaged in collective diagnostic (problem) framing by focusing on the political, 
economic, and historical grievances. This was reflected not just in how they framed the 
collective action frames of the Oromo protests but also on how they counter-framed the 
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government officials’ frames when they were not congruent with activists’ frames. In prognostic 
(solution) framing, the news media highlighted an end to violence by demanding justice.  In the 
motivational framing of human rights violations, they portrayed the government as unjust toward 
innocent people.  
However, it is important to note that there were differences in emphasis on some frames. 
For example, in the call for action theme, the news media did not include one of the solutions 
demanded by the protesters. That is, the solution of the news media focused on a halt to the state-
violence, while the protesters' solutions also included the demand to solve political and economic 
issues that caused the protests in the first place. In other words, while the media focused more on 
immediate human rights abuses during the protests, the protesters stuck to their original demands 
as well that preceded the protests. This focus on public violence during protests might be 
explained by the news media’s tendency to focus more on episodic coverage of news than the 
thematic coverage (Iyengar 1991; Amenta, Gharrity, Gardner, Tierney, Yerena, & Elliot, 2012, 
p. 89).   
The findings also do not support that results of previous studies on the Western media 
coverage of Africa. For example, previous studies suggested that the Western media coverage of 
Africa were influenced by stereotypical tribalism (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; McGulty 1999) or by 
colonial stereotypes (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; Vladisavljevic, 2015). ). Ethiopia is a multinational 
and multilinguistic country with more than 80 different groups. It is not only a country where 
Muslims and Christians live together, but it shares borders with many countries in East Africa 
such as Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Ethnicity, tribalism, and religion are causes of 
conflict. Furthermore, it is in the region where the terrorist groups like Al-Shabab operate. 
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However, the Western media analyzed in this study of the Oromo protests did not use 
ethnicity, tribalism, and religion frames which characterize most of their coverage of Africa. 
Ethiopia's uniqueness as the only African country that did not fall under the Western 
colonization may explain why the Western news media did not use the stereotypical tribalism or 
colonial stereotypes. 
8.3.2 Human rights groups  
Like the news media, similar patterns also emerged in the texts of human rights groups—
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. That is, causes of the protest, violent response 
by the government, and call for action dominated the texts produced by these actors. However, 
there was a slight difference in how these actors framed the themes. For example, all of them 
framed the causes of the protests as a grievance. That is, while the news media frames 
highlighted three types of grievances (economic, political, and historical grievances), Human 
Rights Watch focused on the economic and political, and Amnesty International focused on the 
economic grievance only. The disparities in emphasis on framing grievances among actors may 
have to be studied in the future. 
Human rights groups also framed the Oromo protest movement in a way that fits the 
Snow and Benford (1988) elements of collective action framing —diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing. They focused on the causes of the problem being various grievances 
(diagnostic framing) and solutions or a call for an end to the violence and investigation into 
rights abuses and third-party intervention (prognostic framing), and emphasis on violence, 
highlighting it as a violation of human rights (motivational framing).  
The findings also reveal a symbiotic relationship between human rights groups and 
grassroot activists and the media. For example, the news media and Oromo activists used human 
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rights groups as sources of information and vice versa. Whether actors' use of each other as a 
source of information explains the similarity of themes was beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
But the sharing of information between the news media and activists may be explained by 
Gamson and Wolfsfeld’s (1993) assertion that the media-movement relationship is characterized 
by interdependence in which both need each other. That is, the news media help social 
movements for “mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement” while social movements 
provide news media with “drama, conflict, and action; colorful copy; and photo opportunities” 
(p. 116 - 117). 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have indicated the growing interdependence between 
the news media and NGOs such as human rights groups. The changing political economy of the 
news media and the desire of the human rights groups to get their stories out in the news media 
makes this relationship a necessity. As indicated in this study, the fact that both international 
news media and human rights organizations engaged in collective actions frames that somehow 
reflect that of activists may also show the existence of the interdependent relationship among the 
three actors. The news media and human rights organizations can be allies for grassroots 
democratic activist groups. 
8.3.3 Government Officials  
As indicated in Section 8.2.4, the Ethiopian government officials constructed their 
version of reality which fits scholarly arguments that both social movements and government 
officials are “signifying” agents engaged in meaning construction (Noakes, 2005). The findings 
also prove the suggestion by Benford and Snow (2000), McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), 
Noakes, (2005), and Zald (1996) that collective action frames are a contested arena of framing 
and counter-framing an issue.  For example, the government officials counter-framed the 
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masterplan, which activists framed as a “landgrab,” and as a “development project” plan aimed 
at connecting Addis Ababa with surrounding cities and towns Oromia through infrastructures.  
Government officials and Oromo activists used different counter-framing techniques 
identified by scholars in previous studies. They used the “discrediting frame” technique 
identified by Boscarino (2016). Oromo activists used this technique to portray the government 
officials’ “development project” frame as a “landgrab” aimed at selling their lands to foreign 
investors. The government also used the “discrediting frame” to counter-frame activists’ 
“inequality” frame of the economic grievance. For instance, Getachew Reda, the minister of the 
Government Communications Affairs Office counter-framed saying “real and perceived 
inequality,” questioning the accuracy of the claims and at the same time suggesting that it was 
exaggerated.  
Both the government officials and Oromo activists used three framing techniques 
(“polarization-vilification,” “framing saving,” and “frame debunking”) identified by McCaffrey 
and Keys (2000). Activists used the “polarization-vilification” frame to describe the protest as 
the opposition to the government project (the masterplan), as the war between the Oromo people 
on the one side, and the TPLF-led Ethiopian government on the other side. But the government 
officials counter-framed this by portraying the opposition to the master plan between the 
government (not the TPLF) and external forces who have a hidden agenda.   
Oromo activists also used the “frame-debunking” strategy to make the government 
official’s frame of the masterplan look negative. They debunked the government “development 
project” frame of the masterplan with “the master plan is master killer” slogan. While the 
government officials framed opposition to the “development project” as a few misinformed 
people who did not understand its purpose, the protesters framed it as opposition by millions of 
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people. This was reflected in their use of different hashtags such as “#GrandOromiaRally,” 
#OromoProtests, and #OromoRevolution. 
The government officials’ framing of issues related to the Oromo protest movement 
conforms to Benford and Snow’s (2000) assertion that actors cannot “construct and impose on 
their intended targets any version of reality they would like” because they may face counter-
framing by those targets (p.625). It is worth noting that the findings suggest that the counter-
framing of issues by government officials mainly focused on the diagnostic and prognostic 
frames of collective action and not the motivational frames. It conforms to the arguments made 
by Benford and Snow (2000) that opponents of social movements (the government officials in 
this case) challenge mainly the diagnostic and prognostic collective action frames.  
8.4 Conclusions  
This project shed some lights on the discourses by media and non-media actors 
surrounding the Oromo protest movement. It used the qualitative framing analysis to identify the 
themes highlighted by these actors and the resulting broad categories (cause of the protest, 
government response to the protest, and call for action). Hence, from the findings, the following 
summary can be made:    
1. The news media described the Oromo protest movement as an expression of 
grievances (economic, political, and historical) that was met with state violence 
(killings, beatings, arrests, and torture) that needs some intervention (third-party 
intervention) to stop the violence against the protesters or to also address their 
ongoing issues with government oppression of Oromo people. 
2. The Oromo activists described the Oromo protest movement as an expression of 
grievances (economic, political, and historical) that was met with state violence 
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(killings, beatings, arrests, and torture) that needs some intervention (third-party 
intervention + further protests by the movement against the government) to address 
them. 
3. The human rights groups (Human rights Watch and Amnesty International) described 
the Oromo protest movement as an expression of grievances (political and economic) 
that was met with state violence (killings, beatings, arrests, and torture) that needs 
some intervention (third-party intervention) to stop the violence against the protesters.   
4. The government officials described the Oromo protest movement as an expression of 
grievances (economic and political) that led to violence by the protesters (killing of 
members of security forces and damaging of properties) that needed some 
intervention by the government 1) to maintain peace and stability, and 2) to address 
protesters’ grievance through “deep reform” and the acceleration of economic 
growth.   
In conclusion, the findings fit with social movement framing literature that actors in 
social movements are “signifying” agents engaged in collective actions frames—diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational frames. Like the news media, human rights organizations are also 
involved in constructing collective action frames. Both the news media and human rights 
organizations engaged in collective action frames that reflected the collection frames of social 
movement activists, although at times there were frame contestations, especially between the 
news media and activists. However, government officials engaged in counter-framing the frames 
of the three actors—activists, news media, and human rights groups. 
The results of the study also concur with literature that social movement activists need 
news media for validation, mobilization, and scope enlargement. It also conforms to previous 
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studies on social media (e.g., Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec, 2017; Royas & Davis, 2017; & 
Moscato, 2015)  who characterized social media as a forum where activists organize social 
movements for mobilization, motivation, and scope enlargement, a role previously dominated by 
traditional media, but also as a vital framing tool.  
This study also indicates the different ways activists use social media by posting links to 
content (news articles, videos, and pictures) of online news media and human rights 
organizations’ documents by sharing them on their Facebook pages. The activists whose 
Facebook posts I studied do this for different reasons such as to give the impression that “the 
whole world is watching us,” when the news media and human rights organizations give 
favorable coverages to their causes, or to challenge them when they frame their causes in 
unfavorable ways.   
This study which focused on protests in Ethiopia did not find evidence that supports 
previous findings that suggested stereotypical tribalism and colonial stereotype influenced the 
Western media’s characterization of conflict in Africa. This is perhaps because of Ethiopia’s 
uniqueness for being one of the two African countries that was not colonized. 
 
8.5 Limitations of the Study 
The project shed some lights on the themes highlighted by each actor and the interaction 
among the actors. It uncovered similarities and differences of themes and the frames underscored 
by each actor. However, it is also worth mentioning the limitations of the study.  
First, this project analyzed the messages of each actor. Although different aspects of 
social movements and the link between social movements and the media could be studied, this 
study focused only on themes and how those themes were framed. It did not examine, for 
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example, the type of media the protesters used, how they used them, and why, or their 
motivations for selecting different media. It rather studied messages, their themes and how those 
themes were framed. Also, as this project aims only at understanding the themes and their 
frames, not their impacts; it did not conduct audience analysis, nor did it assess achievement of 
goals by movement actors.  
Second, the study was limited in scope. Although there were protests across Ethiopia, 
mainly in Oromia and Amhara regions, the project focused on protests in Oromia only. So, the 
results of the study should not be generalized to protests, news media, social media activists, 
human rights groups and government officials in the world, or even in Ethiopia.  
Third, this project looked at texts only. That is, it analyzed publicly available Facebook 
posts, news stories, reports, press releases, and government officials’ public statements. It did not 
conduct interviews with any actor, nor did it do an ethnographic study.  
Fourth, now the Oromo protests movement ended in victory. Some of the Oromo 
activists’ questions were addressed. The government leaders including the prime minister of the 
country were replaced by those who have wide acceptance among the people. Some government 
officials, including the director of the government communications affairs, whose statements 
were analyzed in this study, were fired.  Most Oromo social media activists, whose social media 
posts were studied for this project, are back home now. Tens of thousands of prisoners were 
released. Political dissidents who live in foreign countries have been allowed to return to their 
home countries. The ban on media outlets was lifted. The new leaders also promised more 
political reforms that address all the protests grievances. So, this project focused on materials 
produced before the changes. Thus, the results do not reflect the whole process of the protest 
movement, although one could surmise that the Oromo protests were effective, perhaps in part to 
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the strategic messages and the support they received from international media and human rights 
groups. 
Fifth, the project used a qualitative approach aimed at understanding a particular issue, 
the major themes highlighted by different actors. So, the result of the study should not be 
generalized to all movements in the world, various movements in Ethiopia, or even to Oromo 
protests that happened many years back.  
8.6 Areas of Future Study  
Based on the findings of the study, the following suggestions could be made on areas that 
need further study. First, future studies could benefit from adding in interviews for more in-depth 
analysis of the motivations involved and rationales for highlighting some themes by different 
actors. Second, future studies may also benefit from conducting an audience analysis, especially 
to understand the impact of both the themes covered by different actors and how those themes 
are represented. Studies so far focused on the interaction between media and social movements. 
Although other actors, particularly human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International were included, this project did not look at the cause-effect relationship 
between these actors and how the theme of one actor might have influenced the theme of another 
actor or variables involved. Therefore, focusing on these areas may also shed some lights on the 
role of human rights groups in not only covering social movements but in framing them. 
Third, as discussed in the foregoing section, the Oromo protest is now over with some 
degree of success. However, this project focused only on the protest itself rather than how it 
succeeded. So, further study on the evolution of the protest movement from start to the end, with 
success or failure, and of different actors’ (news media, social media activists, government 
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officials, and human rights groups) would further contribute to the literature on strategies for 
democratic social movements. 
In conclusion, this study uncovered that more actors are involved in shaping the discourse 
about social movements. That is, although scholars on social movements have so far typically 
limited their scope of study on the discourse of the social movements, the media, and the 
government officials, this study indicates that international human rights organizations play a 
key role as well. Gamson’s and Wolfsfeld’s (1993) concept of media-social movement 
independence should lead scholars to look into the existence and nature of interdependence 
among different actors, especially non-media actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations.   
For social movements activists, the findings of this study have significance. 
Understanding the supportive role of international human rights organizations may provide them 
with an additional instrument to devise communication.  
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